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Abstract 
This dissertation includes three essays of empirical asset pricing. In the first essay, The 
Value/Growth Anomaly and Hard to Value Firms, I show that combining quality signals (firm 
fundamentals) and hard to value measures increases the return spread between value and growth 
portfolios. A portfolio that is long high quality value firms that are hard to value and short low 
quality growth firms that are hard to value yields a 4-factor alpha of up to 1.41% per month. 
Second, ex-ante observed quality signals are better at predicting high performance and low 
performance growth stocks as compared to value stocks. This growth stock mispricing can be 
explained by extreme quality measures, and enhanced by focusing on hard to value growth firms.  
In the second essay, Using Maximum Drawdowns to Capture Tail Risk, I, along with my 
co-author Wesley R. Gray, propose the use of maximum drawdown, the maximum peak to 
trough loss across a time series of compounded returns, as a simple method to capture an element 
of risk unnoticed by linear factor models: tail risk. Unlike other tail-risk metrics, maximum 
drawdown is intuitive and easy-to-calculate. We look at maximum drawdowns to assess tail risks 
associated with market neutral strategies identified in the academic literature. Our evidence 
suggests that academic anomalies are not anomalous: all strategies endure large drawdowns at 
some point in the time series. Many of these losses would trigger margin calls and investor 
withdrawals, forcing an investor to liquidate.  
In the third essay, Analyzing Valuation Measures: A Performance Horse Race over the 
Past 40 Years, I, along with my co-author Wesley R. Gray, show that EBITDA/TEV has 
historically been the best performing valuation metric and outperforms many investor favorites 
such as price-to-earnings, free-cash-flow to total enterprise value, and book-to-market.  We also 
explore the investment potential of long-term valuation ratios, which replaces one-year earnings 
with an average of long-term earnings. In contrast to prior empirical work, we find that long-
term ratios add little investment value over standard one-year valuation metrics. 
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The Value/Growth Anomaly and Hard to Value Firms1 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Combining quality signals (firm fundamentals) and hard to value measures increases the 
return spread between value and growth portfolios. A portfolio that is long high quality value 
firms that are hard to value and short low quality growth firms that are hard to value yields a 4-
factor alpha of up to 1.41% per month. Second, ex-ante observed quality signals are better at 
predicting high performance and low performance growth stocks as compared to value stocks. 
This growth stock mispricing can be explained by extreme quality measures, and enhanced by 
focusing on hard to value growth firms. 
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Fama and French (1992) find that the market value of equity (size) and the ratio of the 
book value of a firm’s common equity to its size (B/M), and not beta, explain most of the 
variation in the cross-section of average stock returns. While some argue that the size effect has 
disappeared after 1980, Van Dijk (2011) claims that declaring the size effect has gone away is 
premature.2 However, the value (B/M) effect is a robust finding. A key question in asset pricing 
is whether the higher average returns associated with value stocks (high B/M), and the lower 
average returns earned by growth stocks (low B/M), are a compensation for risk, or a systematic 
mispricing.  Fama and French argue that B/M is a proxy for unobserved risk factors. Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) set the stage for an alternative to the risk-based argument: LSV 
present evidence that value stocks earn higher returns relative to growth stocks because investors 
make systematic errors in their expectations about the future profitability of extreme B/M firms, 
in other words, B/M (or similar price-based ratios) identifies mispricing, not risk. 
One way to test the mispricing hypothesis would be to look at signals about the quality of 
the firm and compare these to the price of the firm, similar to Piotroski and So (2012).  
Comparing the quality signal against the current price of the firm, one can attempt to ex ante 
measure an investor’s expectation error. Piotroski and So (2012) find “the mosaic of results 
suggests that the returns to traditional value/glamour strategies are an artifact of predictable 
expectation errors correlated with past financial data among a subset of contrarian value/glamour 
firms.” Similarly, Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) examine eleven well-documented 
anomalies. Specifically, they “explore previously documented differences in cross-sectional 
                                                 
2 Van Dijk (2011) summarizes the studies which claim the size effect has disappeared after 1980. 
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average returns that survive adjustment for exposures to the three factors defined by Fama and 
French (1993).” While these quality measures may proxy for risk, the literature claims these 
(twelve) measures are not fully explained by common risk factors. 
A simple example of a quality signal would be the accrual measure, as it has been shown 
that firms with high accruals earn lower returns on average than firms with low accruals (Sloan 
1996), and this spread in returns is not explained by common risk factors. A firm with a large 
amount of accruals (bad signal) and a high price relative to book value (growth firm) would be 
ex ante identified as having a high expectation error, as the price of the firm (high) is 
“incongruent” with the quality signal (low).  Similarly, a firm with a low price relative to book 
value (value firm) and low accruals (good signal) would be ex ante identified as having high 
expectation error, as the price of the firm (low) is “incongruent” with the quality signal (high).  
Alternatively, a firm with a low price relative to book value (value firm) with high accruals (bad 
signal) would be ex ante identified as having low investor expectation error, as the price of the 
firm (low) is “congruent” with the quality signal (low).  If mispricing drives the return spread 
between value and growth firm, it should be found mainly in firms where the quality signal is 
“incongruent” with the price of the firm. 
Piotroski and So (2012) test the mispricing hypothesis versus risk-based theory with the 
Piotroski “F-Score” (Piotroski 2000). The F-Score consists of accounting signals related to firm 
fundamentals, which are used to proxy for investor expectation errors. The authors create an 
“incongruent” portfolio that is long high quality value firms (high investor expectation errors) 
and short low quality growth firms (high investor expectation errors). They also create a 
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“congruent” portfolio that is long value and short growth firms with the lowest investor 
expectation errors. They find evidence that the incongruent portfolio generates all the mispricing, 
whereas, the congruent portfolio has no mispricing. The authors conclude that the spread 
between value and growth stocks is due to mispricing, which is indicative of behavioral biases. 
Some behavioral biases that may drive the underreaction to firm fundamentals could be  
anchoring or representativeness (Kahneman and Tversky 1974), as well as inattention to new 
signals (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009, Franzoni and Marin 2006, Cohen and Frazzini 2008, and 
Huberman and Regev 2001). 
If behavioral bias drives the Piotroski and So (2012) result, one testable implication is 
that firms in the incongruent portfolios that are susceptible to relatively larger behavioral bias 
should exhibit more extreme mispricing. Kumar (2009) finds empirical evidence using individual 
investor trade data that behavioral biases are higher when stocks are more difficult to value, or 
“hard to value.” I develop an empirical approach to test my hypothesis based on Kumar’s finding 
that harder to value firms accentuate investors’ behavioral biases (e.g., ambiguity aversion).  My 
first hypothesis is that the spread between value and growth firms will be strongest in a portfolio 
that is long high quality value firms (high expectation errors) that are hard to value, and short 
low quality growth firms (high expectation errors) that are hard to value.  To test this hypothesis, 
I use multiple measures that proxy for how difficult it is to value a firm.  The two main measures 
I use are idiosyncratic volatility and analyst dispersion, as a firm with more volatility and more 
differences of opinions may be harder to value.    
To address the first hypothesis, I look at a “super incongruent” portfolio that is long high 
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quality value firms that are hard to value, and short low quality growth firms that are hard to 
value.  The super incongruent portfolio accentuates the mispricing effects identified in the 
Piotroski and So (2012) incongruent portfolio. For example, the Piotroski and So incongruent 
portfolio (using the F-score as the quality measure) generates a 0.53% 4-factor alpha per month, 
while the super incongruent portfolio I develop generates a monthly 4-factor alpha of 1.19%. The 
evidence suggests that mispricing effects are enhanced by identifying firms which are most 
susceptible to underreaction to firm fundamentals (as proxied by firms that are hard to value). 
While the majority of the mispricing in the super incongruent portfolio comes from the short 
portfolio, limits to arbitrage cannot completely explain the super incongruent portfolio's 
outperformance relative to the incongruent portfolio.  
Second, I address another fundamental question regarding quality measures in the context 
of the value/growth anomaly: Do quality signals affect value firms and growth firms differently? 
An examination of quality signals across value and growth firms shows the quality signals in 
growth firms are more variable. Combined with evidence from Zhang (2006), which finds 
investors underreact more to information when there is more uncertainty, my second hypothesis 
is that the quality signals may have different effects on value and growth firms.  
The evidence suggests that there is an important distinction between value and growth 
stocks: quality signals have a better ability to separate winners from losers within growth stocks 
as compared to value stocks. This is indicative of mispricing (behavioral biases) with growth 
stocks. However, if behavioral biases affect all security prices, I should see an effect across all 
securities and not just growth stocks. To address this puzzle, I investigate the mispricing within 
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the growth portfolio and find the mispricing identified among growth stocks is concentrated in 
growth stocks with extreme quality measures (expectation errors). Additionally, I test if these 
extreme quality measures may proxy for the difficulty of valuing a firm. In support of this 
conjecture, the mispricing within growth firms is enhanced by sorting growth firms on hard to 
value signals. 
My empirical results are robust. I examine the Piotroski and So “F-Score” proxy for 
investor expectation errors, but also test 11 different quality metrics identified in the literature as 
proxies for investor expectation errors. I also look at a litany of hard to value proxies suggested 
in previous literature. The empirical results point in the same direction: the value/growth spread 
can be enhanced by focusing on firms that are hard to value.  Additionally, growth stock 
mispricing can be explained by extreme quality measures (expectation errors) as well as 
enhanced by firms that are hard to value. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 outlines the development of 
my hypotheses; Section 2 describes my data; Section 3 presents the results of my first 
hypothesis; Section 4 examines the results of my second hypothesis; Section 5 examines how 
hard to value firms affect the mispricing in growth portfolios; Section 6 presents my conclusions. 
 
  Hypothesis Development 
A key question in asset pricing is whether the spread between value and growth firms is a 
systematic mispricing, or a compensation for risk. Piotroski and So (2012) test the mispricing 
hypothesis versus risk-based theory with the Piotroski “F-Score” (Piotroski 2000). The F-Score 
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consists of 9 accounting signals related to firm fundamentals, which are used to proxy for 
investor expectation errors.3 For example, value firms with high F-score (high quality firms) 
have high expectation errors as the price (low) is incongruent with the quality (high). Value firms 
with low F-score (low quality firms) have low expectation errors as the price (low) is congruent 
with the quality (low). Similarly, growth firms (high price) with high F-score (high quality) have 
low expectation errors, while growth firms (high price) with low F-score (low quality) have high 
expectation errors.  
The authors create an “incongruent” portfolio, which goes long value firms with high 
expectation errors (high B/M, high F-Score), and goes short growth firms with high expectation 
errors (low B/M, low F-Score). Their “congruent” strategy goes long value firms with low 
expectation errors (high B/M, low F-Score) and short growth firms with low expectation errors 
(low B/M, high F-Score). Piotroski and So consider the incongruent strategy as a portfolio that 
captures the highest degree of mispricing; the congruent strategy captures the portfolio with the 
least amount of mispricing. The mispricing hypothesis suggests that the incongruent portfolio 
will produce positive alpha and the congruent portfolio will show no alpha. 
Consistent with the mispricing hypothesis predictions, the authors find evidence that the 
incongruent portfolio has alpha and the congruent portfolio does not. This indicates that investors 
systematically underreact to fundamentals about certain firms, as measured by a firm’s quality 
signal.  A select group of behavioral biases, such as representative bias and limited attention, 
drive investors’ underreaction to fundamentals. 
                                                 
3 The F-Score is built with nine 0/1 indicators that are summed together to give each firm a score between 0 and 9.  
An F-Score of 0 is the worst, while an F-Score of 9 is the best. 
14 
 
To explore the mispricing hypothesis further, I study how ambiguity aversion, or 
individuals preference for avoiding situations where the outcome is unknown (Ellsberg (1961)), 
can affect the value/growth puzzle. Firms with higher idiosyncratic volatility and more 
differences of opinions (measured by analyst dispersion) could be classified as firms whose 
futures are more ambiguous. In the finance literature, Zhang (2006) finds that the “the degree of 
incompleteness of the market reaction increases monotonically with the level of information 
uncertainty, suggesting that investors tend to underreact more to new information when there is 
more ambiguity with respect to its implications for firm value.” This is examined in the context 
of earnings revisions and the momentum strategy. A related paper by Kumar (2009) uses  
individual investor data to find that investors exhibit higher behavioral biases in firms that are 
harder to value. 
My first hypothesis combines the evidence from Zhang (2006) that investors underreact 
to information in firms which have more information uncertainty (ambiguity aversion), with the 
Piotroski and So (2012) result that investors systematically underreact to news in certain stocks 
(value firms with good fundamentals and growth firms with bad fundamentals). My first 
hypothesis is that mispricing effects will be enhanced in a “super-incongruent” portfolio. The 
super-incongruent portfolio should identify those securities where behavioral bias is highest. 
This portfolio is long value firms with high expectation errors that are hard to value (high B/M, 
high quality, hard to value). These high quality value firms that are hard to value (i.e., most 
ambiguous) are predicted to suffer from an even larger mispricing than the high quality value 
firms with that are easy to value (i.e., least ambiguous). The short portfolio contains growth 
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firms with high expectation errors that are hard to value (low B/M, low quality, hard to value). 
Similar to the logic with value firms, low quality growth firms that are hard to value are 
predicted to have more mispricing than low quality growth firms that are easy to value. In total, 
the super-incongruent portfolio that is long high quality value firms that are hard to value and 
short low quality growth firms that are hard to value is predicted to have larger mispricing than 
the Piotroski and So incongruent portfolio, which is long high quality value firms and short low 
quality growth firms. 
My second research hypothesis is that the quality signals (expectation error proxies) have 
different effects for value and growth firms. An examination of quality signals across value and 
growth firms shows the quality signals in growth firms are more variable (higher standard 
deviation). I want to test whether value and growth firms are influenced differently by investors’ 
behavioral biases. 
To test this hypothesis I develop an extension of the methodology used by Piotroski and 
So. Consider the Piotroski and So incongruent portfolio, defined as portfolio A, which has a 
positive expectation under the mispricing hypothesis:  
ܣ ൌ 	ܴሺݒ݈ܽݑ݁, ݄݄݅݃	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊	݁ݎݎ݋ݎݏሻ െ ܴሺ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄, ݄݄݅݃	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊	݁ݎݎ݋ݎݏሻ ൐ 0 
Piotroski and So confirm a positive and significant alpha estimate for portfolio A. 
B is defined as a portfolio which goes long value firms with low expectation errors, and 
short growth firms with high expectation errors. This portfolio is defined in the equation below: 
ܤ ൌ 	ܴሺݒ݈ܽݑ݁, ݈݋ݓ	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊	݁ݎݎ݋ݎݏሻ െ ܴሺ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄, ݄݄݅݃	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊	݁ݎݎ݋ݎݏሻ 
Under the empirical framework posed by Piotroski and So, the returns to A should be greater 
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than portfolio B, because portfolio A contains the mispriced value portfolio, whereas portfolio B 
does not.  This hypothesis (H2A) can be simplified into the following equation (the short 
portfolios cancel): 
ܪ2ܣ:	ܣ െ ܤ ൌ ܴሺݒ݈ܽݑ݁, ݄݄݅݃	݁ݔ݌	݁ݎݎ݋ݎݏሻ െ ܴሺݒ݈ܽݑ݁, ݈݋ݓ	݁ݔ݌	݁ݎݎ݋ݎݏሻ ൐ 0 
This portfolio is long value firms with high quality (high expectation errors) and short value 
firms with low quality (low expectation errors).  
C is defined as a portfolio which goes long value firms with high expectation errors, and 
short growth firms with low expectation errors.  Portfolio C is defined as follows: 
ܥ ൌ 	ܴሺݒ݈ܽݑ݁, ݄݄݅݃	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊	݁ݎݎ݋ݎݏሻ െ ܴሺ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄, ݈݋ݓ	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊	݁ݎݎ݋ݎݏሻ 
Under the mispricing hypothesis, the returns to A should be greater than portfolio C, because 
portfolio A is short the mispriced growth portfolio, whereas portfolio C is not. This prediction 
can be formalized (H2B) (the long portfolios cancel): 
ܪ2ܤ:	ܣ െ ܥ ൌ ܴሺ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄, ݈݋ݓ	݁ݔ݌	݁ݎݎ݋ݎݏሻ െ ܴሺ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄, ݄݄݅݃	݁ݔ݌	݁ݎݎ݋ݎݏሻ ൐ 0 
This portfolio is long high quality growth firms (low expectation errors) and short low quality 
growth firms (high expectation errors).  
 Piostroski and So (2012) do not focus on H2A and H2B, but focus on making a high level 
claim about the B/M anomaly.4 However, by analyzing these new testable predictions, specific 
                                                 
4 Piotroski and So (2012) test H2A and H2B in their Table 2, although they implement size-adjusted buy-and-hold 
returns over either 12 or 24 months and do not focus on these results or tests.  In contrast, I focus on calendar-time 
returns, which do not suffer from a failure to account for cross-sectional dependence among firm abnormal returns 
in event-time (Mitchell and Stafford (2000)).  Also, their sample includes microcap firms, which account for about 
52% of the firms, but only 2.6% of the total market capitalization as of June 30, 2011. Overall, the results in their 
paper are similar to mine, as they find a larger return spread between low and high quality growth firms as compared 
to low and high quality value firms. 
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claims can be made regarding how quality measures affect value and growth stocks. 
A simple example highlights the intuition of my empirical approach for hypothesis 2A 
and 2B: Consider firms A and B, which are selling at a B/M of 1.5. Expectations for firms A and 
B are low relative to firms selling at much lower B/Ms. As portrayed in the literature, both firm 
A and B are “value” stocks. Risk-based arguments would suggest firms A and B are exposed to 
similar unobservable risk factors. Mispricing-based arguments would suggest that firms A and B 
are undervalued because investors are too pessimistic about their future profitability. Consider 
the following additional information on firm A and B: Using simple accounting-based metrics 
the data ex-ante identify that firm A is financially distressed (highly levered and losing money) 
and firm B is financially stable (low leverage and earning profits). If the risk-based hypothesis is 
true, the returns to firm A and firm B should be similar to the returns on all value firms, holding 
constant other known factors (e.g., size and beta). On the other hand, if the mispricing argument 
holds, and investors are simply too pessimistic, firm B, which is a higher quality firm selling at a 
B/M of 1.5, should outperform firm A, which is also selling at a B/M of 1.5, but is a lower 
quality firm. 
 
  Data 
My data sample includes all firms on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ firms with the required data on CRSP and Compustat. 
The data extend over the time period from July 1, 1976 until December 31,  2012.  The sample 
includes firms with ordinary common equity on CRSP and eliminates all REITS, ADRS, closed-
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end funds, and financial firms.  I/B/E/S data is used to compute analyst dispersion.  CRSP 
delisting return data is incorporated into the sample using the technique of Beaver, McNichols, 
and Price (2007).  As per the evidence in Beaver, McNichols, and Price, the choice of delisting 
algorithm might be marginal when assessing market returns, but using their more comprehensive 
delisting algorithm is very important in the context of assessing extreme B/M stocks.5 
To be included in the sample, all firms must have a non-zero market value of equity as of 
June 30th of year t. Firm fundamentals are based on December 31st of year t-1 (for firms with 
fiscal year ends between January 1st and March 31st I use year t fundamentals; for firms with 
fiscal year ends after March 31st I use year t-1 fundamentals).  Book to Market is computed on 
June 30th each year using the methodology from Fama and French (2000) and the market 
capitalization on June 30th.  All firms with negative book values are eliminated from the sample.   
The tests are focused on all non-microcap stocks, defined as all stocks with a market 
capitalization on June 30th above the NYSE 20th percentile for market capitalization each year.  
This approach is similar to that undertaken by Fama and French (2008) and seeks to achieve the 
same goal: determine if the empirical results are applicable to the broader universe of stocks.  
One main reason for this approach is that microcap firms comprise about 52% of the firms in the 
sample universe, but only represent 2.26% of the total market capitalization as of June 30, 2011.   
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the firm-year observations in the sample of 
firms with a market value of equity greater than the NYSE 20th breakpoint.  When splitting the 
                                                 
5 I additionally use the Beaver, McNichols and Price (2007) code to link CRSP and Compustat.  They find that many 
delistings can be excluded because the effective date range in the Compustat/CRSP merged database often ends 
before the security is delisted.   
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sample into high and low book-to-market quintiles, NYSE breakpoints are used to compute the 
20th and 80th percentiles, eliminating any firms with negative book-to-market values.  Firms 
below the NYSE 20th percentile for B/M are classified as growth firms, while firms above the 
NYSE 80th percentile for B/M are classified as value firms. There are over two times as many 
growth firms (low B/M) as value firms (high B/M).  Value firms have lower momentum and 
past-month returns, and are more illiquid compared to growth firms.  The market capitalization 
distribution shows that the two samples have a similar median, but growth firms are slightly 
larger and the size distribution is more skewed. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Listed below are the accounting-based anomaly strategies (quality measures) that have 
been empirically shown to predict investor expectation errors.  Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) 
identify eleven well-document anomalies.  I use these eleven measures as well as the Piotroski 
and So (2012) F-score to estimate high and low expectation errors within value and growth 
firms.  The metrics used in the paper are as follows: 
 Financial distress (DISTRESS).  Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) find that 
firms with high failure probability have lower subsequent returns. Their methodology 
involves estimating a dynamic logit model with both accounting and equity market 
variables as explanatory variables.  Investors systematically underestimate the 
predictive information in the Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi model, which is shown 
to predict future returns.  DISTRESS is computed using the same methodology in 
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). 
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 O-Score (OSCORE).  Ohlson (1980) creates a static model to calculate the 
probability of bankruptcy.  This is computed using accounting variables.  OSCORE is 
computed using the same methodology in Ohlson (1980). 
 Net stock issuance (NETISS).  Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) show 
that, in post-issue years, equity issuers under-perform matching non-issuers with 
similar characteristics.  The evidence suggests that investors are unable to identify 
that firms prefer to raise capital by issuing stock when equity prices are overvalued.  I 
measure net stock issues as the growth rate of the split-adjusted shares outstanding in 
the previous fiscal year. 
 Composite Equity Issuance (COMPISS).  Daniel and Titman (2006) study an 
alternative measure, composite equity issuance, defined as the amount of equity a 
firm issues (or retires) in exchange for cash or services. They also find that issuers 
under-perform non-issuers because investors overlook the signals from repurchases 
and issuance.  I measure COMPISS similar to Daniel and Titman (2006). 
 Total accruals (ACCRUAL). Sloan (1996) shows that firms with high accruals earn 
abnormal lower returns on average than firms with low accruals. This anomaly exists 
because investors overestimate the persistence of the accrual component of earnings.  
Total accruals are computed using the same methodology as Sloan (1996).   
 Net operating assets (NOA). Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) find that net 
operating assets, defined as the difference on the balance sheet between all operating 
assets and all operating liabilities scaled by total assets, is a strong negative predictor 
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of long-run stock returns. Investors are unable to focus on accounting profitability 
while neglecting information about cash profitability.  NOA is computed using the 
methodology in Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004). 
 Momentum (MOM).  The momentum effect was first discovered by Jagadeesh and 
Titman (1993).  I calculate the momentum monthly by looking at the cumulative 
returns from month -12 to month -2 similar to Fama and French (2008). 
 Gross profitability premium (GP). Novy-Marx (2013) discovers that sorting on 
gross profit-to-assets creates abnormal benchmark-adjusted returns, with more 
profitable firms having higher returns than less profitable ones. Novy-Marx argues 
that gross profits divided by total assets is the cleanest accounting measure of true 
economic profitability and that investors overlook the investment value of the 
profitability of the firm.  Gross profitability premium is measured by gross profits 
(REVT - COGS) scaled by total assets (AT).  
 Asset growth (AG). Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) find companies that grow their 
total asset more earn lower subsequent returns.  The authors argue that investors 
overestimate future growth and business prospects based on observing a firm’s asset 
growth.  Asset growth is measured as the growth rate of the total assets (item AT) in 
the previous fiscal year. 
 Return on assets (ROA). Fama and French (2006) find that more profitable firms 
have higher expected returns than less profitable firms. Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang 
(2010) show that firms with higher past return on assets earn abnormally higher 
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subsequent returns.  Investors appear to underestimate the importance of ROA.  ROA 
is computed similar to Piotroski: income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by 
total assets (AT).   
 Investment-to-assets (INV). Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Xing (2008) show 
that higher past investment predicts abnormally lower future returns. The authors 
posit that this anomaly stems from investor’s inability to identify manager empire-
building behavior via investment patterns.  Investment-to-assets is measured as the 
annual change in gross property, plant, and equipment (PPEGT) plus the annual 
change in inventories (INVT) scaled by the lagged book value of assets (AT). 
 F-score (FSCORE).  This is computed using the same methodology as Piotroski and 
So (2012).  Their methodology involves computing 9 signals, which each firm either 
gets a 0 or 1 based on the measure.  Of the nine financial performance signals, four of 
the signals based on profitability, three are based on changes in financial leverage and 
liquidity, and the last two are based on operational efficiency.   Similar to Piotroski 
and So (2012), firms with F-scores of 7, 8, or 9 are considered to have high (low) 
expectation errors for value (growth) firms, while all firms with F-scores of 0, 1, 2, or 
3 have low (high) expectation errors for value (growth) firms.  Piotroski and So 
(2012) show that F-score predicts investor prediction errors.   
Firms are first split into value and growth buckets based on their book-to-market ratio, 
and then split into quintiles based on each of the twelve quality measures (expectation error 
proxies).  Firms with F-scores of 7, 8, or 9 are classified as the top quintile, while firms with F-
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scores of 0, 1, 2, or 3 are classified as the bottom quintile; this classification of the F-score is 
similar to Piotroski and So (2012). The sample uses information available on June of year t to 
forecast the returns from July of t to June of year t + 1. The exception is the momentum variable, 
which is measured each month.     
Correlations in Table 2 are calculated by comparing the quintile ranks for each measure 
(within B/M quintiles) across time.  While the p-values of the correlations are 0.000 for all of the 
measures, the historical correlations are relatively low across quality metrics, with the highest 
correlation being between Net stock issuance (NETISS) and Composite equity issuance 
(COMPISS)6. Thus, the different quality measures (expectation error proxies) appear to give 
different signals to investors.  
[Insert Table 2] 
 Table 3 gives the summary statistics for each of the twelve quality (anomaly) measures 
described above.  These values (with the exception of F-score) are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level each year to eliminate outliers. As can be seen in Panel B (value firms) and Panel C 
(growth firms), in general the quality measures have a higher standard deviation for growth firms 
compared to value firms, with the one exception being Financial distress (DISTRESS).  The 
means and medians between value and growth firms are statistically different for all measures 
except for the F-score.  Overall, it appears that the quality measures have different distributions 
for value and growth firms, with growth firms having more dispersion and different means than 
value firms.    
                                                 
6 In unreported tests, I also run the correlations on the individual signals (as opposed to the quintile ranks in Table 
2), and again find a significant but very low correlation between most of the measures. 
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 [Insert Table 3] 
 The analysis is focused on two “hard to value” measures.  Similar to Diether, Malloy, and 
Scherbina (2002), analyst dispersion is used to proxy for disagreement about the stock price.  A 
firm with higher analyst dispersion should be harder to value than a similar firm with lower 
analyst dispersion.  Analyst dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of the analysts’ one-
year forward earnings forecast.  The second measure of hard to value analyzed is idiosyncratic 
volatility (Kumar 2009).  Idiosyncratic volatility is computed by regressing daily returns on a 
value-weight market index and lagged value-weight market index over a one year period 
preceding the portfolio formation, similar to Arena et al. (2008).    
 The analysis on four additional hard to value measures are reported in the appendix 
tables.  The first two measures are firm age and turnover which are used in Kumar (2009).  The 
intuition behind these measures is that newer firms should be harder to value, and firms with 
more trading may also be harder to value.  The third additional measure is institutional 
ownership, as one may expect firms with higher institutional ownership to be easier to value 
since these firms are followed by more institutions.  The final hard to value measures compares 
simple and complicated firms (Cohen and Lou 2012). Complicated firms are assumed to be 
harder to value compared to simple firms. 
  
  Hard to Value Stocks and the Value Anomaly 
3.1 Results 
My first hypothesis is that mispricing effects will be enhanced in a “super-incongruent” 
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portfolio that identifies those securities where investors may have the highest underreaction to 
fundamentals. I first replicate the Piotroski and So “incongruent” portfolio, which goes long 
value firms with high expectation errors (high B/M, high F-Score), and goes short growth firms 
with high expectation errors (low B/M, low F-Score).  The “congruent” strategy goes long value 
firms with low expectation errors (high B/M, low F-Score) and short growth firms with low 
expectation errors (low B/M, high F-Score).  According to Piotroski and So’s interpretation of 
the mispricing hypothesis, the incongruent strategy is a portfolio that captures the highest degree 
of mispricing; the congruent strategy captures the portfolio with the least amount of mispricing. 
To build the portfolios, I perform a double sort on the data to form the congruent and 
incongruent portfolios.  Value (high B/M) and growth (low B/M) firms are identified using the 
20th and 80th NYSE book-to-market cutoffs.  High and low expectation errors are identified by 
splitting the value and growth portfolios into quintiles based on each of the twelve quality 
measures.  All of the portfolio returns in Table 4 are value-weighted. Equal-weighted results are 
quantitatively similar. Regressions are run on the portfolio’s excess return (portfolio return 
minus risk free rate) against the four factor model, which includes the market return minus the 
risk free rate, and factors to account for size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (MOM) 
effects.7   
Table 4 shows the results for the “congruent” (Panel A) and “incongruent” (Panel B) 
portfolios. Looking at Panel A (congruent portfolio) across the 12 measures, there is no evidence 
of a positive and statistically significant alpha.  One exception is Net operating assets (NOA), 
                                                 
7 I obtain data on the risk factors from Ken French’s data library: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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which has an unexpected negative alpha, since this portfolio goes long value firms and shorts 
growth firms.  Panel B confirms the positive alpha for the F-score in the incongruent portfolio.8  
In addition, four of the other eleven measures have statistically significant alpha at the 5% level.  
Panels A and B also show that the congruent and incongruent portfolios all have positive and 
significant value beta (HML), while generally having negative and significant momentum beta 
(MOM), with one exception being the portfolio formed on momentum.  Overall, panels A and B 
confirm the Piotroski and So (2012) result that the value/growth anomaly is driven by the 
incongruent portfolio, which is indicative of mispricing being able to explain the value/growth 
anomaly.   
[Insert Table 4] 
Next, I construct a “super incongruent” portfolio, which is long high quality value firms 
(high expectation errors) that are hard to value, and short low quality growth firms (high 
expectation errors) that are hard to value. The super incongruent portfolio exploits the evidence 
from Zhang (2006) that investors underreact to news in firms which have more information 
uncertainty (ambiguity aversion). The results of the incongruent portfolio (Panel B of Table 4) 
show that investors systematically underreact to fundamentals in certain stocks (value firms with 
good fundamentals and growth firms with bad fundamentals). The super incongruent portfolio is 
predicted to produce enhanced mispricing relative to the incongruent portfolio because it 
identifies stocks that which should have the largest underreaction firm fundamentals. 
The super incongruent portfolios are formed based on triple sorts of the data.  Value and 
                                                 
8 I report a monthly 0.53% alpha for the F-score “incongruent” strategy, which is 0.98% in Piotroski and So (2012).  
This difference is mainly driven microcap firms, which I have eliminated from the main analysis.   
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growth portfolios are identified using the 20th and 80th NYSE book-to-market cutoffs.  High and 
low expectation errors are identified by splitting the value and growth portfolios into quintiles 
based on each of the twelve quality measures. Last, the portfolios are split into hard to value and 
easy to value using either idiosyncratic volatility or analyst dispersion.  Panel C of Table 4 shows 
the results using idiosyncratic volatility as the hard to value measure, while Panel D gives the 
results using analyst dispersion as the hard to value measure. 
The results are consistent with the prediction that mispricing will be the enhanced in 
firms that are hard to value. For all twelve quality measures (for both hard to value measures), 
the 4-factor alphas for the super incongruent portfolio are higher than the 4-factor alphas for the 
incongruent portfolio.  The F-Score yields a 0.53% monthly 4-factor alpha for the incongruent 
portfolio (Panel B), while the super incongruent portfolio yields a 0.74% and 1.19% monthly 4-
factor alpha for idiosyncratic volatility (Panel C) and analyst dispersion (Panel D), respectively. 
The evidence suggests that the firms that are hard to value drive the mispricing within the 
incongruent portfolio. The Net stock issuance (NETISS) and Composite equity issuance 
(COMPISS) variables for the super incongruent portfolio (Idiosyncratic volatility, Panel C) yield 
a monthly 4-factor alpha of 1.41% and 1.35%, respectively, which more than doubles the alpha 
found in the incongruent portfolio (Panel B).  Panels C and D show that the super incongruent 
portfolios generally have a positive and significant value beta (HML) and a negative and 
significant momentum beta (MOM). 
Panels C and D show the super incongruent portfolio generates a larger alpha compared 
to the incongruent portfolio. By construction, the super incongruent portfolio is one half of the 
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incongruent portfolio (hard to value firms). Panels E and F examine the other half of the 
incongruent portfolio, which is labeled "Incongruent, easy to value" in Table 4. The incongruent, 
easy to value portfolios, are long high quality value firms (high expectation errors) that are easy 
to value, and short low quality growth firms (high expectation errors) that are easy to value.  
As the signals are less ambiguous in the incongruent, easy to value portfolio, the first 
hypothesis would predict these portfolios should exhibit less mispricing compared to the 
incongruent, hard to value portfolios. Since these firms are easier to value, there should be less 
underreaction from investors to firm fundamentals.  The results are consistent with the prediction 
that mispricing will be the less in firms that are easy to value. Panels E and F of Table 4 show 
that twenty-three of the twenty-four possible incongruent, easy to value portfolios have no 
significant alpha. The one exception is the incongruent, easy to value portfolio using F-score and 
idiosyncratic volatility. Still, this monthly alpha (0.485%) is less than the incongruent portfolio 
(0.528%) and the super incongruent portfolios (0.742%). The incongruent, easy to value 
portfolio using F-score and analyst dispersion generates an insignificant 0.218% monthly alpha, 
which is less than the significant alpha found in the incongruent portfolio (0.528%) and super 
incongruent portfolio (1.194%).    
A Wald test is used to formally test for a difference between the alpha from the 
incongruent portfolio and the alpha from the super incongruent portfolio. The Wald test results 
show a statistical difference for eight quality measures using idiosyncratic volatility (Table 4, 
Panel C) and a statistical difference for three quality measures using analyst dispersion (Table 4, 
Panel D).  A paired t-test is used to compare the monthly returns of the incongruent portfolios to 
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the super incongruent portfolios. While this test lacks power due to the highly variable nature of 
monthly returns and the small predicted difference in monthly returns, at the 5% level six of the 
twelve portfolios are different in Panel C (idiosyncratic volatility), while seven of the twelve 
portfolios are different in Panel D (analyst dispersion).   
To analyze robustness of the results, additional tests are conducted using four additional 
hard to value measures (firm age, turnover, institutional ownership, and simple versus 
complicated firms). The results (shown in Appendix Table 1) further support my first hypothesis, 
as a vast majority of the super incongruent alphas are larger than the incongruent alphas. One 
example would be the portfolio that goes long complicated value firms with high F-score, and 
goes short complicated growth firms with low F-score.  This portfolio (Appendix Table 1, Panel 
D) has a four factor alpha of 1.15% per month. Additionally, Appendix Table 1 documents 
incongruent firms which are easy to value (Panels E-H) exhibit less mispricing.  
Overall the results in Table 4 and Appendix Table 1 suggest that mispricing is larger 
(smaller) in firms that are hard to value (easy to value). This result supports the hypothesis that 
the super incongruent portfolio identifies stocks which have the largest underreaction to firm 
fundamentals (good fundamentals for value stocks and bad fundamentals for growth stocks).  
 
3.2 Limits to Arbitrage 
While the hard-to-value results (super incongruent portfolio) can be interpreted in terms 
of behavioral bias, they also appear consistent with limits to arbitrage. For example, idiosyncratic 
volatility has been used as proxy for limits to arbitrage in many papers, with Shleifer and Vishny 
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(1997) as one example. Brav, Heaton, and Li (2010) find that limits to arbitrage can explain 
overvaluation (growth stocks) but not undervaluation (value stocks). A way to test how limits of 
arbitrage affect the returns of the super incongruent portfolio would be to examine the mispricing 
of the long and short legs, independently. Limits to arbitrage are generally stronger for short 
portfolios than they are for long portfolios. 
Table 5 (and Appendix Table 2) shows the results (and Beta loadings) for the long and 
short legs of the incongruent portfolios and the super incongruent portfolio. The short book of 
the incongruent portfolio generates on average 58% of the alpha, while 85-90% of the alpha 
comes from the short side of the super incongruent portfolio.  For example, in idiosyncratic 
volatility hard to value portfolios the long leg produces no significant alpha, while the short leg 
produces 9 significant alphas.  In addition, the idiosyncratic volatility short portfolios have 
significant loadings on SMB, which suggests the mispricing may be driven by small securities 
more affected by arbitrage constraints. The results are similar using analyst dispersion, as well as 
the appendix measures: institutional ownership, firm age, turnover, and simple versus 
complicated firms (Results in Appendix Table 2).  
 [Insert Table 5] 
The empirical results (Table 5 and Appendix Table 2) suggest that mispricing is 
concentrated in the short portfolio of growth firms for both the incongruent and super 
incongruent long/short portfolios. To study if limits to arbitrage explains the outperformance of 
the super incongruent portfolio relative to the incongruent portfolio I examine the characteristics 
of the incongruent portfolio short portfolio relative to the super incongruent short portfolio. I 
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proxy for the short portfolio's limits of arbitrage via market capitalization and liquidity measures, 
which are shown in Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6] 
The market capitalization and liquidity measures for the super incongruent portfolio 
formed on idiosyncratic volatility (Panel B – Table 6) are lower than the incongruent portfolio, 
which cannot rule out a limits to arbitrage story. Appendix Table 3 (Panels B and F) finds similar 
results, as the super incongruent portfolios formed on firm age (new firms) and institutional 
ownership (low) have lower market capitalization and liquidity compared to the incongruent 
portfolio. However, for the super incongruent portfolio formed using analyst dispersion (Panel C 
– Table 6), the market capitalization and liquidity are higher than the original incongruent 
portfolio (i.e., lower limits of arbitrage), and yet, the short portfolio has higher mispricing. 
Appendix Table 3 (Panels C and G) finds similar results, as the super incongruent portfolios 
formed on turnover (higher) and simple versus complicated firms (complicated) have higher 
market capitalization and liquidity compared to the incongruent portfolio. Thus, limits to 
arbitrage cannot completely explain the super incongruent portfolio's outperformance relative to 
the incongruent portfolio. 
 
3.3 Sub-period Analysis 
 Appendix Table 4 examines the super incongruent portfolios by splitting the sample into 
first half and second half (7/1/1976 – 9/30/1994, 10/1/1994 – 12/31/2012). Using idiosyncratic 
volatility as the hard to value measure, it produces eight (five) significant alphas in the first 
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(second) half, while using analyst dispersion as the hard to value measure produces two (six) 
significant alphas in the first (second) half.  This is compared to ten (nine) significant alphas 
produced over the entire time period using idiosyncratic volatility (analyst dispersion) as the hard 
to value measure (see Table 4). Overall, it appears that the super incongruent portfolio worked 
better in the first (second) half while using idiosyncratic volatility (analyst dispersion) as the hard 
to value measure. 
   
  Is Mispricing Different for Growth and Value Portfolios? 
4.1 Results 
My second research hypothesis is that the quality signals (expectation error proxies) have 
differing effects among value and growth firms. Hypothesis 2A and 2B look at the spread 
between high and low quality measures (expectation errors) within value (H-2A) and growth (H-
2B) firms.  The results are shown in Table 7.  
 [Insert Table 7] 
H-2A tests for a spread between high quality value stocks (high expectation errors) and 
low quality value stocks (low expectation errors). The results in Panel A of Table 7 provide no 
evidence for mispricing among value stocks, as none of the twelve long/short portfolios have a 
significant 4-factor alpha.  H-2B tests whether there is mispricing among growth stocks. This test 
looks at the spread between high quality growth stocks (low expectation errors) and low quality 
growth stocks (high expectation errors). The evidence suggests mispricing for eight of the twelve 
long/short portfolios in Panel B based on 4-factor alphas.  The results from Panels A and B 
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suggest that the quality measures have differing effects within value and growth firms. The 
quality measures show a greater ability to separate winners and losers within growth stocks as 
compared to value stocks. 
One concern may be that this result is simply the result of sample selection and 
methodology.  To address this, there are four appendix Tables that show the core results are 
robust across different samples and methodologies.  These four tables test the following 
perturbations on my original tests: 1) using non-NYSE B/M breakpoints to create the value and 
growth portfolios (Appendix Table 5), 2) using the NYSE 30th and 70th percentile B/M 
breakpoints to create the value and growth portfolios (Appendix Table 6), 3) equal-weighting the 
returns (Appendix Table 7), and 4) adding micro-cap firms to the sample (Appendix Table 8).  
The robustness results are all quantitatively similar to Table 7, with the quality measures 
showing a greater ability to separate winners and losers within growth stocks as compared to 
value stocks. Additionally, the mispricing exists in both liquid and illiquid growth firms using 
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (Appendix Table 9).  Last, when investigating only 
micro-cap firms, there is mispricing in both value and growth portfolios (Appendix Table 10). 
 
4.2 Why isn’t there a return differential among value stocks? 
The evidence from Table 7 suggests that quality measures can predict returns in growth 
stocks, but have limited ability to identify good and bad performing value stocks. Nonetheless, it 
is unclear why there is no spread in returns between high quality value stocks (high expectation 
errors) and low quality value stocks (low expectation errors). If behavioral biases affect security 
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prices, we should see an effect across all securities and not just in growth stocks. To investigate 
this inconsistency, means for the quality measures (top and bottom quintiles) across value and 
growth stocks are calculated in Table 8. Panels A and B highlight the difference in the spread 
between high expectation error and low expectation error value and growth stocks. The data 
shows that the expectation error proxy estimates have more dispersion across growth stocks. 
[Insert Table 8] 
If extreme quality measures (expectation error proxies) drive mispricing, a plausible 
hypothesis is that random samples of growth firms with similar quality measure dispersion 
estimates as value stocks, will exhibit less mispricing. To test this prediction random samples of 
growth firms are drawn for each of the twelve quality measures attempting to match the means of 
the value firms. To build these samples, for each measure within the growth stock universe 
(Panel B) cutoff percentiles are chosen in such a way that they produce a mean similar to the 
value firm sample. From this sample, a 100 random samples of growth firms are generated, 
which have a similar number of firms as in the value sample.  The random sample that has a 
mean closest to the value sample is chosen. Means of the random sample of growth firms are 
presented in Table 8, Panel C.   
To clarify the sampling process I detail my procedure on the return on asset (ROA) 
measure.  Looking at Panel B of Table 8, the difference between the mean of the high-ROA 
value firms and high-ROA growth firms is 0.201, as the mean for the high-ROA value firms is 
0.097, while the mean for the high-ROA growth firms is 0.298.  Similarly, the difference 
between the low-ROA value firms and low-ROA growth firms is -0.170, as the mean for the 
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low-ROA value firms is -0.108 and the mean of the low-ROA growth firms is -0.278.  Within the 
growth firm sample, firms below the 28th percentile for ROA are chosen to be in the low-ROA 
sample.  From this group of firms, 100 random samples are generated with a similar number of 
firms as the value firm sample each year.  A random sample is then chosen so that the mean of 
the sample is closest to that of the low-ROA value firms.  As can be seen in Panel C of Table 8, 
the difference in means between the low-ROA value firms and the random sample of low-ROA 
growth firms is now 0.000.  To match the sample of high-ROA value firms, growth firms 
between the 28th and 59th percentiles for ROA are selected to be in the high-ROA sample.  From 
this group of firms, 100 random samples are generated with a similar number of firms as the 
value firm sample each year. The random sample with the mean closest to the high-ROA value 
firms is chosen.  As can be seen in Panel C of Table 8, the difference in means between the high-
ROA value firms and the random sample of high-ROA growth firms is now 0.001.   
This random sampling process is conducted for each of the twelve quality measures.  In 
general, creating the random samples decreases the difference between the mean of value firms 
and the mean of growth firms for each measure, as can be seen in Panel C of Table 8.  The 
random sample procedures create samples of growth firms with a similar mean and number of 
firms as the value firm sample. With characteristic-matched samples, I test the hypothesis that 
random samples of growth firms, with similar quality dispersion as value stocks, will exhibit less 
mispricing in Table 9.  
[Insert Table 9] 
 In Table 9, long-short growth portfolios are formed with the random sample data and I 
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repeat the analysis presented earlier in Table 7. The evidence highlights that growth firms with 
similar quality dispersion estimates as their value counterparts exhibit little mispricing. Only one 
(accrual measure) of the 4-factor alpha estimates is statistically significantly different than zero, 
compared to eight measures in Table 7. This suggests that the ability of the quality measures to 
separate winners and losers within growth firms is concentrated in those stocks with the most 
extreme quality measures. 
 
4.3 Underreaction versus overconfidence 
 The significant alpha produced by the portfolios with extreme quality observations (firm 
fundamentals) can be somewhat puzzling as some research finds that people overreact to extreme 
observations (Griffin and Tversky 1992). If this is the case, extreme observations should be 
embedded in asset prices, and yet, the evidence discussed previously suggests that investors 
underreact to extreme quality observations. What can explain this discrepancy? The answer may 
lie in the prior research’s assumption that the extreme observation signals are unambiguous. For 
example, Zhang (2006) presents evidence which finds that investors appear to underreact more to 
signals when there is more uncertainty. 
Empirical tests are needed to reconcile the competing predictions related to an investor’s 
reaction to extreme quality observations. The evidence from Zhang (2006) suggests that 
underreaction would be expected if the observed signal is more ambiguous; for non-ambiguous 
signals, Griffin and Tversky (1992) would predict an overreaction. To calculate the ambiguity of 
quality signals, for every firm in the universe standard deviations are computed for each quality 
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measure using the past 5 annual values. As an example, for the gross profits (GP) measure, 
standard deviation is calculated for the past 5 GP values of every firm: GP measure in year t, t-1, 
t-2, t-3, and t-4. Higher deviation signals are considered more ambiguous than lower standard 
deviation signals. In appendix Table 11 quality measure standard deviations are compared for 
each firm across value and growth firms. Growth firms have a higher standard deviation for eight 
of the twelve quality measures compared to value firms, which suggests that growth firms have 
more ambiguous signals. Combining the ambiguity results with growth firm mispricing results, 
suggests the findings are consistent with the Zhang (2006) analysis that investors underreact to 
ambiguous signals.9 
 
 Results: Do Hard to Value Growth Firms Enhance Mispricing? 
Section 3 highlights that the hard to value firm characteristic enhances the mispricing in 
the value/growth anomaly. Section 4 documents that the quality measures show a greater ability 
to separate winners and losers within growth stocks as compared to value stocks. Section 4 also 
highlights that growth firms have larger quality measure distributions, but random samples with 
similar quality measure distributions as value firms show little evidence for mispricing. In this 
section I identify how hard to value affects mispricing within the value and growth portfolios (in 
Section 3 I look across value and growth). A plausible hypothesis is that the extreme quality 
                                                 
9 Appendix Table 12 compares the firm level standard deviations across hard to value firms and easy to value firms 
using institutional ownership and analyst dispersion. The results show that hard to value firms in general have a 
more ambiguous signal (higher standard deviation) compared to easy to value firms. Combining the ambiguity 
results with the hard to value mispricing results, suggests the findings are consistent with the Zhang (2006) analysis 
that investors underreact to ambiguous signals. 
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measure (expectation error) distribution found among growth firms reflects the fact these growth 
firms are generally harder to value, and thus more susceptible to behavioral bias. If this is the 
case, examining those firms which are harder to value (ambiguity aversion) should lead to a 
larger underreaction to relevant information (firm fundamentals).  
To test this, samples are partitioned using a triple sort similar to section 3. Firms are first 
split into value and growth, then firms are split into high and low quality (investor expectation 
errors), and finally, firms are split into easy to value and hard to value. The long/short portfolios 
are long value (growth) firms with high quality measures that are easy/hard to value, and short 
value (growth) firms with low quality measures that are easy/hard to value. Hard to value firms 
are identified by either idiosyncratic volatility (Kumar 2009) or analyst dispersion (Diether, 
Malloy, and Scherbina 2002).  The results are shown in Table 10. 
[Insert Table 10] 
Value firms split by idiosyncratic volatility (Table 10 – Test 1) show no significant 
alphas for the hard to value portfolios (e.g., high idiosyncratic volatility), and only two 
significant alphas for the easy to value portfolios.  For growth firms, there is a noticeable 
difference between the hard to value portfolios relative to the easy to value portfolios.  There are 
eight significant alphas for the hard to value portfolios, but there are only four significant alphas 
for the easy to value portfolios.  Looking closer at the point estimates for both the value and 
growth portfolios, the estimates are higher for the hard to value portfolios. Within growth firms, 
the alpha estimates for the hard to value portfolios are higher for eleven of the twelve long/short 
portfolios. Four of the alphas for the hard to value growth portfolio are statistically different from 
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the alphas from the easy to value growth portfolio when using a Wald test. A paired t-test to 
compare the monthly returns finds that five of the measures produce significantly different 
returns for growth firms when comparing the hard to value and easy to value portfolios. 
When using analyst dispersion (Table 10 – Test 2), value firms show three significant 
alphas for the easy to value portfolios, compared with no significant alphas for the hard to value 
portfolios.  However, one of the significant point estimates (Momentum) in the easy to value 
portfolio has negative alpha, which is unexpected in the long-short portfolio.  For the growth 
firms, there is again a noticeable difference between the hard to value portfolios compared to the 
easy to value portfolios.  There are nine significant alphas for the hard to value portfolios, while 
there are four significant alphas for the easy to value portfolios.  Looking at growth firms, the 
alpha estimates for the hard to value portfolios are higher for nine of the twelve long/short 
portfolios. Three of the alphas for the hard to value growth portfolio are statistically different 
from the alphas from the easy to value growth portfolio when using a Wald test. A paired t-test 
to compare the monthly returns finds that five of the measures produce significantly different 
returns for growth firms when comparing the hard to value and easy to value portfolios.   
Results are reported for four additional hard to value measures in Appendix Table 13. 
The evidence tells a similar story for firm age (Test 1), turnover (Test 2), institutional ownership 
(Test 3), and simple versus complicated firms (Test 4).  Overall, the results suggest that 
mispricing within growth firms can be enhanced by hard to value measures.  For value firms, 
which have little mispricing, separating on hard to value measures does little to enhance 
mispricing. 
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As an alternative to calendar-time portfolio regressions, the analysis is conducted using 
the Fama-MacBeth regression approach (Fama and MacBeth (1973)). Table 11 shows the results 
of Fama-MacBeth regressions of firms’ stock returns on F-Score and the hard to value measures 
(idiosyncratic volatility and analyst dispersion). The control variables, similar to Novy-Marx 
(2013), are book-to-market (log(B/M)), size (log(ME)), and past returns measured over the past 
month (Return-1,0) and over the past twelve to two months (Return-12,-2). The regression contains 
all non-microcap firms; the results are similar if only value and growth firms are included. To 
build the hard to value indicator (0/1), each book-to-market quintile is split into easy to value and 
hard to value using either idiosyncratic volatility or analyst dispersion. 
[Insert Table 11] 
Column 1 of Table 11 shows the F-Score variable (discrete 0-9 variable) is positively 
related to future stock returns. Column 2 finds that idiosyncratic volatility dummy has no 
significant impact on future stock returns.  This is in line with the literature, as Chua, Goh, and 
Zhang (2010) document that the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and returns is 
mixed in the literature. Column 4 finds the analyst dispersion dummy has a negative relation to 
future stock returns.  This is also in line with the literature, as Diether, Malloy and Scherbina 
(2002) document a negative relationship between analyst dispersion and stock returns. 
Columns 3 and 5 interact the F-score with the hard to value dummy variable. The 
evidence shows a positive relation between the interaction term and returns.  Thus, high F-score 
firms that are harder to value have higher returns, all else equal. Column 5 also finds that when 
interacting the F-score with the hard to value (analyst dispersion) dummy, the F-score by itself is 
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no longer significant, while the interaction term is significant. These results suggest that hard to 
value enhances situations where behavioral bias is expected to be high, which is in line with 
prior results.    
 
  Conclusion 
Piotroski and So (2012) show evidence suggesting that the value/growth anomaly is 
driven by investor underreaction to firm fundamentals.  They construct a simple test which 
allows them to identify instances where the quality of a firm’s fundamentals is incongruent with 
the price of the firm (value firms with good fundamentals, and growth firms with bad 
fundamentals).  I first confirm their main finding which indicates that for a specific subset of 
firms, investors systematically underreact to  firm fundamentals. 
I then exploit evidence from Zhang (2006) which shows that investors suffer from 
ambiguity aversion and underreact to noisy signals. My hypothesis is that mispricing effects will 
be enhanced in a “super-incongruent” portfolio that takes advantage of investors’ underreaction 
to firm fundamentals and investor’s underreaction to noisy signals.  I find evidence in support of 
my hypothesis. For example, for net issuance quality measure, the 4 factor alpha in the super 
incongruent portfolio is either 1.410% or 1.035% (Table 4, Panels C and D), while the alpha 
from the incongruent portfolio is only 0.596% (Table 4, Panel B). The results are similar for the 
other eleven quality measures (and across all the hard to value measures).  
Next, I conduct tests which show that the mispricing effects are in growth stocks, and I 
find little evidence for mispricing among value stocks. The growth stock mispricing is 
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concentrated in growth stocks with extreme quality measures. This can be explained by investor 
inattention and underreaction to firm fundamentals. I hypothesize that these extreme quality 
measures may proxy for the difficulty of valuing a firm, in which case the mispricing within 
growth firms should be enhanced by hard to value firms where the signals are more ambiguous. 
In line with this hypothesis, the mispricing within growth firms is enhanced by hard to value 
firms.   
In summary, combining quality signals (firm fundamentals) and hard to value measures 
increases the return spread between value and growth portfolios. Second, ex-ante observed 
quality signals are better at predicting high performance and low performance growth stocks as 
compared to value stocks. This growth stock mispricing can be explained by investor limited 
attention and can be enhanced by ambiguity aversion. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for all firm year observations above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. The 
portfolios are formed on July 1st of year t and are held until June 30th of year t+1.  Panel A shows the characteristics all firms, while Panels B and C show the 
characteristics of high and low B/M firms respectively.  MVE is the market value of equity in millions of dollars on June 30th.  B/M is the book value of equity 
scaled by MVE on June 30th.  Illiquidity is the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity defined as the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading 
volume, measured over a twelve month period prior to the portfolio formation.  Past1 Return is the buy-and-hold return during the one month preceding the 
portfolio formation, and Past12 Return is the buy-and-hold return during the 12 months preceding the portfolio formation, ignoring the return from month t-1.  
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Q1 Q3 Max 
MVE 62,437 3,676 754 15,080 35 300 2,107 547,363 
B/M 62,437 0.600 0.467 0.602 0.000 0.260 0.797 33.929 
Past1 Return 62,226 0.019 0.009 0.134 -0.740 -0.049 0.071 2.567 
Past12 Return 59,596 0.265 0.142 0.740 -0.967 -0.080 0.422 21.000 
Illiquidity 60,710 0.116 0.009 1.114 0.000 0.002 0.051 164.779 
Panel B: Value Firms  
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Q1 Q3 Max 
MVE 7,547 2,087 679 5,242 35 274 1,749 128,300 
B/M 7,547 1.534 1.334 1.146 0.679 1.073 1.704 33.929 
Past1 Return 7,547 0.171 0.011 1.362 0.000 0.002 0.063 93.221 
Past12 Return 7,534 -0.011 -0.004 0.101 -0.625 -0.059 0.043 0.864 
Illiquidity 7,472 0.172 0.011 1.362 0.000 0.002 0.063 93.221 
Panel C: Growth Firms  
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Q1 Q3 Max 
MVE 17,516 5,245 772 20,867 35 297 2,445 547,363 
B/M 17,516 0.185 0.171 0.112 0.000 0.105 0.238 0.610 
Past1 Return 17,358 0.054 0.029 0.179 -0.640 -0.038 0.110 2.567 
Past12 Return 17,516 0.555 0.274 1.143 -0.914 0.000 0.738 21.000 
Illiquidity 16,578 0.109 0.009 1.446 0.000 0.001 0.043 164.779 
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Table 2: Correlation between Quality Metrics 
 
Pearson correlation coefficients are calculated over all firm-year observations.  I use the firm’s quintile rank (1-5) within their B/M quintile for each strategy to 
compute the correlations. 
 
DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
DISTESS 1.000      
OSCORE -0.029 1.000      
NETISS 0.031 0.101 1.000      
COMPISS 0.057 0.062 0.808 1.000      
ACCRUAL 0.036 -0.125 0.077 0.076 1.000      
NOA 0.014 0.059 0.181 0.179 0.219 1.000      
MOM 0.411 -0.071 -0.064 -0.015 0.057 0.009 1.000      
GP -0.043 0.291 0.199 0.153 -0.055 0.159 -0.088 1.000     
AG 0.072 -0.083 0.273 0.310 0.265 0.455 0.073 0.066 1.000    
ROA -0.071 0.485 0.152 0.168 -0.213 -0.113 -0.089 0.355 -0.320 1.000   
INV 0.053 0.009 0.188 0.220 0.186 0.503 0.080 0.072 0.631 -0.220 1.000  
FSCORE 0.015 0.139 0.097 0.106 0.072 0.103 0.096 0.105 0.131 0.206 0.114 1.000 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Investor Expectation Errors Proxies 
 
This table reports summary statistics for all firm year observations above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. The 
portfolios are formed on July 1st of year t and are held until June 30th of year t+1.  Panel A shows the characteristics all firms, while Panels B and C show the 
characteristics of high and low B/M firms respectively.  DISTRESS is computed using the methodology in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). OSCORE is 
computed using the methodology in Ohlson (1980).  NETISS is computed as the growth rate of the split-adjusted shares outstanding in the previous fiscal year. 
COMPISS is computed similar to Daniel and Titman (2006). ACCRUAL is computed using the methodology in Sloan (1996). NOA is computed using the 
methodology in Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004). MOM is the cumulative returns from month -12 to month -2 similar to Fama and French (2008). 
Gross profitability premium is measured by gross profits scaled by total assets as in Novy-Marx (2013). Asset growth is measured as the growth rate of the total 
assets in the previous fiscal year, as in Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008). ROA is computed similar to Piotroski and So (2012): income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets. Investment-to-assets is measured as the annual change in gross property, plant, and equipment plus the annual change in inventories 
scaled by the lagged book value of assets, as in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004). FSCORE is computed using the methodology as Piotroski and So (2012). 
 
  Panel A: All Firms 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
N 61,675 57,930 59,770 59,438 57,925 59,708 59,596 62,376 59,720 59,691 58,809 57,132 
Mean 0.061 0.018 0.052 0.019 -0.030 0.724 0.252 0.363 0.255 0.058 0.115 5.447 
Median 0.000 0.008 0.007 -0.004 -0.034 0.702 0.142 0.320 0.104 0.063 0.070 5.000 
Standard Deviation 0.201 0.032 0.168 0.123 0.073 0.394 0.625 0.248 0.729 0.159 0.190 1.501 
25th Percentile 0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.035 -0.068 0.556 -0.080 0.175 0.023 0.030 0.022 4.000 
75th Percentile 0.005 0.019 0.036 0.025 0.000 0.836 0.422 0.502 0.242 0.109 0.149 7.000 
  Panel B: Value Firms  
N 7,489 7,021 7,344 7,294 6,998 7,338 7,323 7,535 7,343 7,335 7,199 6,871 
Mean 0.087 0.018 0.036 -0.015 -0.040 0.759 0.001 0.204 0.140 0.021 0.082 5.391 
Median 0.001 0.012 0.004 -0.027 -0.037 0.725 -0.002 0.153 0.047 0.032 0.050 5.000 
Standard Deviation 0.235 0.020 0.152 0.113 0.052 0.411 0.338 0.157 0.674 0.137 0.175 1.539 
25th Percentile 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.060 -0.063 0.622 -0.208 0.105 -0.010 0.012 0.012 4.000 
75th Percentile 0.015 0.023 0.025 0.003 -0.018 0.827 0.189 0.259 0.120 0.049 0.107 6.000 
  Panel C: Growth Firms  
N 17,039 15,523 15,856 15,756 15,530 15,826 15,840 17,493 15,829 15,824 15,631 15,252 
Mean 0.063 0.025 0.084 0.055 -0.020 0.678 0.567 0.464 0.432 0.076 0.152 5.374 
Median 0.000 0.007 0.015 0.011 -0.028 0.653 0.340 0.448 0.198 0.112 0.091 5.000 
Standard Deviation 0.210 0.047 0.203 0.141 0.090 0.441 0.936 0.294 0.943 0.236 0.218 1.527 
25th Percentile 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.013 -0.069 0.439 0.037 0.265 0.070 0.047 0.031 4.000 
75th Percentile 0.002 0.023 0.078 0.070 0.020 0.847 0.810 0.650 0.430 0.174 0.200 6.000 
             
P-value for diff. in 
Means (B vs. C) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.437 
P-value for diff. in 
medians (B vs. C) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.676 
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Table 4: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions across Value and Growth Firms 
  
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I 
calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-
values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on 
July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. Panels A through F show the returns to the value-weighted long/short portfolios.  Panels A 
represents “congruent” portfolio that is long value and short growth firms with the lowest investor expectation errors. Panel B represent an “incongruent” 
portfolio that is long value firms with the highest investor expectation errors and short growth firms with the highest investor expectation errors. Panels C and D 
are formed using a triple sort. The portfolios are formed by first identifying value portfolios and growth portfolios. Next, I identify high and low expectation 
errors using each specific anomaly strategy. Last, these portfolios are then split by one of the two hard to value measures (Idiosyncratic Volatility and Analyst 
Dispersion).  Panels C and D represent a “super incongruent” portfolio that is long value firms with high expectation errors that are hard to value, and short 
growth firms with high expectation errors that are hard to value. The first p-value of difference row gives the p-value using a paired T-test comparing the 
incongruent portfolio monthly returns (Panel B) and the super incongruent portfolio monthly returns (Panel C or Panel D). The second p-value of difference row 
uses a Wald test for a significant difference between the alpha in the incongruent portfolio (Panel B) to the alpha in the super incongruent portfolio (Panels C and 
D) for each measure.  Panels E (idiosyncratic volatility) and F (analyst dispersion) represent incongruent portfolios that are easy to value. These portfolios are 
long value firms with high expectation errors that are easy to value, and short growth firms with high expectation errors that are easy to value. The time period 
under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012. Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
  Panel A: Congruent Portfolio 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha -0.124 -0.167 -0.122 -0.258 -0.315 -0.495 0.061 -0.293 -0.226 -0.368 -0.300 -0.313 
 0.726 0.457 0.531 0.176 0.110 0.019 0.830 0.163 0.242 0.135 0.119 0.244 
             
Market Return – RF -0.037 0.072 -0.033 0.156 -0.025 -0.033 0.021 -0.017 0.181 0.185 0.101 0.078 
 0.675 0.196 0.493 0.005 0.644 0.597 0.783 0.763 0.000 0.004 0.050 0.295 
SMB -0.048 0.387 0.370 0.599 0.168 0.201 0.107 0.105 0.351 0.449 0.297 0.480 
 0.698 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.038 0.388 0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HML 1.038 1.368 0.581 0.570 1.096 1.188 0.875 0.738 0.541 1.065 0.669 0.756 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.628 -0.108 -0.268 -0.266 -0.194 -0.332 -1.579 -0.171 -0.334 -0.348 -0.359 -0.428 
 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Panel B: Incongruent 
Alpha 0.287 0.088 0.596 0.670 0.391 0.460 0.253 0.780 0.255 0.443 0.412 0.528 
 0.250 0.687 0.002 0.001 0.078 0.040 0.206 0.004 0.277 0.066 0.064 0.012 
             
Market Return – RF -0.039 -0.076 -0.216 -0.331 -0.108 -0.107 -0.040 -0.244 -0.212 -0.316 -0.145 -0.197 
 0.592 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.077 0.426 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 
SMB 0.041 -0.188 0.112 0.010 -0.093 0.102 0.174 0.401 -0.056 -0.228 0.098 -0.141 
 0.702 0.063 0.350 0.923 0.258 0.432 0.022 0.000 0.569 0.009 0.295 0.157 
HML 1.312 0.607 1.292 1.347 1.157 1.081 1.297 0.913 1.377 1.332 1.177 0.962 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.272 -0.369 -0.189 -0.180 -0.174 -0.231 1.133 -0.432 -0.167 -0.121 -0.123 0.013 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.161 0.132 0.819 
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Table 4: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions across Value and Growth Firms (Continued) 
 
  Panel C: Super Incongruent (Idiosyncratic Volatility) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.993 0.684 1.410 1.347 0.567 1.184 1.112 0.877 1.036 0.833 0.978 0.742 
 0.004 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.154 0.005 0.000 0.029 0.015 0.027 0.009 0.047 
             
Market Return – RF -0.249 -0.185 -0.110 -0.311 -0.046 -0.208 -0.154 -0.128 -0.110 -0.378 -0.175 -0.116 
 0.012 0.030 0.255 0.001 0.630 0.023 0.025 0.186 0.299 0.000 0.086 0.248 
SMB -0.474 -0.413 -0.261 -0.577 -0.278 -0.058 -0.323 -0.050 -0.200 -0.441 -0.025 -0.435 
 0.000 0.004 0.060 0.000 0.078 0.667 0.002 0.735 0.186 0.000 0.854 0.005 
HML 1.456 0.737 1.698 1.582 1.357 1.390 1.626 1.184 1.649 1.381 1.686 1.659 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.332 -0.276 -0.335 -0.370 -0.266 -0.304 1.051 -0.348 -0.226 -0.113 -0.077 -0.061 
 0.000 0.012 0.005 0.000 0.143 0.036 0.000 0.004 0.104 0.195 0.510 0.636 
             
p-value (paired t-test: 
Panel B vs. Panel C) 0.054 0.030 0.005 0.087 0.556 0.036 0.015 0.501 0.003 0.252 0.010 0.265 
p-value  (Wald test: 
Panel B vs. Panel C) 0.017 0.037 0.007 0.020 0.564 0.037 0.004 0.741 0.014 0.198 0.046 0.487 
  Panel D: Super Incongruent (Analyst Dispersion) 
Alpha 0.634 0.288 1.035 1.023 0.540 0.670 0.567 0.831 0.602 0.723 0.674 1.194 
 0.066 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.022 0.032 0.031 0.036 0.012 0.035 0.000 
             
Market Return – RF -0.011 0.018 -0.178 -0.313 0.063 -0.289 -0.037 -0.211 -0.216 -0.226 -0.147 -0.211 
 0.908 0.807 0.012 0.000 0.469 0.000 0.556 0.044 0.005 0.001 0.071 0.004 
SMB 0.066 -0.206 0.348 0.267 0.115 0.128 0.192 0.280 0.129 -0.294 0.092 -0.345 
 0.647 0.097 0.000 0.007 0.324 0.256 0.045 0.022 0.214 0.007 0.411 0.005 
HML 1.447 0.544 1.332 1.358 1.176 1.114 1.448 0.990 1.493 1.221 1.290 1.052 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.401 -0.410 -0.110 -0.151 -0.252 -0.068 1.087 -0.318 -0.105 -0.048 0.098 -0.042 
 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.025 0.019 0.461 0.000 0.003 0.258 0.535 0.431 0.632 
             
p-value (paired t-test: 
Panel B vs. Panel C) 0.005 0.343 0.002 0.005 0.271 0.280 0.046 0.548 0.013 0.093 0.032 0.013 
p-value  (Wald test: 
Panel B vs. Panel C) 0.081 0.371 0.023 0.038 0.536 0.373 0.078 0.852 0.073 0.167 0.216 0.007 
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Table 4: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions across Value and Growth Firms (Continued) 
 
  Panel E: Incongruent, Easy to Value (Idiosyncratic Volatility) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.189 -0.153 0.301 0.379 0.312 0.192 0.191 0.813 0.225 0.240 0.138 0.485 
 0.485 0.487 0.190 0.114 0.165 0.412 0.406 0.004 0.371 0.362 0.556 0.028 
             
Market Return – RF -0.051 -0.007 -0.225 -0.360 -0.163 -0.126 -0.078 -0.331 -0.323 -0.305 -0.172 -0.268 
 0.502 0.897 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.045 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 
SMB 0.134 -0.103 0.177 0.104 -0.046 0.132 0.177 0.402 0.060 -0.147 0.091 -0.165
 0.230 0.330 0.178 0.375 0.608 0.334 0.031 0.000 0.630 0.153 0.399 0.126 
HML 1.292 0.539 1.277 1.372 1.102 1.013 1.211 0.871 1.322 1.309 1.063 0.871 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.268 -0.386 -0.118 -0.044 -0.092 -0.156 1.147 -0.429 -0.084 -0.111 -0.063 0.057 
 0.003 0.000 0.141 0.576 0.154 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.245 0.443 0.346 
  Panel F: Incongruent, Easy to Value (Analyst Dispersion) 
Alpha -0.267 -0.211 -0.014 0.245 0.345 0.496 -0.197 0.598 -0.296 -0.391 0.165 0.218
 0.359 0.453 0.961 0.361 0.314 0.136 0.450 0.090 0.412 0.220 0.558 0.459 
             
Market Return – RF -0.164 -0.125 -0.082 -0.276 -0.055 0.050 -0.107 -0.206 -0.069 -0.352 -0.087 -0.283 
 0.046 0.066 0.342 0.001 0.558 0.575 0.089 0.015 0.470 0.000 0.277 0.000 
SMB 0.031 -0.138 -0.177 -0.305 -0.137 0.100 0.195 0.594 -0.122 -0.084 0.096 -0.097
 0.817 0.256 0.265 0.030 0.273 0.579 0.034 0.000 0.507 0.471 0.487 0.443 
HML 1.238 0.535 1.314 1.344 0.990 1.175 1.204 1.068 1.643 1.547 1.220 1.031 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.148 -0.426 -0.296 -0.271 -0.268 -0.347 1.177 -0.564 -0.387 -0.237 -0.315 0.162 
 0.072 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.024 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.070 0.001 0.033 
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Table 5: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions: Long and Short Legs of Super Incongruent Portfolio 
  
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I 
calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-
values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on 
July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. Panels A through F show the returns to the value-weighted portfolios. Panels A represents a 
portfolio of value firms with the highest investor expectation errors, while Panel B represents a portfolio of growth firms with the highest investor expectation 
errors.  Panel C (E) represents a portfolio of value firms with the highest investor expectation errors, which are hardest to value using Idiosyncratic Volatility 
(Analyst Dispersion). Panel D (F) represents a portfolio of growth firms with the highest investor expectation errors, which are hardest to value using 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (Analyst Dispersion). Panels C through F are formed using a triple sort. The portfolios are formed by first identifying value portfolios and 
growth portfolios. Next, I identify high and low expectation errors using each specific anomaly strategy. Last, these portfolios are then split by one of the two 
hard to value measures (Idiosyncratic Volatility and Analyst Dispersion).  The time period under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012. Regression p-values 
use robust standard errors as computed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
  Panel A: Incongruent – Long leg (Value firms) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.009 0.022 0.134 0.244 0.169 0.245 0.196 0.301 0.181 0.189 0.199 0.207 
 0.955 0.895 0.326 0.086 0.338 0.143 0.207 0.192 0.296 0.243 0.219 0.079 
             
Market Return – RF 1.007 1.081 0.991 0.883 1.076 1.013 0.983 1.016 1.043 0.960 1.055 0.922 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.061 0.103 0.208 0.106 0.157 0.220 0.167 0.470 0.188 0.196 0.260 0.022
 0.326 0.128 0.020 0.109 0.017 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.670 
HML 0.661 0.386 0.728 0.756 0.467 0.529 0.652 0.417 0.476 0.556 0.656 0.537 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.050 -0.247 -0.154 -0.149 -0.240 -0.196 0.302 -0.375 -0.225 -0.171 -0.108 -0.069 
 0.216 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.030 0.020 
  Panel B: Incongruent – Short leg (Growth firms) 
Alpha -0.278 -0.066 -0.462 -0.426 -0.222 -0.215 -0.057 -0.478 -0.074 -0.253 -0.212 -0.320
 0.080 0.683 0.001 0.002 0.130 0.120 0.749 0.005 0.676 0.169 0.146 0.076 
             
Market Return – RF 1.046 1.158 1.207 1.213 1.184 1.120 1.024 1.260 1.255 1.276 1.200 1.118 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.020 0.292 0.096 0.095 0.250 0.118 -0.007 0.069 0.244 0.425 0.163 0.163 
 0.800 0.000 0.165 0.180 0.000 0.132 0.919 0.272 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.031 
HML -0.651 -0.222 -0.564 -0.591 -0.691 -0.551 -0.645 -0.495 -0.901 -0.777 -0.520 -0.424 
 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.222 0.122 0.035 0.031 -0.066 0.035 -0.831 0.057 -0.058 -0.050 0.014 -0.082 
 0.000 0.015 0.291 0.371 0.091 0.299 0.000 0.179 0.289 0.337 0.789 0.103 
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Table 5: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions: Long and Short Legs of Super Incongruent Portfolio (Continued) 
 
  Panel C: Super Incongruent (Idiosyncratic Volatility) – Long leg (Value firms) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.197 0.072 0.399 0.387 0.190 0.302 0.302 -0.049 0.131 0.303 0.272 0.193 
 0.453 0.788 0.089 0.079 0.568 0.298 0.298 0.870 0.680 0.155 0.283 0.313 
             
Market Return – RF 1.129 1.225 1.261 1.076 1.318 1.249 1.249 1.184 1.310 1.034 1.253 1.154 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.249 0.305 0.626 0.312 0.501 0.575 0.575 0.680 0.548 0.496 0.717 0.416 
 0.018 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HML 0.479 0.146 0.770 0.667 0.237 0.657 0.657 0.342 0.599 0.495 0.727 0.571 
 0.001 0.326 0.000 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.079 -0.302 -0.349 -0.365 -0.440 -0.379 -0.379 -0.352 -0.304 -0.300 -0.216 -0.135 
 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.006 
  Panel D: Super Incongruent (Idiosyncratic Volatility) – Short leg (Growth firms) 
Alpha -0.796 -0.612 -1.011 -0.960 -0.377 -0.882 -0.882 -0.927 -0.904 -0.531 -0.706 -0.549
 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.067 0.004 0.094 
             
Market Return – RF 1.378 1.409 1.371 1.387 1.364 1.458 1.458 1.311 1.420 1.412 1.429 1.270 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.723 0.719 0.887 0.889 0.779 0.633 0.633 0.730 0.748 0.937 0.742 0.851 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HML -0.978 -0.591 -0.927 -0.915 -1.120 -0.734 -0.734 -0.843 -1.050 -0.886 -0.960 -1.089 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.411 -0.026 -0.014 0.005 -0.174 -0.076 -0.076 -0.004 -0.078 -0.187 -0.140 -0.074 
 0.000 0.708 0.847 0.948 0.041 0.306 0.306 0.955 0.315 0.011 0.041 0.544 
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Table 5: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions: Long and Short Legs of Super Incongruent Portfolio (Continued) 
 
  Panel E: Super Incongruent (Analyst Dispersion) – Long Leg (Value firms) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.152 -0.273 0.199 0.176 -0.083 0.038 0.038 0.102 -0.021 0.058 -0.087 0.293
 0.520 0.275 0.338 0.367 0.775 0.856 0.856 0.735 0.931 0.780 0.726 0.116 
             
Market Return – RF 1.026 1.132 1.137 0.993 1.212 0.978 0.978 1.039 1.106 1.036 1.130 0.974 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.125 0.109 0.285 0.184 0.417 0.242 0.242 0.517 0.168 0.172 0.354 0.072
 0.227 0.292 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.128 0.024 0.000 0.358 
HML 0.724 0.312 0.784 0.776 0.313 0.577 0.577 0.411 0.522 0.564 0.663 0.528 
 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.015 -0.450 -0.195 -0.221 -0.437 -0.231 -0.231 -0.420 -0.251 -0.184 -0.106 -0.139 
 0.814 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.178 0.009 
  Panel F: Super Incongruent (Analyst Dispersion) – Short Leg (Growth firms) 
Alpha -0.482 -0.561 -0.836 -0.847 -0.623 -0.632 -0.632 -0.728 -0.623 -0.665 -0.762 -0.901 
 0.029 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.000 
             
Market Return – RF 1.037 1.114 1.314 1.306 1.149 1.267 1.267 1.249 1.323 1.261 1.277 1.186 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.059 0.316 -0.063 -0.083 0.302 0.114 0.114 0.237 0.040 0.467 0.262 0.418 
 0.542 0.000 0.433 0.305 0.000 0.249 0.249 0.005 0.637 0.000 0.001 0.000 
HML -0.724 -0.232 -0.549 -0.583 -0.862 -0.536 -0.536 -0.579 -0.971 -0.657 -0.627 -0.525 
 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.415 -0.039 -0.085 -0.070 -0.184 -0.164 -0.164 -0.102 -0.146 -0.137 -0.203 -0.098 
 0.000 0.430 0.073 0.118 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.153 0.023 0.012 0.003 0.101 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Incongruent and Super Incongruent Portfolios 
 
This table reports summary statistics for annually-rebalance portfolios starting on 7/1/1976. The exception is the momentum portfolio, which is formed each 
month. MVE is the market value of equity in millions of dollars on June 30th.  Illiquidity is the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity defined as the average ratio 
of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume, measured over a twelve month period prior to the portfolio formation. Panel A represents an 
“incongruent” portfolio that is long value firms with the highest investor expectation errors and short growth firms with the highest investor expectation errors.  
Panels B and C represent a “super incongruent” portfolio that is long value firms with high expectation errors that are hard to value, and short growth firms with 
high expectation errors that are hard to value. The hard to value measures are idiosyncratic volatility (Panel B) and analyst dispersion (Panel C). Panel D 
represents the summary statistics for all firms, value firms (high B/M), and growth firms (low B/M). The statistics in Panel D are also found in Table 1. 
 
  Panel A: Incongruent Growth Firms   Panel D: Universe of Firms 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
 All 
Firms 
Value 
Firms 
Growth 
Firms 
MVE (N)  3,391   3,090   3,155   3,135   3,094   3,152  37,930  3,485   3,153   3,148   3,135   1,767    62,437   7,547   17,516  
MVE (Mean)  4,140   1,577   2,838   2,835   2,896   3,605   4,053   2,896   3,287   1,395   2,835   2,555    3,676   2,087   5,245  
MVE (Median)  667   520   608   604   610   701   655   553   631   481   604   547    754   679   772  
Illiquidity (N)  3,202   2,896   2,987   2,958   2,899   2,937  35,738  3,291   2,920   2,979   2,958   1,700    60,710   7,472   16,578  
Illiquidity (Mean)  0.101   0.192   0.239   0.234   0.073   0.124   0.103   0.256   0.090   0.262   0.234   0.229    0.116   0.172   0.109  
Illiquidity (Median)  0.008   0.019   0.015   0.015   0.010   0.009   0.008   0.018   0.010   0.021   0.015   0.016    0.009   0.011   0.009  
  Panel B: Super Incongruent Growth Firms (High Idiosyncratic Volatility)   Panel D: Universe of Firms 
MVE (N)  1,704   1,557   1,586   1,577   1,559   1,585  19,091  1,755   1,590   1,590   2,223   890    62,437   7,547   17,516  
MVE (Mean)  1,392   898   957   965   1,111   1,448   1,196   969   1,155   738   1,361   816    3,676   2,087   5,245  
MVE (Median)  426   381   419   417   454   515   428   379   456   359   519   365    754   679   772  
Illiquidity (N)  1,603   1,460   1,494   1,482   1,460   1,466  17,839  1,647   1,475   1,494   2,108   846    60,710   7,472   16,578  
Illiquidity (Mean)  0.160   0.297   0.429   0.418   0.095   0.193   0.158   0.422   0.128   0.437   0.306   0.403    0.116   0.172   0.109  
Illiquidity (Median)  0.014   0.035   0.027   0.026   0.015   0.016   0.013   0.031   0.015   0.035   0.018   0.030    0.009   0.011   0.009  
  Panel C: Super Incongruent Growth Firms (Analyst Dispersion)   Panel D: Universe of Firms 
MVE (N)  1,578   1,245   1,421   1,412   1,559   1,507  17,714  1,279   1,474   1,237   1,700   787    62,437   7,547   17,516  
MVE (Mean)  5,233   1,942   3,781   3,784   3,556   3,578   4,058   2,837   4,370   1,473   3,674   2,319    3,676   2,087   5,245  
MVE (Median)  826   740   723   724   674   895   729   699   734   617   709   606    754   679   772  
Illiquidity (N)  1,544   1,215   1,382   1,373   1,505   1,464  17,138  1,260   1,422   1,212   1,651   769    60,710   7,472   16,578  
Illiquidity (Mean)  0.040   0.069   0.225   0.222   0.048   0.049   0.040   0.060   0.053   0.069   0.197   0.283    0.116   0.172   0.109  
Illiquidity (Median)  0.005   0.009   0.011   0.010   0.008   0.007   0.006   0.010   0.007   0.012   0.010   0.012    0.009   0.011   0.009  
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Table 7: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions within Value and Growth Firms 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I 
calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-
values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on 
July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. Panel A represents a portfolio that is long value firms with high expectation errors, and 
short value firms with low expectation errors. Panel B represents a portfolio that is long growth firms with low expectation errors, and short growth firms with 
high expectation errors. The time period under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012. Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
  Panel A: Value Stocks Long/Short 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.167 -0.117 0.079 0.302 0.182 0.368 -0.157 0.310 0.359 0.275 0.276 0.345 
 0.567 0.643 0.716 0.136 0.372 0.141 0.618 0.292 0.092 0.309 0.205 0.241 
             
Market Return – RF -0.171 0.016 0.111 -0.132 0.006 -0.017 -0.262 0.134 -0.091 -0.246 -0.004 -0.156 
 0.051 0.820 0.042 0.020 0.898 0.808 0.005 0.067 0.103 0.002 0.950 0.090 
SMB -0.339 -0.158 0.116 -0.212 -0.026 0.098 -0.276 0.480 0.042 -0.075 0.107 -0.239 
 0.000 0.077 0.270 0.020 0.744 0.323 0.028 0.000 0.602 0.415 0.216 0.011 
HML 0.189 -0.226 0.389 0.377 -0.030 0.059 0.393 -0.001 0.078 0.193 0.201 0.224 
 0.163 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.731 0.598 0.009 0.994 0.412 0.137 0.046 0.129 
MOM 0.483 -0.078 0.074 0.101 0.027 0.152 1.333 -0.278 0.074 0.190 0.176 0.309 
 0.000 0.403 0.359 0.133 0.695 0.085 0.000 0.019 0.289 0.018 0.006 0.000 
  Panel B: Growth Stock Long/Short  
Alpha 0.244 0.372 0.638 0.626 0.524 0.587 0.349 0.763 0.121 0.536 0.437 0.496 
 0.457 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.008 0.170 0.001 0.544 0.018 0.014 0.026 
             
Market Return – RF 0.169 -0.164 -0.294 -0.355 -0.089 -0.057 0.201 -0.361 -0.302 -0.255 -0.243 -0.119 
 0.067 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.274 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 
SMB 0.428 -0.417 -0.373 -0.377 -0.235 -0.197 0.343 -0.184 -0.449 -0.602 -0.306 -0.383 
 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.039 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HML 0.084 -0.535 0.322 0.400 0.091 -0.166 0.029 0.176 0.759 0.075 0.307 -0.018 
 0.631 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.261 0.111 0.794 0.126 0.000 0.447 0.000 0.821 
MOM 0.417 -0.183 0.004 -0.016 -0.006 -0.052 1.379 0.017 0.093 0.038 0.060 0.132 
 0.001 0.002 0.926 0.700 0.916 0.396 0.000 0.785 0.094 0.569 0.310 0.057 
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Table 8: Summary Statistics for Investor Expectation Errors Proxies – Means of Value and Growth Portfolios 
 
The table presents both the number of firms (N) and the mean of the high and low quintiles for each expectation error proxy. Panel A shows the characteristics 
for value firms, while Panel B shows the characteristics of growth firms. Panel C shows the characteristics for a random sample of growth firms, with the intent 
of trying to match the mean from the value firm samples. I create the random samples (Panel C) the following way. For each expectation error measure within the 
growth stock universe (Panel B) I first choose arbitrary cutoff percentiles for which produce a mean similar to the value firm sample. From this sample of growth 
firms, I then generate 100 random samples of growth firms which have a similar number of firms as in the value sample.  I then chose the random sample that has 
the mean closest to the value sample. The difference in means computes the difference between the mean for the value and growth firms (Panel B/C mean – 
Panel A mean). DISTRESS is computed using the methodology in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). OSCORE is computed using the methodology in 
Ohlson (1980).  NETISS is computed as the growth rate of the split-adjusted shares outstanding in the previous fiscal year. COMPISS is computed similar to 
Daniel and Titman (2006). ACCRUAL is computed using the methodology in Sloan (1996). NOA is computed using the methodology in Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, 
and Zhang (2004). MOM is the cumulative returns from month -12 to month -2 similar to Fama and French (2008). Gross profitability premium is measured by 
gross profits scaled by total assets as in Novy-Marx (2013). Asset growth is measured as the growth rate of the total assets in the previous fiscal year, as in 
Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008). ROA is computed similar to Piotroski and So (2012): income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Investment-to-
assets is measured as the annual change in gross property, plant, and equipment plus the annual change in inventories scaled by the lagged book value of assets, 
as in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004). FSCORE is computed using the methodology as Piotroski and So (2012). 
 
  Panel A: Value Firms  
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
N – Low 1,607 1,515 1,557 1,564 1,501 1,575 18,557 1,621 1,578 1,577 1,542 805 
Mean – Low 0.4119 0.048 0.265 0.133 0.028 1.521 -0.336 0.065 1.208 -0.108 0.598 2.694 
N – High 1,617 1,519 1,457 1,577 1,511 1,583 18.638 1,629 1,588 1,583 1,551 1,903 
Mean – High 0.000058 0.0026 -0.066 -0.152 -0.110 0.483 0.499 0.457 -0.098 0.097 -0.073 7.404 
  Panel B: Growth Firms  
N – Low 3,672 3,337 3,390 3,382 3,340 3,398 41,095 3,766 3,400 3,395 3,358 1,873 
Mean – Low 0.2911 0.116 0.497 0.278 0.120 1.408 -0.298 0.062 1.794 -0.278 0.552 2.616 
N – High 3,682 3,345 3,390 3,390 3,346 3,405 41,202 3,770 3,408 3,404 3,367 4,028 
Mean – High 0.0000025 0.0008 -0.031 -0.058 -0.138 0.212 1.304 0.915 -0.059 0.298 -0.024 7.296 
             
Low Mean Diff. -0.1208 0.068 0.232 0.145 0.092 -0.113 0.038 -0.003 0.586 -0.170 -0.046 -0.078 
High Mean Diff. -0.0000555 -0.0018 0.035 0.094 -0.028 -0.271 0.805 0.458 0.039 0.201 0.049 -0.108 
  Panel C: Growth Firms – Random Samples 
N – Low 1,561 1,595 1,584 1,584 1,610 1,536 17,453 1,338 1,606 1,625 1,518 775 
Mean – Low 0.2556 0.048 0.256 0.132 0.028 1.309 -0.252 0.087 1.073 -0.108 0.505 2.676 
N – High 1,610 1,608 1,504 1,571 1,609 1,598 18,514 1,621 1,510 1,625 1,499 1,864 
Mean – High 0.000057 0.0026 -0.030 -0.055 -0.110 0.490 0.479 0.459 -0.061 0.098 -0.028 7.319 
             
Low Mean Diff. -0.1563 0.000 -0.009 -0.001 0.000 -0.212 0.084 0.022 -0.135 0.000 -0.093 -0.018 
High Mean Diff. -0.0000010 0.0000 0.036 0.097 0.000 0.007 -0.020 0.002 0.037 0.001 0.045 -0.085 
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Table 9: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions – Random Sample of Growth Firms 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I 
calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-
values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  This table analyzes random samples of growth firms with 
the intent to try to match the means from the value firm samples. For each measure within the growth stock universe I first choose arbitrary cutoff percentiles for 
which produce a mean similar to the value firm sample. From this sample, I then generate 100 random samples of growth firms which have a similar number of 
firms as in the value sample. I then chose the random sample that has a mean closest to the value sample. Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on 
July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. The table represents a portfolio that is long growth firms with low expectation errors, and 
short growth firms with high expectation errors. The time period under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012. Regression p-values use robust standard errors as 
computed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
  Growth Stock Long/Short: Random Sample 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.270 0.047 0.282 0.215 0.468 0.270 0.330 0.408 -0.187 0.088 0.411 0.388 
 0.323 0.822 0.207 0.364 0.048 0.213 0.219 0.158 0.429 0.743 0.129 0.229 
             
Market Return – RF -0.161 -0.050 -0.216 -0.363 0.005 -0.177 -0.066 -0.283 -0.150 -0.287 -0.246 -0.067 
 0.022 0.332 0.000 0.000 0.937 0.012 0.362 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.325 
SMB -0.213 -0.272 -0.516 -0.318 -0.097 -0.153 -0.125 -0.550 -0.321 -0.298 -0.348 -0.362 
 0.069 0.009 0.000 0.047 0.335 0.358 0.191 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.015 
HML 0.147 -0.598 0.075 0.705 -0.268 0.251 0.133 0.109 0.918 0.161 0.425 0.245 
 0.206 0.000 0.448 0.000 0.012 0.021 0.348 0.535 0.000 0.145 0.004 0.049 
MOM 0.191 -0.159 -0.030 0.112 0.050 -0.025 0.757 0.243 0.103 0.036 0.179 0.112 
 0.021 0.021 0.606 0.143 0.457 0.693 0.000 0.032 0.101 0.630 0.038 0.133 
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Table 10: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions within Value and Growth Firms, using 
Hard to Value Measures 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market 
value of equity on June 30th of year t. I calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess 
returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-values are shown below the 
coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced 
each year on July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1.  Idiosyncratic volatility is 
computed by regressing daily returns on a value-weight market index and lagged value-weight market index over a 
one year period preceding the portfolio formation. Analyst dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of the 
analysts’ one-year forward earnings forecast. The portfolios are formed by first identifying value and growth firms. 
Next, I identify high and low expectation errors using each specific expectation error proxy. Last, these portfolios 
are then split by one of the two hard to value measures (Idiosyncratic Volatility and Analyst Dispersion).   The 
long/short portfolios are long value (growth) firms with high (low) expectation errors that are easy/hard to value, 
and short value (growth) firms with low (high) expectation errors that are easy/hard to value. The first p-value of 
difference column uses a paired T-test comparing the monthly returns of the easy to value portfolio against the hard 
to value portfolio (column 2 against column 3, and column 6 against column 7). The second p-value of difference 
column uses a Wald test for a significant difference between the alpha in the easy to value portfolio versus the hard 
to value portfolio (column 2 against column 3, and column 6 against column 7) for each measure. The time period 
under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012.  Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
 
 Value   Growth   
 Test 1: Idiosyncratic Volatility 
  Test 1: Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
  
 Low Ivol High Ivol p-value of 
difference 
(paired t-
test) 
p-value of 
difference 
(Wald 
test) 
Low Ivol High Ivol p-value of 
difference 
(paired t-
test) 
p-value of 
difference 
(Wald test)  Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short 
DISTRESS 0.266 0.324 0.505 0.895 0.118 0.976 0.023 0.011  0.447 0.436 0.728 0.006 
OSCORE -0.360 0.139 0.520 0.196 0.163 0.743 0.088 0.146 
 0.166 0.685 0.455 0.048 
NETISS -0.053 0.420 0.247 0.187 0.501 1.104 0.011 0.041  0.825 0.225 0.006 0.000 
COMPISS 0.017 0.721 0.421 0.105 0.489 1.039 0.068 0.081  0.942 0.068 0.009 0.000 
ACCRUAL 0.219 0.177 0.707 0.919 0.470 0.196 0.872 0.391  0.346 0.635 0.039 0.497 
NOA 0.370 0.347 0.902 0.962 0.457 0.829 0.439 0.307  0.216 0.344 0.052 0.013 
MOM -0.185 0.206 0.267 0.382 0.355 0.950 0.465 0.107  0.626 0.594 0.185 0.007 
GP 0.562 -0.131 0.040 0.118 0.529 1.477 0.003 0.011  0.107 0.707 0.023 0.000 
AG 0.567 0.079 0.503 0.283 -0.048 0.965 0.004 0.005  0.020 0.848 0.817 0.003 
ROA 0.179 0.469 0.619 0.422 0.492 0.600 0.581 0.774  0.524 0.238 0.053 0.066 
INV 0.174 0.344 0.265 0.667 0.346 0.449 0.307 0.751  0.461 0.358 0.074 0.117 
FSCORE 0.486 0.243 0.943 0.602 0.395 0.464 0.508 0.830  0.046 0.608 0.082 0.187 
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Table 10: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions within Value and Growth Firms, using 
Hard to Value Measures (Continued) 
 
 Value   Growth   
 Test 2: Analyst Dispersion   Test 2: Analyst Dispersion   
 Low Disp. High Disp. p-value of 
difference 
(paired t-
test) 
p-value of 
difference 
(Wald test) 
Low Disp. High Disp. p-value of 
difference 
(paired t-
test) 
p-value of 
difference 
(Wald test)  Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short 
DISTRESS -0.335 0.441 0.018 0.070 0.476 -0.090 0.331 0.105  0.363 0.253 0.197 0.816 
OSCORE -0.191 -0.279 0.459 0.817 0.043 0.594 0.037 0.091  0.463 0.477 0.877 0.022 
NETISS -0.140 0.423 0.101 0.179 0.243 0.803 0.061 0.058  0.645 0.203 0.248 0.001 
COMPISS 0.289 0.363 0.677 0.847 0.185 0.910 0.006 0.009  0.243 0.306 0.385 0.000 
ACCRUAL 0.428 0.003 0.362 0.357 0.498 0.564 0.332 0.830  0.199 0.992 0.040 0.029 
NOA 0.808 0.298 0.066 0.208 0.436 0.682 0.558 0.513  0.007 0.380 0.106 0.023 
MOM -0.888 -0.079 0.035 0.143 0.727 0.092 0.056 0.057  0.047 0.853 0.028 0.741 
GP 0.539 0.089 0.152 0.297 0.838 0.645 0.003 0.582  0.174 0.797 0.003 0.032 
AG 0.627 0.024 0.080 0.162 -0.586 0.438 0.000 0.004  0.044 0.942 0.025 0.093 
ROA -0.435 0.420 0.015 0.040 0.520 0.559 0.755 0.901  0.185 0.253 0.083 0.049 
INV 0.494 0.025 0.255 0.217 0.019 0.864 0.002 0.005  0.096 0.941 0.931 0.000 
FSCORE 0.218 0.304 0.755 0.844 0.430 0.757 0.678 0.371  0.466 0.448 0.132 0.010 
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Table 11: Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
 
This table reports the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly individual stock returns on the dependent 
variables. The dependent variables are as follows: FSCORE is computed using the methodology as Piotroski and So 
(2012). Idiosyncratic volatility is computed by regressing daily returns on a value-weight market index and lagged 
value-weight market index over a one year period preceding the portfolio formation. Analyst dispersion is measured 
as the standard deviation of the analysts’ one-year forward earnings forecast. To compute the Hard to Value (HTV) 
indicator (0/1), I split each book-to-market quintile into easy to value and hard to value using either idiosyncratic 
volatility or analyst dispersion. The HTV*FSCORE variable is the interaction between the FSCORE variable and 
the HTV (0/1) indicator. Log(ME) is the log of the market value of equity in millions of dollars. Log(B/M) is the log 
of the book-to-market ratio. Return (-1,0) is the past month’s return for each individual stock, while Return (-12,-2) 
is the cumulative returns from month -12 to month -2 for each stock.  The time period under analysis is 7/1/1976 
until 12/31/2012.  Robust t-stats are shown below the coefficient estimates; *, **, *** denotes significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
       
   Idiosyncratic Volatility Analyst Dispersion 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FSCORE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
 (3.39) (3.74) (3.28) (2.94) (1.36) 
Hard to value (HTV)  -0.001 -0.003 -0.006*** -0.009*** 
(0/1 indicator)  (-0.47) (-1.34) (-7.24) (-5.96) 
HTV* FSCORE   0.001*  0.001*** 
    (1.77)  (2.82) 
Log(B/M) 0.005* 0.006* 0.006* 0.005* 0.005* 
 (1.87) (1.94) (1.93) (1.88) (1.86) 
Log(ME) -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001* 
  (-1.77) (-2.29) (-2.28) (-1.63) (-1.71) 
Return-1,0 -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.031*** 
  (-5.82) (-6.14) (-6.16) (-6.19) (-5.87) 
Return-12,-2 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.004 0.005* 
  (1.67) (1.71) (1.71) (1.42) (1.69) 
Constant 0.008 0.009* 0.011** 0.014** 0.013** 
  (1.31) (1.90) (2.33) (2.24) (2.36) 
         
Observations 543,559 543,559 543,559 543,559 543,559 
Adjusted R-squared 0.056*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 
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Appendix Table 1: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions– Super Incongruent Portfolio Measures 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I calculate monthly 
returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-values are shown below the coefficient 
estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of 
year t+1. Panels A through D show the returns to the value-weighted long/short portfolios using four different hard to value measures. The portfolios are formed by first 
identifying value portfolios and growth portfolios. Next, I identify high and low expectation errors using each specific anomaly strategy. Last, these portfolios are then split by one 
of the four hard to value measures.  Firm age is computed using the first date a firm enters the CRSP database.  Turnover is computed as the monthly volume divided by the 
number of shares outstanding.  The average of the past 12 month’s turnover is used in this table.  Institutional ownership is measured as the percentage of a firm’s outstanding 
stock that is held by institutional investors on June 30th of each year.  A firm is classified as simple if it has 1 segment, and complicated if it has more than 1 segment (using the 
COMPUSTSAT Segments File). The p-value of difference uses a Wald test for a significant difference between the alphas in each panel compared to the alpha of the congruent 
portfolio (Table 4, Panel B) for each measure. Panels E (firm age), F (turnover), G (institutional ownership), and H (simple versus complicated) represent incongruent portfolios 
that are easy to value. These portfolios are long value firms with high expectation errors that are easy to value, and short growth firms with high expectation errors that are easy to 
value. The time period under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012 for firm age and turner, and 7/1/1980 – 12/31/2012 for simple/complicated firms and institutional ownership. 
Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
  Panel A: Super Incongruent (Firm Age) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.418 0.325 0.659 0.757 0.679 1.139 0.969 0.882 0.712 1.045 0.718 0.513 
 0.121 0.255 0.006 0.010 0.050 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.047 0.004 0.018 0.114 
             
Market Return – RF -0.085 -0.121 -0.208 -0.338 -0.161 -0.173 -0.150 -0.359 -0.345 -0.562 -0.211 -0.409 
 0.222 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.021 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 
SMB -0.398 -0.452 -0.075 -0.271 -0.347 -0.219 -0.396 -0.017 -0.199 -0.325 -0.146 -0.425 
 0.001 0.000 0.415 0.042 0.004 0.042 0.000 0.901 0.149 0.004 0.185 0.001 
HML 1.379 0.765 1.531 1.645 1.219 1.177 1.451 1.299 1.615 1.187 1.671 1.413 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.346 -0.312 -0.132 -0.209 -0.208 -0.289 1.051 -0.232 -0.263 -0.049 -0.067 -0.140 
 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.018 0.117 0.006 0.000 0.015 0.051 0.711 0.442 0.152 
             
P-Value of difference 0.598 0.297 0.754 0.735 0.287 0.008 0.013 0.719 0.081 0.014 0.220 0.991 
  Panel B: Super Incongruent (Turnover) 
Alpha 0.395 0.439 0.707 0.958 0.282 1.061 0.878 0.939 0.289 0.576 0.753 0.464 
 0.187 0.137 0.011 0.001 0.444 0.005 0.002 0.015 0.463 0.066 0.022 0.186 
             
Market Return – RF -0.241 -0.206 -0.223 -0.394 -0.025 -0.235 -0.155 -0.208 -0.202 -0.399 -0.144 -0.401 
 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.802 0.005 0.024 0.021 0.039 0.000 0.080 0.000 
SMB -0.253 -0.307 -0.025 -0.207 -0.262 0.082 -0.091 0.105 0.126 -0.294 -0.033 -0.113 
 0.035 0.025 0.820 0.099 0.108 0.552 0.352 0.451 0.423 0.011 0.782 0.408 
HML 1.331 0.722 1.682 1.743 1.347 1.419 1.509 1.307 1.837 1.485 1.727 1.443 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.264 -0.400 -0.170 -0.189 -0.299 -0.331 1.074 -0.566 -0.230 -0.224 -0.161 0.038 
 0.001 0.000 0.076 0.066 0.041 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.014 0.152 0.648 
             
P-Value of difference 0.637 0.097 0.629 0.213 0.699 0.048 0.004 0.523 0.893 0.488 0.145 0.809 
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Appendix Table 1: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions– Super Incongruent Portfolio Measures (Continued) 
 
  Panel C: Super Incongruent (Institutional Ownership) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.493 0.385 0.519 0.877 0.852 0.940 0.372 1.206 0.448 0.808 0.690 1.263 
 0.180 0.229 0.088 0.004 0.016 0.004 0.223 0.001 0.256 0.015 0.036 0.000 
             
Market Return – RF -0.123 -0.119 -0.232 -0.358 -0.221 -0.213 -0.102 -0.265 -0.314 -0.457 -0.177 -0.449 
 0.220 0.154 0.010 0.000 0.011 0.005 0.234 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.066 0.000 
SMB -0.167 -0.236 0.105 -0.042 -0.178 0.199 -0.025 0.006 -0.083 -0.439 0.033 -0.362 
 0.247 0.074 0.511 0.792 0.149 0.149 0.823 0.962 0.665 0.000 0.793 0.004 
HML 1.290 0.605 1.194 1.224 1.033 0.873 1.233 0.827 1.145 1.266 1.008 1.154 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.226 -0.377 -0.223 -0.172 -0.179 -0.158 1.059 -0.304 -0.123 0.141 -0.101 0.071 
 0.073 0.000 0.001 0.027 0.222 0.179 0.000 0.010 0.323 0.079 0.327 0.288 
             
P-Value of difference 0.317 0.216 0.822 0.208 0.093 0.114 0.598 0.144 0.619 0.239 0.372 0.004 
 Panel D: Super Incongruent (Complicated)
Alpha 0.456 0.189 0.673 0.713 1.059 1.136 0.164 0.717 0.785 0.845 0.878 1.152 
 0.132 0.441 0.020 0.017 0.004 0.000 0.586 0.043 0.030 0.005 0.002 0.000 
             
Market Return – RF -0.092 -0.035 -0.210 -0.299 -0.037 -0.169 -0.098 -0.204 -0.086 -0.299 -0.033 -0.147 
 0.297 0.594 0.009 0.000 0.709 0.013 0.159 0.023 0.291 0.000 0.631 0.059 
SMB 0.053 -0.059 0.289 0.130 -0.067 0.297 0.294 0.520 0.119 -0.160 0.084 -0.206 
 0.711 0.592 0.036 0.314 0.601 0.020 0.016 0.000 0.391 0.136 0.418 0.131 
HML 1.032 0.545 1.131 1.138 0.935 0.824 1.152 0.763 1.244 1.205 1.034 0.756 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.307 -0.231 -0.164 -0.140 -0.068 -0.171 1.154 -0.329 -0.042 0.048 0.011 0.082 
 0.001 0.008 0.018 0.051 0.538 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.768 0.588 0.885 0.204 
             
P-Value of difference 0.308 0.665 0.616 0.717 0.044 0.011 0.641 0.439 0.183 0.238 0.141 0.024 
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Appendix Table 1: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions– Super Incongruent Portfolio Measures (Continued) 
 
  Panel E: Incongruent, Easy to Value (Firm Age) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.421 0.069 0.624 0.838 0.198 0.290 0.259 0.604 0.134 0.073 0.290 0.593 
 0.138 0.790 0.011 0.001 0.460 0.219 0.288 0.061 0.600 0.784 0.254 0.014 
             
Market Return – RF -0.072 -0.081 -0.231 -0.420 -0.091 -0.150 -0.077 -0.178 -0.235 -0.178 -0.169 -0.216 
 0.376 0.208 0.001 0.000 0.229 0.021 0.211 0.040 0.001 0.005 0.018 0.000 
SMB 0.152 -0.026 0.189 0.046 0.079 0.171 0.294 0.547 -0.011 -0.168 0.155 -0.087
 0.178 0.843 0.183 0.746 0.408 0.236 0.001 0.000 0.932 0.128 0.166 0.490 
HML 1.340 0.419 1.187 1.152 1.029 1.044 1.276 0.751 1.247 1.417 1.019 0.789 
 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.297 -0.441 -0.158 -0.156 -0.146 -0.209 1.135 -0.498 -0.097 -0.180 -0.101 0.059 
 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.066 0.052 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.251 0.097 0.269 0.338 
 Panel F: Incongruent, Easy to Value (Turnover)
Alpha 0.195 -0.083 0.254 0.294 0.524 0.130 0.069 0.489 0.366 0.492 0.047 0.573 
 0.503 0.727 0.297 0.238 0.061 0.606 0.771 0.066 0.120 0.059 0.862 0.017 
             
Market Return – RF -0.003 0.031 -0.138 -0.243 -0.071 -0.074 -0.007 -0.281 -0.237 -0.237 -0.146 -0.153 
 0.972 0.618 0.076 0.001 0.357 0.286 0.906 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.029 
SMB 0.176 -0.132 0.204 0.084 -0.023 0.222 0.139 0.589 -0.047 -0.199 0.244 -0.077
 0.151 0.205 0.156 0.524 0.806 0.116 0.169 0.000 0.654 0.030 0.021 0.391 
HML 1.160 0.477 1.163 1.126 1.026 0.849 1.183 0.727 0.986 1.035 0.902 0.824 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.306 -0.268 -0.185 -0.147 -0.055 -0.126 1.091 -0.274 -0.118 -0.019 -0.040 -0.017 
 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.023 0.471 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.834 0.681 0.802 
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Appendix Table 1: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions– Super Incongruent Portfolio Measures (Continued) 
 
  Panel G: Incongruent, Easy to Value (Institutional Ownership) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.267 -0.101 0.464 0.557 0.160 0.418 0.358 0.814 0.383 0.499 0.375 0.401
 0.358 0.718 0.089 0.052 0.582 0.112 0.137 0.016 0.207 0.114 0.197 0.162 
             
Market Return – RF -0.062 0.059 -0.139 -0.295 -0.034 0.000 -0.022 -0.133 -0.076 -0.222 -0.077 -0.063
 0.472 0.399 0.049 0.000 0.682 0.997 0.670 0.137 0.344 0.009 0.293 0.441 
SMB 0.036 -0.027 0.114 0.010 -0.050 0.148 0.222 0.631 -0.030 -0.076 0.118 -0.110
 0.789 0.832 0.285 0.939 0.625 0.250 0.012 0.000 0.779 0.485 0.204 0.455 
HML 1.193 0.682 1.386 1.451 1.242 1.263 1.274 1.093 1.637 1.376 1.349 0.940 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.264 -0.338 -0.176 -0.214 -0.210 -0.375 1.108 -0.534 -0.358 -0.259 -0.212 -0.154 
 0.001 0.000 0.066 0.047 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.015 0.099 
 Panel H: Incongruent, Easy to Value (Complicated)
Alpha 0.275 0.315 0.465 0.681 0.500 0.257 0.428 1.158 0.268 0.666 0.423 0.451
 0.364 0.383 0.164 0.034 0.207 0.417 0.147 0.004 0.460 0.081 0.202 0.216 
             
Market Return – RF -0.098 -0.034 -0.150 -0.382 -0.039 -0.008 0.001 -0.237 -0.221 -0.327 -0.238 -0.301 
 0.222 0.722 0.129 0.000 0.709 0.922 0.988 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.015 0.001 
SMB 0.053 -0.291 -0.124 -0.166 0.065 0.081 0.091 0.195 0.056 -0.240 0.312 -0.240 
 0.691 0.041 0.389 0.232 0.675 0.559 0.364 0.151 0.658 0.049 0.004 0.100 
HML 1.372 0.497 1.315 1.447 1.191 1.188 1.286 1.073 1.557 1.412 1.290 1.099 
 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.156 -0.432 -0.130 -0.104 -0.287 -0.233 1.002 -0.529 -0.343 -0.088 -0.321 -0.081 
 0.043 0.000 0.301 0.346 0.076 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.519 0.001 0.539 
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Appendix Table 2: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions: Long and Short Legs of Super Incongruent Portfolio 
  
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I 
calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-
values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on 
July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. Panels A through H show the returns to the value-weighted portfolios.  Panels A, C, E, and 
G represent a portfolio of value firms with the highest investor expectation errors, which are hardest to value using Firm Age, Turnover, Institutional Ownership, 
and Simple/Complicated firms respectively. Panels B, D, F, and H represent a portfolio of growth firms with the highest investor expectation errors, which are 
hardest to value using Firm Age, Turnover, Institutional Ownership, and Simple/Complicated firms respectively. Panels A through H are formed using a triple 
sort. The portfolios are formed by first identifying value portfolios and growth portfolios. Next, I identify high and low expectation errors using each specific 
anomaly strategy. Last, these portfolios are then split by one of the hard to value measures (Firm Age, Turnover, Institutional Ownership, and 
Simple/Complicated firms). The time period under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012. Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
 
  Panel A: Super Incongruent (Firm Age) – Long Leg (Value firms) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.030 0.023 0.210 0.271 0.503 0.443 0.281 0.282 0.287 0.464 0.254 0.062
 0.867 0.912 0.231 0.164 0.048 0.040 0.141 0.273 0.244 0.031 0.232 0.729 
             
Market Return – RF 1.105 1.155 1.085 0.972 1.156 1.182 1.084 1.021 1.154 0.982 1.198 1.005 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.185 0.172 0.371 0.206 0.177 0.309 0.229 0.471 0.358 0.316 0.514 0.186 
 0.023 0.021 0.000 0.006 0.051 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 
HML 0.480 0.390 0.667 0.699 0.329 0.500 0.597 0.472 0.627 0.474 0.717 0.502 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.028 -0.287 -0.195 -0.267 -0.359 -0.311 0.246 -0.294 -0.376 -0.134 -0.213 -0.154 
 0.616 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.076 0.003 0.001 
  Panel B: Super Incongruent (Firm Age) – Short Leg (Growth firms) 
Alpha -0.388 -0.302 -0.449 -0.486 -0.176 -0.696 -0.689 -0.600 -0.425 -0.581 -0.463 -0.452 
 0.062 0.139 0.026 0.029 0.436 0.002 0.008 0.015 0.127 0.032 0.057 0.097 
             
Market Return – RF 1.189 1.276 1.292 1.311 1.316 1.355 1.234 1.380 1.500 1.544 1.409 1.413 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.583 0.625 0.447 0.477 0.524 0.529 0.626 0.489 0.557 0.642 0.660 0.611 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HML -0.899 -0.375 -0.864 -0.946 -0.890 -0.676 -0.853 -0.827 -0.988 -0.712 -0.953 -0.911 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.374 0.025 -0.063 -0.058 -0.151 -0.022 -0.804 -0.063 -0.113 -0.086 -0.146 -0.014 
 0.000 0.653 0.232 0.267 0.011 0.774 0.000 0.345 0.267 0.268 0.038 0.861 
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Appendix Table 2: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions: Long and Short Legs of Super Incongruent Portfolio (Continued) 
 
  Panel C: Super Incongruent (Turnover) – Long Leg (Value firms) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.083 0.165 0.251 0.562 0.287 0.544 0.244 0.363 0.386 0.312 0.377 0.275
 0.703 0.448 0.195 0.009 0.295 0.025 0.179 0.215 0.178 0.127 0.109 0.110 
             
Market Return – RF 1.091 1.110 1.139 0.965 1.313 1.141 1.085 1.169 1.198 0.985 1.226 0.959 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.121 0.158 0.363 0.167 0.258 0.441 0.265 0.504 0.425 0.197 0.436 0.100
 0.156 0.125 0.000 0.084 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.125 
HML 0.535 0.105 0.746 0.801 0.259 0.568 0.657 0.472 0.601 0.385 0.741 0.555 
 0.000 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.041 -0.302 -0.202 -0.215 -0.391 -0.399 0.331 -0.505 -0.371 -0.239 -0.251 -0.092 
 0.471 0.000 0.014 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.030 
  Panel D: Super Incongruent (Turnover) – Short Leg (Growth firms) 
Alpha -0.312 -0.274 -0.455 -0.395 0.005 -0.517 -0.634 -0.577 0.097 -0.265 -0.376 -0.189
 0.121 0.279 0.032 0.065 0.983 0.024 0.006 0.011 0.697 0.314 0.068 0.553 
             
Market Return – RF 1.332 1.316 1.361 1.359 1.338 1.376 1.240 1.377 1.400 1.384 1.370 1.360 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.375 0.465 0.388 0.374 0.521 0.359 0.356 0.399 0.300 0.490 0.469 0.214 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.085 
HML -0.796 -0.616 -0.936 -0.941 -1.088 -0.851 -0.853 -0.835 -1.236 -1.100 -0.986 -0.888 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.223 0.097 -0.032 -0.026 -0.092 -0.069 -0.743 0.062 -0.141 -0.015 -0.090 -0.130 
 0.000 0.190 0.549 0.640 0.183 0.275 0.000 0.261 0.060 0.830 0.097 0.086 
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Appendix Table 2: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions: Long and Short Legs of Super Incongruent Portfolio (Continued) 
 
  Panel E: Super Incongruent (Institutional Ownership) – Long Leg (Value firms) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.069 0.082 -0.064 0.303 0.438 0.314 0.284 0.361 0.177 0.130 0.091 0.428 
 0.742 0.733 0.741 0.128 0.085 0.187 0.152 0.203 0.485 0.526 0.680 0.009 
             
Market Return – RF 0.870 1.017 0.948 0.817 1.011 0.835 0.860 0.959 0.941 0.946 1.002 0.790 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.079 0.109 0.217 0.058 0.203 0.331 0.115 0.437 0.123 0.247 0.314 0.014
 0.321 0.222 0.058 0.595 0.034 0.008 0.159 0.000 0.367 0.001 0.002 0.820 
HML 0.544 0.339 0.704 0.667 0.291 0.337 0.571 0.320 0.238 0.571 0.606 0.435 
 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.001 0.000 0.015 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.006 -0.346 -0.175 -0.138 -0.361 -0.238 0.217 -0.356 -0.304 -0.159 -0.141 -0.030
 0.910 0.000 0.012 0.023 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.025 0.020 0.596 
  Panel F: Super Incongruent (Institutional Ownership) – Short Leg (Growth firms) 
Alpha -0.424 -0.304 -0.583 -0.574 -0.413 -0.625 -0.088 -0.845 -0.272 -0.678 -0.600 -0.834 
 0.099 0.109 0.012 0.015 0.059 0.004 0.743 0.001 0.283 0.017 0.007 0.001 
             
Market Return – RF 0.993 1.136 1.180 1.174 1.232 1.048 0.962 1.224 1.255 1.403 1.178 1.239 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.246 0.345 0.111 0.100 0.382 0.132 0.140 0.431 0.206 0.687 0.281 0.377 
 0.040 0.000 0.211 0.267 0.000 0.115 0.157 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.002 
HML -0.746 -0.267 -0.490 -0.557 -0.742 -0.536 -0.662 -0.507 -0.907 -0.695 -0.401 -0.719 
 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.232 0.031 0.048 0.034 -0.182 -0.080 -0.842 -0.051 -0.181 -0.300 -0.041 -0.101 
 0.012 0.548 0.328 0.472 0.012 0.184 0.000 0.346 0.009 0.000 0.530 0.123 
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Appendix Table 2: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions: Long and Short Legs of Super Incongruent Portfolio (Continued) 
 
  Panel G: Super Incongruent (Simple vs. Complicated Firms) – Long Leg (Value firms) 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.056 -0.050 0.002 0.024 0.308 0.554 0.272 0.263 0.349 0.159 0.226 0.323 
 0.769 0.775 0.992 0.890 0.219 0.018 0.125 0.384 0.136 0.369 0.239 0.016 
             
Market Return – RF 0.983 1.097 1.008 0.924 1.034 0.958 0.903 1.011 1.048 0.959 1.078 0.906 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB -0.045 0.124 0.269 0.109 0.050 0.234 0.139 0.303 0.236 0.216 0.193 0.008
 0.591 0.089 0.006 0.137 0.572 0.010 0.057 0.005 0.013 0.000 0.021 0.901 
HML 0.593 0.410 0.800 0.788 0.376 0.499 0.580 0.316 0.573 0.588 0.697 0.576 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM -0.016 -0.282 -0.168 -0.142 -0.205 -0.310 0.245 -0.384 -0.273 -0.242 -0.127 -0.113 
 0.763 0.000 0.005 0.021 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.018 0.001 
  Panel H: Super Incongruent (Simple vs. Complicated Firms) – Short Leg (Growth firms) 
Alpha -0.400 -0.238 -0.672 -0.689 -0.752 -0.582 0.108 -0.454 -0.436 -0.686 -0.652 -0.829 
 0.054 0.206 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.011 0.674 0.053 0.170 0.017 0.009 0.002 
             
Market Return – RF 1.074 1.131 1.218 1.223 1.071 1.127 1.001 1.215 1.133 1.257 1.111 1.053 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB -0.098 0.183 -0.019 -0.021 0.117 -0.063 -0.155 -0.217 0.117 0.375 0.109 0.213 
 0.302 0.024 0.829 0.818 0.255 0.507 0.116 0.011 0.339 0.000 0.352 0.044 
HML -0.439 -0.135 -0.330 -0.350 -0.559 -0.325 -0.572 -0.448 -0.671 -0.616 -0.336 -0.180
 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.061 
MOM -0.323 -0.051 -0.005 -0.002 -0.137 -0.139 -0.910 -0.055 -0.230 -0.290 -0.138 -0.194 
 0.000 0.470 0.914 0.966 0.044 0.006 0.000 0.358 0.040 0.001 0.092 0.001 
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Appendix Table 3: Summary Statistics for Incongruent and Super Incongruent Portfolios 
 
This table reports summary statistics for annually-rebalance portfolios. The exception is the momentum portfolio, which is formed each month. MVE is the 
market value of equity in millions of dollars on June 30th.  Illiquidity is the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity defined as the average ratio of the daily absolute 
return to the dollar trading volume, measured over a twelve month period prior to the portfolio formation. Panels A and E represent an “incongruent” portfolio 
that is long value firms with the highest investor expectation errors and short growth firms with the highest investor expectation errors.  Panels B, C, F, and G 
represent a “super incongruent” portfolio that is long value firms with high expectation errors that are hard to value, and short growth firms with high expectation 
errors that are hard to value. The hard to value measures are firm age (Panel B), turnover (Panel C), institutional ownership (Panel F), and simple versus 
complicated firms (Panel G). Panels D and H represents the summary statistics for all firms, value firms (high B/M), and growth firms (low B/M). Panels A 
through D represent summary statistics for the portfolios starting on 7/1/1976; Panels F through H represent summary statistics for the portfolios starting on 
7/1/1976 
 
  Panel A: Incongruent Growth Firms   Panel D: Universe of Firms 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
 All 
Firms 
Value 
Firms 
Growth 
Firms 
MVE (N)  3,391   3,090   3,155   3,135   3,094   3,152  37,930  3,485   3,153   3,148   3,135   1,767    62,437   7,547   17,516  
MVE (Mean)  4,140   1,577   2,838   2,835   2,896   3,605   4,053   2,896   3,287   1,395   2,835   2,555    3,676   2,087   5,245  
MVE (Median)  667   520   608   604   610   701   655   553   631   481   604   547    754   679   772  
Illiquidity (N)  3,202   2,896   2,987   2,958   2,899   2,937  35,738  3,291   2,920   2,979   2,958   1,700    60,710   7,472   16,578  
Illiquidity (Mean)  0.101   0.192   0.239   0.234   0.073   0.124   0.103   0.256   0.090   0.262   0.234   0.229    0.116   0.172   0.109  
Illiquidity (Median)  0.008   0.019   0.015   0.015   0.010   0.009   0.008   0.018   0.010   0.021   0.015   0.016    0.009   0.011   0.009  
  Panel B: Super Incongruent Growth Firms (Firm Age)   Panel D: Universe of Firms 
MVE (N)  1,615   1,432   1,495   1,461   1,431   1,488  18,075  1,674   1,456   1,488   1,799   837    62,437   7,547   17,516  
MVE (Mean)  1,545   1,168   1,805   1,792   1,763   2,002   1,482   1,414   1,743   1,067   2,256   1,313    3,676   2,087   5,245  
MVE (Median)  523   511   564   564   575   604   504   480   579   449   574   472    754   679   772  
Illiquidity (N)  1,499   1,323   1,381   1,359   1,335   1,370  16,577  1,536   1,361   1,360   1,678   800    60,710   7,472   16,578  
Illiquidity (Mean)  0.117   0.199   0.274   0.263   0.069   0.103   0.097   0.290   0.082   0.331   0.309   0.334    0.116   0.172   0.109  
Illiquidity (Median)  0.012   0.021   0.017   0.017   0.013   0.013   0.012   0.021   0.013   0.025   0.016   0.020    0.009   0.011   0.009  
  Panel C: Super Incongruent Growth Firms (Turnover)   Panel D: Universe of Firms 
MVE (N)  1,454   1,419   1,454   1,457   1,429   1,437  17,913  1,461   1,426   1,471   1,995   813    62,437   7,547   17,516  
MVE (Mean)  2,636   1,388   2,288   2,295   2,335   2,836   2,331   2,112   3,739   1,560   2,111   1,922    3,676   2,087   5,245  
MVE (Median)  709   542   692   696   690   814   722   635   804   598   682   628    754   679   772  
Illiquidity (N)  1,454   1,419   1,454   1,457   1,429   1,437  17,913  1,459   1,426   1,471   1,995   813    60,710   7,472   16,578  
Illiquidity (Mean)  0.037   0.109   0.070   0.066   0.035   0.039   0.031   0.178   0.035   0.208   0.181   0.274    0.116   0.172   0.109  
Illiquidity (Median)  0.005   0.013   0.009   0.008   0.006   0.006   0.005   0.010   0.005   0.010   0.010   0.009    0.009   0.011   0.009  
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Appendix Table 3: Summary Statistics for Incongruent and Super Incongruent Portfolios (Continued) 
 
 
  Panel E: Incongruent Growth Firms   Panel H: Universe of Firms 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
 All 
Firms 
Value 
Firms 
Growth 
Firms 
MVE (N)  3,114   2,820   2,881   2,865   2,824   2,879  34,722  3,206   2,880   2,876   2,865   1,672    56,938   6,803   16,116  
MVE (Mean)  4,438   1,715   3,068   3,064   3,148   3,919   4,341   3,119   3,576   1,487   3,064   2,666    3,977   2,279   5,639  
MVE (Median)  754   613   663   660   690   811   705   626   709   534   660   579    841   762   851  
Illiquidity (N)  3,028   2,725   2,795   2,776   2,729   2,764  33,609  3,098   2,770   2,788   2,776   1,632    56,114   6,770   15,614  
Illiquidity (Mean)  0.094   0.175   0.243   0.237   0.063   0.118   0.100   0.255   0.083   0.254   0.237   0.229    0.093   0.120   0.102  
Illiquidity (Median)  0.007   0.016   0.013   0.012   0.009   0.008   0.007   0.015   0.008   0.018   0.012   0.015    0.007   0.008   0.007  
  Panel F: Super Incongruent Growth Firms (Institutional Ownership)   Panel H: Universe of Firms 
MVE (N)  1,531   1,379   1,412   1,407   1,386   1,411  17,061  1,568   1,408   1,405   1,424   819    56,938   6,803   16,116  
MVE (Mean)  5,509   1,626   3,673   3,653   3,579   4,462   5,317   2,750   4,094   1,053   3,311   2,118    3,977   2,279   5,639  
MVE (Median)  584   484   495   496   542   616   517   455   569   423   481   403    841   762   851  
Illiquidity (N)  1,470   1,330   1,359   1,353   1,330   1,347  16,359  1,502   1,347   1,356   1,375   796    56,114   6,770   15,614  
Illiquidity (Mean)  0.159   0.264   0.423   0.410   0.095   0.184   0.160   0.315   0.110   0.410   0.410   0.416    0.093   0.120   0.102  
Illiquidity (Median)  0.012   0.029   0.027   0.027   0.016   0.015   0.015   0.028   0.016   0.031   0.028   0.032    0.007   0.008   0.007  
  Panel G: Super Incongruent Growth Firms (Simple vs. Complicated)   Panel H: Universe of Firms 
MVE (N)  905   1,016   795   778   701   810   9,342   864   604   789   778   436    56,938   6,803   16,116  
MVE (Mean)  7,331   2,025   5,468   5,552   5,278   4,454   8,311   6,591   5,549   1,831   5,552   3,911    3,977   2,279   5,639  
MVE (Median)  1,121   721   772   762   1,007   1,151   1,096   1,050   973   611   762   702    841   762   851  
Illiquidity (N)  874   975   767   749   676   777   8,973   832   574   760   749   422    56,114   6,770   15,614  
Illiquidity (Mean)  0.059   0.129   0.161   0.160   0.074   0.068   0.066   0.209   0.076   0.149   0.160   0.092    0.093   0.120   0.102  
Illiquidity (Median)  0.003   0.010   0.009   0.009   0.005   0.004   0.004   0.006   0.004   0.018   0.009   0.010    0.007   0.008   0.007  
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Appendix Table 4: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions across Value and Growth Firms (Sub period analysis) 
  
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I 
calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-
values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on 
July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. Panels A through D show the returns to the value-weighted long/short portfolios. Panels A 
through D are formed using a triple sort. The portfolios are formed by first identifying value portfolios and growth portfolios. Next, I identify high and low 
expectation errors using each specific anomaly strategy. Last, these portfolios are then split by one of the two hard to value measures (Idiosyncratic Volatility and 
Analyst Dispersion).  Panels A and B represent the long/short “super incongruent” portfolio using Idiosyncratic Volatility, while Panels C and D use Analyst 
Dispersion.  Panels A and C examine the time period from 7/1/1976 – 9/30/1994, while Panels B and D examine the time period from 10/1/1994 – 12/31/2012. 
Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
  Panel A: Super Incongruent (Idiosyncratic Volatility) – 7/1/1976 – 9/30/1994 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 1.119 0.660 1.225 1.262 0.492 0.767 1.261 1.064 1.117 1.751 1.193 0.823
 0.002 0.108 0.003 0.002 0.205 0.100 0.001 0.033 0.005 0.000 0.012 0.063 
             
Market Return – RF -0.055 -0.180 -0.027 -0.114 0.028 -0.096 -0.066 0.036 -0.059 -0.256 0.154 -0.064 
 0.531 0.119 0.841 0.343 0.765 0.318 0.473 0.769 0.484 0.013 0.128 0.536 
SMB -0.527 -0.575 -0.305 -0.779 -0.285 -0.277 -0.298 -0.036 0.045 -0.880 0.065 -0.387 
 0.000 0.002 0.117 0.000 0.105 0.076 0.021 0.849 0.815 0.000 0.672 0.010 
HML 1.666 0.767 1.351 1.390 1.703 1.354 1.257 1.107 1.442 0.712 1.239 1.478 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.418 -0.189 -0.336 -0.549 -0.278 -0.210 1.019 -0.264 -0.104 -0.306 -0.400 -0.036
 0.000 0.144 0.014 0.000 0.033 0.218 0.000 0.103 0.469 0.021 0.013 0.798 
  Panel B: Super Incongruent (Idiosyncratic Volatility) – 10/1/1994 – 12/31/2012 
Alpha 0.781 0.675 1.738 1.648 0.529 1.602 1.128 0.700 0.944 0.360 1.132 0.717
 0.154 0.231 0.001 0.002 0.414 0.017 0.019 0.247 0.178 0.522 0.040 0.213 
             
Market Return – RF -0.429 -0.200 -0.264 -0.477 -0.043 -0.344 -0.315 -0.342 -0.263 -0.555 -0.505 -0.219
 0.008 0.174 0.066 0.000 0.775 0.028 0.008 0.021 0.145 0.000 0.002 0.196 
SMB -0.442 -0.330 -0.164 -0.426 -0.320 0.089 -0.261 -0.008 -0.264 -0.120 0.034 -0.416 
 0.019 0.121 0.387 0.017 0.181 0.648 0.069 0.971 0.228 0.425 0.844 0.057 
HML 1.365 0.739 1.905 1.735 1.180 1.455 1.831 1.237 1.736 1.788 1.955 1.756 
 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.235 -0.309 -0.386 -0.368 -0.261 -0.377 1.001 -0.457 -0.325 -0.121 -0.093 -0.109 
 0.027 0.048 0.008 0.007 0.287 0.046 0.000 0.003 0.066 0.240 0.533 0.538 
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Appendix Table 4: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions across Value and Growth Firms (sub period analysis - Continued) 
 
  Panel C: Super Incongruent (Analyst Dispersion) - 7/1/1976 – 9/30/1994 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.878 0.324 0.705 0.901 -0.313 0.272 0.529 0.588 0.699 0.208 0.404 1.052 
 0.025 0.354 0.095 0.025 0.441 0.498 0.134 0.254 0.054 0.510 0.314 0.013 
             
Market Return – RF 0.088 -0.009 0.149 -0.104 0.068 -0.193 0.014 -0.034 -0.025 -0.044 0.082 -0.068 
 0.396 0.927 0.233 0.356 0.583 0.045 0.853 0.821 0.795 0.576 0.387 0.577 
SMB -0.127 -0.394 0.146 -0.042 0.010 0.120 0.050 0.285 0.134 -0.366 0.388 -0.510 
 0.454 0.013 0.339 0.766 0.951 0.485 0.712 0.106 0.405 0.004 0.020 0.014 
HML 1.922 1.082 1.660 1.630 1.848 1.584 1.531 1.320 1.461 1.158 1.515 1.463 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.516 -0.293 -0.216 -0.290 0.047 -0.218 1.221 -0.267 -0.251 -0.257 -0.110 0.107 
 0.000 0.016 0.064 0.013 0.698 0.098 0.000 0.067 0.038 0.008 0.414 0.424 
  Panel D: Super Incongruent (Analyst Dispersion) - 10/1/1994 – 12/31/2012 
Alpha 0.198 0.013 1.362 1.182 0.985 0.977 0.530 0.942 0.620 1.394 0.952 1.144 
 0.714 0.976 0.000 0.003 0.052 0.015 0.169 0.095 0.164 0.003 0.043 0.010 
             
Market Return – RF -0.038 0.133 -0.389 -0.401 0.113 -0.233 -0.105 -0.337 -0.370 -0.346 -0.283 -0.308 
 0.815 0.241 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.017 0.320 0.013 0.003 0.002 0.015 0.002 
SMB 0.105 -0.201 0.444 0.397 0.092 0.059 0.269 0.261 0.151 -0.229 -0.066 -0.294
 0.590 0.220 0.000 0.001 0.591 0.676 0.049 0.134 0.286 0.154 0.648 0.070 
HML 1.214 0.266 1.221 1.273 0.838 0.880 1.423 0.834 1.531 1.299 1.169 0.864 
 0.000 0.159 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.348 -0.409 -0.148 -0.135 -0.323 0.007 1.018 -0.379 -0.114 -0.013 0.117 -0.125 
 0.035 0.000 0.058 0.130 0.020 0.950 0.000 0.003 0.325 0.901 0.448 0.228 
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Appendix Table 5: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions: Using non-NYSE B/M breakpoints 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I 
calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-
values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on 
July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. Panel A represents a portfolio that is long value firms with high expectation errors, and 
short value firms with low expectation errors. Panel B represents a portfolio that is long growth firms with low expectation errors, and short growth firms with 
high expectation errors. The time period under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012. Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
  Panel A: Value Stocks Long/Short 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.043 -0.193 0.161 0.307 0.045 0.347 -0.175 0.455 0.301 0.155 0.137 0.329 
 0.863 0.365 0.379 0.084 0.805 0.078 0.500 0.031 0.090 0.501 0.440 0.125 
             
Market Return – RF -0.167 -0.036 0.140 -0.126 0.048 0.136 -0.155 0.152 -0.005 -0.237 0.077 -0.244 
 0.015 0.526 0.001 0.004 0.257 0.009 0.036 0.007 0.901 0.000 0.104 0.000 
SMB -0.302 -0.235 0.033 -0.223 -0.084 0.055 -0.212 0.459 0.027 -0.188 0.132 -0.211 
 0.000 0.003 0.668 0.002 0.220 0.446 0.044 0.000 0.692 0.019 0.069 0.012 
HML 0.211 -0.377 0.310 0.364 0.072 0.183 0.304 0.025 0.217 0.115 0.208 0.144 
 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.363 0.022 0.010 0.780 0.002 0.282 0.007 0.139 
MOM 0.551 -0.108 0.145 0.188 -0.010 0.069 1.286 -0.202 0.043 0.355 0.036 0.276 
 0.000 0.222 0.013 0.001 0.887 0.210 0.000 0.008 0.489 0.000 0.496 0.000 
  Panel B: Growth Stock Long/Short  
Alpha 0.317 0.403 0.546 0.545 0.657 0.589 0.659 0.703 0.089 0.452 0.238 0.451 
 0.369 0.092 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.018 0.016 0.006 0.709 0.070 0.261 0.060 
             
Market Return – RF 0.189 -0.138 -0.295 -0.318 -0.143 -0.015 0.187 -0.374 -0.350 -0.228 -0.285 -0.084 
 0.051 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.791 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.117 
SMB 0.447 -0.573 -0.457 -0.490 -0.171 -0.303 0.423 -0.228 -0.376 -0.628 -0.316 -0.368 
 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.005 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HML 0.027 -0.586 0.309 0.330 -0.021 -0.061 -0.020 0.016 0.845 0.120 0.614 -0.140 
 0.883 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.826 0.567 0.862 0.895 0.000 0.288 0.000 0.070 
MOM 0.400 -0.192 -0.008 -0.004 0.047 -0.040 1.327 0.007 0.153 0.015 0.099 0.078 
 0.002 0.000 0.869 0.923 0.477 0.508 0.000 0.906 0.034 0.849 0.178 0.155 
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Appendix Table 6: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions: Using the 30th and 70th NYSE B/M Percentiles 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I 
calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-
values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on 
July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. Panel A represents a portfolio that is long value firms with high expectation errors, and 
short value firms with low expectation errors. Panel B represents a portfolio that is long growth firms with low expectation errors, and short growth firms with 
high expectation errors. The time period under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012. Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
 
  Panel A: Value Stocks Long/Short 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.104 -0.049 0.200 0.401 0.222 0.418 -0.137 0.447 0.313 0.305 0.117 0.282 
 0.678 0.797 0.251 0.017 0.221 0.027 0.605 0.053 0.057 0.216 0.535 0.196 
             
Market Return – RF -0.193 -0.021 0.126 -0.167 0.040 0.120 -0.211 0.169 -0.009 -0.226 0.050 -0.231 
 0.010 0.706 0.006 0.000 0.338 0.018 0.007 0.006 0.833 0.001 0.337 0.000 
SMB -0.210 -0.232 0.137 -0.179 -0.070 0.089 -0.190 0.490 0.053 -0.114 0.159 -0.278 
 0.015 0.002 0.083 0.013 0.280 0.242 0.092 0.000 0.427 0.185 0.042 0.000 
HML 0.067 -0.280 0.292 0.367 -0.018 0.134 0.255 -0.037 0.169 0.057 0.233 0.081 
 0.580 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.824 0.075 0.064 0.714 0.003 0.646 0.005 0.444 
MOM 0.480 -0.069 0.067 0.108 -0.077 0.013 1.262 -0.258 0.018 0.301 0.045 0.262 
 0.000 0.278 0.136 0.016 0.237 0.823 0.000 0.005 0.708 0.000 0.486 0.000 
  Panel B: Growth Stock Long/Short  
Alpha 0.155 0.329 0.495 0.531 0.465 0.443 0.046 0.648 0.150 0.407 0.394 0.371 
 0.602 0.085 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.023 0.826 0.001 0.402 0.034 0.014 0.063 
             
Market Return – RF 0.102 -0.158 -0.276 -0.314 -0.061 -0.051 0.149 -0.343 -0.237 -0.311 -0.178 -0.040 
 0.218 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.159 0.274 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.420 
SMB 0.426 -0.304 -0.343 -0.383 -0.274 -0.115 0.339 -0.183 -0.325 -0.395 -0.211 -0.322 
 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HML 0.083 -0.513 0.307 0.397 0.196 -0.156 0.063 -0.013 0.778 0.000 0.299 0.098 
 0.595 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.082 0.513 0.882 0.000 0.999 0.000 0.237 
MOM 0.399 -0.140 0.055 0.055 0.013 0.006 1.366 -0.018 0.101 0.033 0.090 0.124 
 0.000 0.016 0.075 0.088 0.811 0.911 0.000 0.708 0.040 0.583 0.052 0.063 
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Appendix Table 7: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions: NYSE B/M breakpoints EW Returns 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I 
calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-
values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on 
July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. Panel A represents a portfolio that is long value firms with high expectation errors, and 
short value firms with low expectation errors. Panel B represents a portfolio that is long growth firms with low expectation errors, and short growth firms with 
high expectation errors. The time period under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012. Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
  Panel A: Value Stocks Long/Short 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha -0.032 0.071 0.383 0.612 0.300 0.438 -0.074 0.457 0.464 0.165 0.270 0.419 
 0.911 0.701 0.101 0.006 0.216 0.038 0.798 0.076 0.031 0.542 0.200 0.089 
             
Market Return – RF -0.170 0.014 0.048 -0.222 0.114 0.014 -0.260 0.079 0.034 -0.362 0.034 -0.253 
 0.042 0.743 0.401 0.000 0.017 0.781 0.002 0.169 0.551 0.000 0.555 0.000 
SMB -0.439 -0.142 0.005 -0.350 -0.034 0.096 -0.439 0.511 0.119 -0.258 0.192 -0.388 
 0.000 0.022 0.954 0.000 0.697 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.227 0.010 0.018 0.000 
HML 0.279 -0.222 0.332 0.308 -0.069 0.121 0.515 0.137 0.371 0.175 0.320 0.211 
 0.054 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.518 0.200 0.000 0.232 0.000 0.127 0.002 0.081 
MOM 0.626 -0.032 0.172 0.145 0.004 0.166 1.474 -0.147 0.091 0.322 0.214 0.422 
 0.000 0.657 0.117 0.244 0.971 0.009 0.000 0.263 0.414 0.006 0.001 0.000 
  Panel B: Growth Stock Long/Short  
Alpha 0.320 0.325 0.734 0.719 0.483 0.656 0.404 0.960 0.618 0.473 0.608 0.706 
 0.278 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 
             
Market Return – RF 0.102 -0.104 -0.287 -0.344 -0.010 -0.129 0.105 -0.205 -0.180 -0.171 -0.201 -0.160 
 0.110 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.779 0.004 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.006 -0.169 -0.467 -0.570 -0.006 0.103 0.044 -0.315 -0.254 -0.404 -0.129 -0.397 
 0.952 0.166 0.000 0.000 0.912 0.274 0.619 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.000 
HML 0.232 -0.427 0.563 0.649 0.097 -0.193 0.079 0.168 0.561 0.218 0.330 0.326 
 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.133 0.016 0.460 0.046 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 
MOM 0.463 0.018 0.134 0.152 -0.058 0.006 1.306 0.073 0.179 0.130 0.171 0.167 
 0.001 0.822 0.081 0.066 0.295 0.941 0.000 0.195 0.001 0.046 0.000 0.010 
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Appendix Table 8: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions: all firms, NYSE B/M breakpoints 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I 
calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-
values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on 
July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. Panel A represents a portfolio that is long value firms with high expectation errors, and 
short value firms with low expectation errors. Panel B represents a portfolio that is long growth firms with low expectation errors, and short growth firms with 
high expectation errors. The time period under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012. Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
  Panel A: Value Stocks Long/Short 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.369 0.043 0.200 0.323 0.217 0.493 0.096 0.368 0.409 0.307 0.248 0.325 
 0.229 0.863 0.320 0.083 0.377 0.037 0.786 0.146 0.069 0.327 0.274 0.194 
             
Market Return – RF -0.116 -0.070 0.042 -0.157 0.096 0.071 -0.192 0.102 -0.039 -0.249 0.026 -0.147 
 0.215 0.262 0.396 0.002 0.076 0.369 0.069 0.111 0.518 0.004 0.677 0.059 
SMB -0.755 -0.862 0.075 -0.403 -0.332 0.545 -0.563 0.942 0.391 -0.777 0.254 -0.364 
 0.000 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
HML 0.304 -0.318 0.348 0.333 -0.087 -0.143 0.567 0.003 -0.037 0.447 0.207 0.248 
 0.048 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.423 0.156 0.003 0.977 0.702 0.005 0.026 0.046 
MOM 0.628 0.116 0.141 0.161 0.082 0.018 1.443 -0.184 0.052 0.153 0.156 0.280 
 0.000 0.138 0.052 0.020 0.333 0.769 0.000 0.039 0.380 0.113 0.038 0.000 
  Panel B: Growth Stock Long/Short  
Alpha 0.588 0.928 0.813 0.782 0.595 0.634 0.683 1.249 -0.110 1.448 0.248 0.621 
 0.081 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.000 0.642 0.000 0.171 0.004 
             
Market Return – RF 0.144 -0.231 -0.319 -0.323 -0.056 0.001 0.106 -0.373 -0.266 -0.287 -0.169 -0.123 
 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.288 0.986 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 
SMB 0.212 -1.103 -0.461 -0.457 -0.271 -0.194 0.183 -0.704 -0.138 -0.847 -0.172 -0.458 
 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.064 0.053 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.020 0.000 
HML 0.070 -0.419 0.178 0.284 -0.062 -0.247 -0.015 0.291 0.723 0.251 0.407 -0.043 
 0.668 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.471 0.015 0.892 0.014 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.578 
MOM 0.406 -0.176 -0.009 -0.016 -0.053 -0.099 1.475 0.002 0.130 0.013 0.079 0.130 
 0.001 0.020 0.842 0.735 0.456 0.111 0.000 0.978 0.024 0.882 0.141 0.041 
 79 
 
Appendix Table 9: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions, Liquidity 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t. I 
calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-
values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on 
July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. Portfolios are formed by first sorting on book-to-market to identify value and growth 
quintiles, then by splitting the value and growth firms into liquid and illiquid buckets, and last by separating on each expectation error measure (choose top decile 
as long, and bottom decile as short). Panel A represents returns to a long/short illiquid value portfolio, while Panel C represents returns to a long/short liquid 
value portfolio.  Panel B represents returns to a long/short illiquid growth portfolio, while Panel D represents returns to a long/short liquid growth portfolio. 
Illiquidity is the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity defined as the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume, measured over a 
twelve month period prior to the portfolio formation.  The time period under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012. Regression p-values use robust standard 
errors as computed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
  Panel A: Value Stocks Long/Short: Illiquid Firms 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.125 -0.148 -0.100 0.050 0.288 0.687 -0.310 0.411 0.529 0.254 0.356 0.286 
 0.701 0.611 0.702 0.839 0.242 0.015 0.395 0.209 0.036 0.382 0.142 0.431 
             
Market Return – RF -0.240 0.126 0.159 -0.079 0.050 -0.043 -0.325 0.153 -0.115 -0.207 -0.049 -0.115 
 0.019 0.121 0.019 0.263 0.345 0.599 0.002 0.062 0.088 0.010 0.482 0.301 
SMB -0.463 -0.058 0.135 -0.095 0.129 0.096 -0.320 0.338 0.008 0.005 0.189 -0.211 
 0.000 0.574 0.271 0.411 0.163 0.448 0.043 0.004 0.935 0.967 0.087 0.059 
HML 0.282 -0.229 0.503 0.458 -0.072 -0.021 0.480 0.044 0.086 0.306 0.308 0.282 
 0.076 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.536 0.880 0.006 0.745 0.455 0.041 0.011 0.130 
MOM 0.549 -0.097 0.094 0.103 -0.098 0.140 1.404 -0.364 0.033 0.199 0.209 0.317 
 0.000 0.372 0.377 0.267 0.282 0.148 0.000 0.003 0.701 0.035 0.003 0.000 
  Panel B: Growth Stock Long/Short: Illiquid Firms  
Alpha 0.307 0.516 0.594 0.525 0.532 0.576 0.187 0.685 0.118 0.434 0.504 0.404 
 0.334 0.018 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.007 0.457 0.002 0.576 0.024 0.009 0.093 
             
Market Return – RF 0.079 -0.088 -0.246 -0.310 -0.061 -0.072 0.117 -0.352 -0.294 -0.209 -0.258 -0.089 
 0.374 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.244 0.142 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 
SMB 0.262 -0.120 -0.244 -0.276 -0.215 -0.151 0.256 -0.111 -0.348 -0.101 -0.263 -0.331 
 0.069 0.165 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.098 0.006 0.176 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.001 
HML 0.202 -0.571 0.377 0.547 0.055 -0.037 0.139 0.021 0.886 -0.156 0.336 -0.035 
 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.511 0.692 0.176 0.822 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.683 
MOM 0.412 -0.207 0.013 0.061 -0.019 -0.011 1.363 0.021 0.067 0.003 0.031 0.140 
 0.001 0.000 0.742 0.170 0.745 0.837 0.000 0.704 0.291 0.951 0.660 0.052 
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Appendix Table 9: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions, Liquidity (Contiuned) 
 
  Panel C: Value Stocks Long/Short: Liquid Firms 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.250 0.220 0.462 0.707 0.337 -0.078 0.362 0.386 -0.039 0.684 0.091 0.690 
 0.360 0.351 0.062 0.002 0.160 0.736 0.247 0.111 0.874 0.010 0.713 0.009 
             
Market Return – RF -0.070 -0.118 -0.064 -0.320 0.006 0.020 -0.152 -0.031 0.114 -0.447 0.142 -0.248 
 0.367 0.037 0.387 0.000 0.928 0.754 0.173 0.623 0.176 0.000 0.086 0.000 
SMB -0.266 -0.115 0.125 -0.320 -0.271 0.172 -0.486 0.490 0.257 -0.287 0.128 -0.380 
 0.002 0.228 0.111 0.000 0.019 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.001 0.153 0.000 
HML 0.140 -0.106 0.064 -0.055 -0.100 0.041 0.140 -0.094 0.257 -0.069 0.107 0.051 
 0.200 0.292 0.578 0.545 0.274 0.623 0.325 0.367 0.012 0.535 0.263 0.637 
MOM 0.298 0.054 0.076 0.128 0.096 0.061 1.175 -0.136 0.047 0.145 0.079 0.249 
 0.002 0.522 0.193 0.138 0.350 0.368 0.000 0.142 0.521 0.117 0.294 0.001 
  Panel D: Growth Stock Long/Short: Liquid Firms  
Alpha 0.308 0.147 0.338 0.414 0.377 0.468 0.603 0.926 0.508 0.448 0.333 0.937 
 0.346 0.540 0.100 0.039 0.076 0.061 0.033 0.001 0.030 0.095 0.117 0.001 
             
Market Return – RF 0.193 -0.180 -0.269 -0.305 0.002 -0.148 0.153 -0.264 -0.153 -0.262 -0.134 -0.270 
 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.961 0.009 0.045 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.008 0.001 
SMB 0.001 -0.050 -0.361 -0.396 0.055 0.230 -0.015 -0.179 0.017 -0.400 0.059 -0.211 
 0.992 0.724 0.000 0.000 0.487 0.056 0.882 0.117 0.856 0.000 0.548 0.024 
HML 0.139 -0.280 0.434 0.487 0.186 -0.289 -0.078 0.163 0.300 0.439 0.213 0.216 
 0.308 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.004 0.488 0.124 0.002 0.000 0.024 0.030 
MOM 0.350 -0.030 -0.026 -0.024 0.097 -0.060 1.171 -0.097 0.063 0.091 0.003 0.068 
 0.001 0.667 0.563 0.586 0.080 0.469 0.000 0.137 0.332 0.140 0.955 0.275 
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Appendix Table 10: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions – Microcap Firms Only 
  
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms below the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity (microcap firms) on June 30th 
of year t. I calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly 
percent, p-values are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each 
year on July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. Panel A represents a portfolio that is long value firms with high expectation errors, 
and short value firms with low expectation errors. Panel B represents a portfolio that is long growth firms with low expectation errors, and short growth firms 
with high expectation errors. The time period under analysis is from 7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012. Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
 
  Panel A: Value Stocks Long/Short 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
Alpha 0.762 0.198 0.350 0.531 0.401 0.843 1.135 0.623 0.592 0.221 0.331 0.354 
 0.003 0.326 0.061 0.002 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.426 0.049 0.044 
             
Market Return – RF -0.062 -0.184 -0.008 -0.156 0.059 -0.068 -0.158 -0.091 0.090 -0.208 0.045 -0.138 
 0.371 0.000 0.856 0.000 0.142 0.282 0.012 0.046 0.125 0.000 0.290 0.001 
SMB -0.426 -0.342 -0.138 -0.390 0.065 0.307 -0.330 -0.049 0.441 -0.677 0.225 -0.373 
 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.354 0.004 0.002 0.431 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.000 
HML 0.367 -0.291 0.175 0.249 0.055 -0.225 0.338 0.050 0.103 0.344 0.231 0.316 
 0.002 0.002 0.035 0.001 0.482 0.017 0.009 0.538 0.330 0.005 0.004 0.000 
MOM 0.542 0.209 0.110 0.170 0.060 0.165 1.189 0.063 0.110 0.158 0.214 0.158 
 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.004 0.346 0.032 0.000 0.217 0.215 0.158 0.001 0.004 
  Panel B: Growth Stock Long/Short  
Alpha 0.991 0.827 0.858 0.945 0.069 0.555 1.552 1.219 0.452 1.116 0.390 0.855 
 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.779 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.081 0.001 
             
Market Return – RF 0.158 0.043 -0.197 -0.236 0.007 -0.014 0.184 -0.010 -0.057 -0.005 -0.130 -0.046 
 0.026 0.515 0.000 0.000 0.911 0.803 0.029 0.880 0.267 0.942 0.011 0.485 
SMB -0.239 -0.310 -0.234 -0.279 0.163 0.228 -0.333 -0.321 0.198 -0.400 0.065 -0.583 
 0.040 0.016 0.004 0.001 0.116 0.079 0.030 0.040 0.049 0.004 0.463 0.001 
HML 0.391 0.045 0.354 0.364 -0.044 -0.239 0.171 0.107 -0.011 0.450 -0.065 0.207 
 0.008 0.738 0.000 0.000 0.696 0.011 0.293 0.356 0.916 0.000 0.522 0.069 
MOM 0.456 -0.100 -0.014 0.004 0.114 -0.075 1.144 0.080 0.034 0.014 0.012 0.075 
 0.001 0.210 0.829 0.962 0.117 0.265 0.000 0.414 0.585 0.876 0.834 0.510 
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Appendix Table 11: Comparing Expectation Error Standard Deviations between Value and Growth firms 
 
This table reports summary statistics for all observations above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t, who also have 
necessary data for the expectational error proxies for five years.  For each firm with five years of data, the standard deviation of each measure is computed over 
the past five years.  The standard deviation (at the firm level) of each measure is shown below for all firms (Panel A), Value firms (Panel B), and growth firms 
(Panel C).  DISTRESS is computed using the methodology in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). OSCORE is computed using the methodology in Ohlson 
(1980).  NETISS is computed as the growth rate of the split-adjusted shares outstanding in the previous fiscal year. COMPISS is computed similar to Daniel and 
Titman (2006). ACCRUAL is computed using the methodology in Sloan (1996). NOA is computed using the methodology in Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang 
(2004). MOM is the cumulative returns from month -12 to month -2 similar to Fama and French (2008). Gross profitability premium is measured by gross profits 
scaled by total assets as in Novy-Marx (2013). Asset growth is measured as the growth rate of the total assets in the previous fiscal year, as in Cooper, Gulen, and 
Schill (2008). ROA is computed similar to Piotroski and So (2012): income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Investment-to-assets is measured 
as the annual change in gross property, plant, and equipment plus the annual change in inventories scaled by the lagged book value of assets, as in Titman, Wei, 
and Xie (2004). FSCORE is computed using the methodology as Piotroski and So (2012). 
 
  Panel A: All Firms 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
N  44,115   41,812   43,530   42,552   41,476   43,228  42,681 44,990  43,477   43,404   42,293   40,465  
Mean  0.087   0.010   0.099   0.070   0.046   0.199   0.392   0.052   0.268   0.045   0.167   1.300  
  Panel B: Value Firms  
N  6,392   6,014   6,344   6,157   5,931   6,311   6,172   6,484   6,340   6,320   6,130   5,732  
Mean  0.0995   0.0081   0.1107   0.0819   0.0356   0.1476  0.3212 0.0370  0.2004   0.0340   0.1140   1.3494  
  Panel C: Growth Firms  
N  8,704   8,194   8,442   8,262   8,206   8,415   8,302   8,905   8,426   8,410   8,260   7,920  
Mean  0.0911   0.0172   0.1083   0.0666   0.0534   0.3667  0.4955  .0721   0.4907   0.0672   0.4138   1.2645  
             
Mean higher for 
growth firms? 
No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
             
P-value for diff. in 
Means (B vs. C) 
0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.41 0.00 
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Appendix Table 12: Comparing Expectation Error Standard Deviations between hard to value and easy to value firms 
 
This table reports summary statistics for all observations above the NYSE 20th percentile for market value of equity on June 30th of year t, who also have 
necessary data for the expectational error proxies for five years and are classified as a value or a growth firms each year. For each firm with five years of data, the 
standard deviation of each measure is computed over the past five years.  The standard deviation (at the firm level) of each measure is shown below for hard to 
value firms (Panel A – Idiosyncratic volatility, Panel C – Analyst Dispersion), and for easy to value firms (Panel B – Idiosyncratic volatility, Panel D – Analyst 
Dispersion).  DISTRESS is computed using the methodology in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). OSCORE is computed using the methodology in 
Ohlson (1980).  NETISS is computed as the growth rate of the split-adjusted shares outstanding in the previous fiscal year. COMPISS is computed similar to 
Daniel and Titman (2006). ACCRUAL is computed using the methodology in Sloan (1996). NOA is computed using the methodology in Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, 
and Zhang (2004). MOM is the cumulative returns from month -12 to month -2 similar to Fama and French (2008). Gross profitability premium is measured by 
gross profits scaled by total assets as in Novy-Marx (2013). Asset growth is measured as the growth rate of the total assets in the previous fiscal year, as in 
Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008). ROA is computed similar to Piotroski and So (2012): income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Investment-to-
assets is measured as the annual change in gross property, plant, and equipment plus the annual change in inventories scaled by the lagged book value of assets, 
as in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004). FSCORE is computed using the methodology as Piotroski and So (2012). 
 
  Panel A: Hard to Value firms – Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
N 5,761 5,311 5,549 5,354 5,298 5,532 5,385 5,880 5,537 5,513 5,395 5,018 
Mean 0.1658 0.0197 0.1599 0.0950 0.0575 0.2104 0.5677 0.0720 0.3443 0.0813 0.1381 1.4036 
  Panel B: Easy to Value firms – Idiosyncratic Volatility 
N 9,335 8,897 9,237 9,065 8,839 9,194 9,089 9,509 9,229 9,217 8,995 8,634 
Mean 0.0508 0.0096 0.0790 0.0602 0.0390 0.3104 0.3343 0.0482 0.3791 0.0360 0.3748 1.2400 
             
Mean higher for 
hard to value? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
             
P-value for diff. in 
Means (A vs. B) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.41 0.00 
  Panel C: Hard to Value firms – Analyst Dispersion 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV FSCORE 
N 7,074 6,644 6,921 6,755 6,614 6,899 6,777 7,192 6,909 6,899 6,738 6,431 
Mean 0.1089 0.0159 0.1227 0.0788 0.0487 0.4179 0.4532 0.0628 0.5465 0.0641 0.5022 1.3291 
  Panel D: Easy to Value firms – Analyst Dispersion 
N 5,871 5,578 5,767 5,687 5,560 5,743 5,703 5,989 5,761 5,761 5,614 5,477 
Mean 0.0712 0.0087 0.0877 0.0621 0.0413 0.1402 0.3824 0.0515 0.2011 0.0400 0.0859 1.2365 
             
Mean higher for 
hard to value? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
P-value for diff. in 
Means (C vs. D) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.28 0.00 
 
 84 
 
Appendix Table 13: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions within Value and Growth Firms, 
using Hard to Value Measures 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas for all firms above the NYSE 20th percentile for market 
value of equity on June 30th of year t. I calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions of the excess 
returns against the four-factor model. Average alphas are in monthly percent, p-values are shown below the 
coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced 
each year on July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1.  Firm age is computed using the 
first time a firm enters the CRSP database.  Turnover is computed as the monthly volume divided by the number of 
shares outstanding.  The average of the past 12 month’s turnover is used in this table.  Institutional ownership is 
measured as the percentage of a firm’s outstanding stock that is held by institutional investors on June 30th of each 
year.  The last measure identifies firms as either complicated or simple using the COMPUSTSAT Segments File.  A 
firm is classified as simple if it has 1 segment, and complicated if it has more than 1 segment. The portfolios are 
formed by first identifying value and growth firms. Next, I identify high and low expectation errors using each 
specific expectation error proxy. Last, these portfolios are then split by one of the four hard to value measures (Firm 
Age, Turnover, Institutional Ownership, and Simple vs. Complicated Firms).   The long/short portfolios are long 
value (growth) firms with high (low) expectation errors that are easy/hard to value, and short value (growth) firms 
with low (high) expectation errors that are easy/hard to value.  The p-value of difference uses a Wald test for a 
significant difference between the alpha in the easy to value portfolio versus the hard to value portfolio (column 2 
against column 3, and column 5 against column 6) for each measure.  The time period under analysis is from 
7/1/1976 – 12/31/2012 for firm age and turnover, and from 7/1/1980 – 12/31/2012 for institutional ownership and 
simple versus complicated firms. Regression p-values use robust standard errors as computed in Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993, pg. 553).   
 
 Value  Growth  
 Test 1: Firm Age  Test 1: Firm Age  
 Old Firms New Firms P-value of 
difference 
Old Firms New Firms P-value of 
difference  Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short 
DISTRESS 0.102 0.384 0.438 0.192 0.653 0.188  0.760 0.260 0.585 0.065 
OSCORE -0.154 0.136 0.401 0.262 0.711 0.165  0.604 0.640 0.282 0.024 
NETISS 0.187 0.142 0.879 0.628 0.977 0.223  0.435 0.600 0.001 0.000 
COMPISS 0.494 0.324 0.598 0.645 0.923 0.382  0.035 0.242 0.001 0.001 
ACCRUAL 0.102 0.415 0.418 0.511 0.252 0.372  0.720 0.150 0.026 0.343 
NOA 0.476 0.326 0.679 0.406 1.104 0.050  0.104 0.273 0.099 0.000 
MOM -0.292 0.038 0.433 0.274 1.240 0.009  0.467 0.917 0.315 0.000 
GP 0.229 0.280 0.900 0.664 1.040 0.242  0.485 0.425 0.005 0.001 
AG 0.308 0.287 0.967 0.046 0.575 0.130  0.236 0.343 0.834 0.061 
ROA 0.088 0.529 0.227 0.355 0.929 0.120  0.789 0.108 0.171 0.005 
INV 0.212 0.266 0.866 0.358 0.780 0.228  0.426 0.364 0.067 0.008 
FSCORE 0.471 0.531 0.885 0.351 0.585 0.482  0.154 0.139 0.150 0.049 
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Appendix Table 13: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions within Value and Growth Firms, 
using Hard to Value Measures (Continued) 
 
 Value  Growth  
 Test 2: Turnover  Test 2: Turnover  
 Low Turnover 
High 
Turnover 
P-value of 
difference 
Low 
Turnover 
High 
Turnover 
P-value of 
difference 
 Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short 
DISTRESS -0.103 0.377 0.219 0.104 0.511 0.200  0.752 0.323 0.750 0.127 
OSCORE -0.220 0.000 0.580 0.230 0.776 0.117  0.413 0.999 0.304 0.018 
NETISS -0.075 0.223 0.455 0.387 0.621 0.410  0.773 0.510 0.042 0.012 
COMPISS 0.161 0.640 0.288 0.382 0.675 0.330  0.506 0.087 0.055 0.006 
ACCRUAL 0.310 0.284 0.954 0.481 0.323 0.643  0.261 0.381 0.046 0.242 
NOA 0.173 0.640 0.297 0.158 1.300 0.001  0.601 0.046 0.516 0.000 
MOM -0.254 -0.297 0.927 0.163 1.125 0.005  0.497 0.456 0.549 0.001 
GP 0.023 0.627 0.157 0.456 1.248 0.019  0.939 0.100 0.072 0.000 
AG 0.201 0.429 0.589 0.332 0.104 0.503  0.412 0.226 0.115 0.720 
ROA 0.153 0.349 0.560 0.564 0.847 0.438  0.617 0.300 0.029 0.007 
INV -0.085 0.497 0.103 0.384 0.420 0.912  0.738 0.119 0.059 0.101 
FSCORE 0.152 0.325 0.712 0.623 0.344 0.460  0.652 0.406 0.011 0.322 
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Appendix Table 13: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions within Value and Growth Firms, 
using Hard to Value Measures (Continued) 
 
 Value  Growth  
 Test 3: Institutional Ownership 
 Test 3: Institutional 
Ownership 
 
 High Inst. Ownership 
Low Inst. 
Ownership 
P-value of 
difference 
High Inst. 
Ownership 
Low Inst. 
Ownership 
P-value of 
difference 
 Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short 
DISTRESS 0.168 -0.061 0.587 0.338 0.255 0.825  0.673 0.879 0.349 0.568 
OSCORE -0.327 0.067 0.348 0.164 0.697 0.085  0.391 0.815 0.519 0.006 
NETISS 0.012 0.003 0.992 0.589 0.593 0.984  0.968 0.991 0.006 0.023 
COMPISS 0.182 0.483 0.470 0.680 0.636 0.892  0.575 0.095 0.002 0.015 
ACCRUAL 0.104 0.376 0.456 0.058 0.668 0.122  0.717 0.200 0.828 0.027 
NOA 0.556 0.542 0.954 0.345 0.868 0.114  0.034 0.136 0.151 0.005 
MOM -0.417 -0.044 0.488 0.408 0.333 0.822  0.343 0.916 0.166 0.364 
GP 0.451 0.513 0.872 0.827 1.256 0.181  0.207 0.149 0.002 0.000 
AG 0.395 0.308 0.816 0.335 -0.057 0.329  0.207 0.335 0.182 0.855 
ROA 0.318 0.053 0.590 0.377 1.028 0.104  0.421 0.903 0.172 0.003 
INV 0.265 0.011 0.494 0.355 0.466 0.760  0.403 0.971 0.098 0.097 
FSCORE 0.102 0.331 0.659 0.298 1.026 0.040  0.825 0.344 0.220 0.001 
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Appendix Table 13: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions within Value and Growth Firms, 
using Hard to Value Measures (Continued) 
 
 Value  Growth  
 Test 4: Simple vs. Complicated Firms 
 Test 4: Simple vs. 
Complicated Firms 
 
 Simple Firms 
Complicated 
Firms 
P-value of 
difference 
Simple 
Firms 
Complicated 
Firms 
P-value of 
difference 
 Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short Long/Short 
DISTRESS 0.076 -0.031 0.806 0.333 -0.127 0.231  0.852 0.923 0.393 0.727 
OSCORE 0.404 -0.355 0.105 0.279 0.377 0.762  0.333 0.204 0.294 0.156 
NETISS 0.059 -0.080 0.742 0.461 0.938 0.151  0.873 0.758 0.074 0.000 
COMPISS 0.548 -0.045 0.151 0.455 0.977 0.128  0.105 0.871 0.095 0.000 
ACCRUAL 0.454 0.123 0.513 0.491 0.743 0.539  0.222 0.675 0.074 0.023 
NOA 0.039 0.816 0.088 0.805 0.574 0.536  0.915 0.011 0.006 0.057 
MOM -0.038 -0.731 0.290 0.811 -0.181 0.011  0.943 0.103 0.010 0.603 
GP 0.798 0.241 0.232 1.157 0.756 0.264  0.055 0.512 0.000 0.016 
AG 0.080 0.486 0.332 0.215 0.591 0.392  0.832 0.103 0.423 0.075 
ROA 0.529 0.145 0.371 0.465 0.916 0.294  0.241 0.640 0.133 0.008 
INV 0.316 0.181 0.721 0.183 1.015 0.020  0.380 0.499 0.486 0.000 
FSCORE 0.465 0.358 0.845 0.366 1.004 0.120  0.305 0.323 0.219 0.002 
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ABSTRACT 
 
We propose the use of maximum drawdown, the maximum peak to trough loss across a time 
series of compounded returns, as a simple method to capture an element of risk unnoticed by 
linear factor models: tail risk. Unlike other tail-risk metrics, maximum drawdown is intuitive and 
easy-to-calculate. We look at maximum drawdowns to assess tail risks associated with market 
neutral strategies identified in the academic literature. Our evidence suggests that academic 
anomalies are not anomalous: all strategies endure large drawdowns at some point in the time 
series. Many of these losses would trigger margin calls and investor withdrawals, forcing an 
investor to liquidate10. 
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 Empirical asset pricing research focused on identifying anomalous returns often 
disregards tail-risk metrics. For example, none of the 11 academic studies identified in 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) as the most pervasive academic anomaly studies, include an 
examination of tail-risk in their original analysis. In these research papers, the primary basis for 
proclaiming an “anomaly” is anchored on intercept estimates (i.e., “alpha”) from linear factor 
models, such as the 3-factor Fama and French (1993) market, value, and size model, or the 4-
factor model that includes an additional momentum factor (Carhart (1997)).  The momentum 
anomaly originally outlined in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) illustrates the point that asset 
pricing studies over rely on alpha estimates to claim an anomaly victory.  Jegadeesh and Titman 
showcase large monthly outperformance associated with long/short momentum strategies over 
the 1965 to 1989 time period. The authors fail to mention that the long/short strategy endures a 
33.81% holding period loss from July 1970 until March 1971. When we look out of sample from 
1989 to 2012, there is still significant alpha associated with the long/short momentum strategy, 
but the strategy endures an 86.05% loss from March 2009 to September 2009. An updated 
momentum study reporting alpha estimates would claim victory, an investor engaged in the 
long/short momentum strategy would claim bankruptcy. Tail risk matters to investors and it 
should matter in empirical research. 
There is a well-developed theoretical literature highlighting why tail-risk matters to 
investors such as Rubinstein (1973) as well as Kraus and Litzenberger (1976). In Table 1 we 
highlight with a simple example why tail risk requires researcher attention. Table 1 shows a set 
of statistical measures included in many academic anomaly papers: average monthly returns, 
standard deviation of returns, and a laundry list of linear factor model alphas. We analyze 3 time 
series: 1) the value-weight CRSP index, 2) the value-weight CRSP index with 10 percent alpha 
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injected (we simply add 10%/12 into each monthly return), and 3) the value-weight CRSP index 
with a 10 percent alpha injection, but the index experiences a final return of -100%, or in other 
words, the index goes bankrupt. 
The alpha estimates for the alpha injected series and the alpha injected series with an 
eventual bankruptcy are robust and highly significant alphas across all factor models. The author 
of this research study would proclaim that investing in an eventual bankrupt, high-alpha value-
weight CRSP index rejects the market efficiency hypothesis. The reality is that researchers need 
to include measures of tail risk for a particular strategy before claiming an anomaly victory. 
Our first contribution to the literature is to highlight an easily measurable and intuitive 
tail-risk measure referred to as maximum drawdown. Maximum drawdown is defined as the 
maximum peak to trough loss associated with a time series. Maximum drawdown captures the 
worst possible performance scenario experienced by a buy and hold investor dedicated to a 
specific strategy. The intuition behind maximum drawdown is simple: how much can I lose? 
Maximum drawdowns have received little attention in the academic literature relative to 
common linear factor models such as the CAPM, the 3-factor, and the 4-factor models, or data 
intensive measures designed to capture tail-risk, such as the Harvy and Siddique (2000) 
conditional skewness measure or the Conrad, Dittmar, and Ghysels (2013) option market data 
measure. And yet, the use of maximum drawdown is pervasive in practice. For example, 
PerTrac, the investme 
nt industry leading performance analytics software, showcases drawdowns and statistics 
that use drawdowns (e.g., Calmar and Sterling Ratio), in their software package. Another 
example is from HSBC Private Bank Hedge Weekly newsletter, which features Maximum 
Drawdown alongside Annual Volatility as the only two measures of risk highlighted in the 
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report. Of course, maximum drawdown is not perfect: the measure is an in-sample realization of 
the worst-case scenario, and the measure is not amiable to traditional statistical analysis. 
However, maximum drawdown does serve as a benchmark for how much an investor can lose by 
investing in a strategy. 
Our second contribution to the literature is to highlight the usefulness of the simple 
maximum drawdown measure in the context of academic anomalies. Anomalies are proclaimed 
when the patterns in average stock returns cannot be explained by the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) or more sophisticated factor models, such 
as the Fama-French 3-Factor model or the 4-factor model (Carhart (1997)). Despite robust alpha 
estimates, we find significant maximum drawdowns associated with all long/short asset pricing 
anomalies. The drawdowns are so extreme, that in most of the long/short strategies proposed an 
arbitrageur would suffer margin calls via direct broker intervention or from indirect margin calls 
via forced liquidations by fund investors. In short, anomalies don’t represent proverbial twenty 
dollar bills sitting on the ground; instead, they represent strategies with extreme tail risk. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes drawdown 
calculations. Section II describes the data. Section III provides a performance analysis of 
long/short asset pricing anomalies. Section IV explores drawdowns in the context of long/short 
strategies. Section V concludes.  
[Insert Table 1] 
  
I. Maximum Drawdown 
Maximum drawdown (MDD) is defined as follows: 
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In words, maximum drawdown measures the worst possible peak to trough performance 
within a time series of returns. Throughout our analysis we focus on monthly return 
measurements within our time series, but the technique can also be applied to daily or even intra-
day data.  
Investors care about MDD because it shows, historically, the worst possible scenario. 
Understanding worst possible scenarios is important for investors because it allows an investor to 
identify the required recovery rate to break even with their previous high-water mark. Investment 
managers with compensation contracts tied to high-water marks (e.g., hedge funds) are also 
focused on MDD because it directly ties into their compensation. 
Despite the simplicity and intuitive nature of the MDD, the measure is far from perfect. 
First, MDD will mechanically increase as the sample size increases, because there is more 
probability for extreme return possibilities as the sample increases. One must be careful to 
compare similar time periods when comparing MDD across strategies. Second, MDD only 
measures loss extrema, but says nothing about the frequency of large losses. For example, 
strategy A may have a MDD of -40% and strategy B may have a MDD of -50%, but strategy A 
has multiple -30% drawdowns, whereas strategy B has no drawdowns, save the -50% drawdown 
observed. Strategy A dominates with respect to MDD, but it is unclear that it is less risky than 
strategy B. Conditional value-at-risk (CVAR), or expected shortfall (e.g., Rockafellar and 
Uryasev (2002)), can help in the analysis of the frequency of large drawdowns. 
In Table 2 we highlight historical MDD associated with the value-weight CRSP index, the 
equal-weight CRSP index, and the 10-year Treasury bond. Panel A highlights the actual 
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drawdowns associated with the benchmarks over the July 1, 1963 to December 31, 2012 period. 
The equal-weight CRSP index is the most risky, with a MDD of -59.81%. Panel B shows the 
associated recovery rates required in order to break even after experiencing a drawdown. For 
example, to recover from the -59.81% MDD on the equal-weight CRSP index, an investor would 
require a 148.79% return to reach their previous high-water mark—a heroic achievement by 
most investor’s standards. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
II. Data 
Our data sample includes all firms on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and Nasdaq firms with the required data on CRSP and Compustat. We 
examine the time period from July 1st 1963 until December 31st 2012.  We only examine firms 
with ordinary common equity on CRSP and eliminate all REITS, ADRS, and closed-end funds, 
and financial firms.11  We incorporate CRSP delisting return data using the technique of Beaver, 
McNichols, and Price (2007).   
To be included in the sample, all firms must have a non-zero market value of equity as of 
June 30th of year t.  Stock returns are measured from July 1st 1963 through December 31st 2012. 
Firm size (e.g., market capitalization) is determined by the June 30th value of year t.  Firm 
fundamentals are based on December 31st of year t-1 (for firms with fiscal year ends between 
January 1st and March 31st we use year t fundamentals; for firms with fiscal year ends after 
March 31st we use year t-1 fundamentals).   
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) identify 11 academic anomalies that are the most 
                                                 
11 We perform our analysis while including financial firms and get similar results, which are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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prominent in the literature.  The 11 anomalies are as follows: 
 Financial distress (DISTRESS).  Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2007) find that 
firms with high failure probability have lower subsequent returns. Their methodology 
involves estimating a dynamic logit model with both accounting and equity market 
variables as explanatory variables.  Investors systematically underestimate the 
predictive information in the Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi model, which is shown 
to predict future returns.  DISTRESS is computed similar to Campbell, Hilscher, and 
Szilagyi (2007). 
 O-Score (OSCORE).  Ohlson (1980) creates a static model to calculate the 
probability of bankruptcy.  This is computed using accounting variables.  OSCORE is 
computed using the same methodology in Ohlson (1980). 
 Net stock issuance (NETISS).  Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) show 
that, in post-issue years, equity issuers under-perform matching non-issuers with 
similar characteristics.  The evidence suggests that investors are unable to identify 
that firms prefer to raise capital by issuing stock when equity prices are overvalued.  
We measure net stock issues as the growth rate of the split-adjusted shares 
outstanding in the previous fiscal year. 
 Composite Equity Issuance (COMPISS).  Daniel and Titman (2006) study an 
alternative measure, composite equity issuance, defined as the amount of equity a 
firm issues (or retires) in exchange for cash or services. They also find that issuers 
under-perform non-issuers because investors overlook the signals from repurchases 
and issuance.  We measure COMPISS similar to Daniel and Titman (2006). 
 Total accruals (ACCRUAL). Sloan (1996) shows that firms with high accruals earn 
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abnormal lower returns on average than firms with low accruals. This anomaly exists 
because investors overestimate the persistence of the accrual component of earnings.  
Total accruals are computed using the same methodology as Sloan (1996).   
 Net operating assets (NOA). Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) find that net 
operating assets, defined as the difference on the balance sheet between all operating 
assets and all operating liabilities scaled by total assets, is a strong negative predictor 
of long-run stock returns. Investors are unable to focus on accounting profitability 
while neglecting information about cash profitability.  NOA is computed using the 
methodology in Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004). 
 Momentum (MOM).  The momentum effect was first documented by Jagadeesh and 
Titman (1993).  We calculate the momentum ranking monthly by looking at the 
cumulative returns from month -12 to month -2 similar to Fama and French (2008). 
 Gross profitability premium (GP). Novy-Marx (2010) discovers that sorting on 
gross profit-to-assets creates abnormal benchmark-adjusted returns, with more 
profitable firms having higher returns than less profitable ones. Novy-Marx argues 
that gross profits divided by total assets is the cleanest accounting measure of true 
economic profitability and that investors overlook the investment value of the 
profitability of the firm.  Gross profitability premium is measured by gross profits 
(REVT - COGS) scaled by total assets (AT).  
 Asset growth (AG). Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) find companies that grow their 
total asset more earn lower subsequent returns.  The authors argue that investors 
overestimate future growth and business prospects based on observing a firm’s asset 
growth.  Asset growth is measured as the growth rate of the total assets (AT) in the 
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previous fiscal year. 
 Return on assets (ROA). Fama and French (2006) find that more profitable firms 
have higher expected returns than less profitable firms. Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang 
(2010) show that firms with higher past return on assets earn abnormally higher 
subsequent returns.  Investors appear to underestimate the importance of ROA.  ROA 
is computed as income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by lagged total assets 
(AT).   
 Investment-to-assets (INV). Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Xing (2008) show 
that higher past investment predicts abnormally lower future returns. The authors 
posit that this anomaly stems from investor’s inability to identify manager empire-
building behavior via investment patterns.  Investment-to-assets is measured as the 
annual change in gross property, plant, and equipment (PPEGT) plus the annual 
change in inventories (INVT) scaled by the lagged total assets (AT). 
We calculate monthly alphas on three different factor models.  Three of the factors are 
described in Fama and French (1993): the return on the stock market (MKT), the return spread 
between small and large stocks (SMB), and the return spread between stocks with high and low 
book-to-market ratios (HML).  The fourth factor is the spread between high and low momentum 
stocks (UMD), first described in Carhart (1997).  We get the monthly returns to these four 
factors from Ken French’s website.12  In our Tables, we show the monthly alpha estimates for the 
1-factor (MKT), 3-factor (MKT, SMB, HML), and 4-factor (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD) models. 
For each of the anomaly strategies we use the information available on June of year t to 
sort portfolios and generate returns from July of t to June of year t + 1. The exception is the 
momentum variable, which is recalculated each month to sort portfolios.   
                                                 
12 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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III. Results: Long/Short Strategy Performance Analysis 
We look at the performance of the 11 academic anomalies in Table 3. For each strategy 
we go long the top decile firms ranked on the respective anomaly measure and go short the 
bottom decile of firms. To avoid confusion, the top decile firms are considered the “good” firms, 
and the bottom decile firms are considered the “bad” firms. For example, if we sort firms on 
accruals, high accruals are bad and the low accrual firms are good. In our rankings, the top firms 
are the lowest accrual firms and the bottom firms are the highest accrual firms. As per previous 
research, we identify strong evidence for anomalous long/short zero-investment returns. Alpha 
estimates across all factor models are generally positive and statistically significant. 
Among the competing anomalies, we find that Financial Distress, Momentum, Gross 
Profits, and Return on Assets perform the best when comparing 3-factor alphas.  Table 3, Panel 
A shows monthly 3-factor alphas of 1.52%, 2.23%, 0.87%, and 1.07%, respectively.  The 
outperformance of these measures is robust to the 4-factor model.  The monthly 4-factor alphas 
are 0.85% for Financial Distress, 0.64% for Momentum, 0.70% for Gross Profits, and 0.96% for 
Return on Assets.  The momentum anomaly drops by 71% because the momentum factor 
included in the regression captures most of the variability associated with momentum-based 
returns. 
Looking at the equal-weighted returns, we find that monthly alpha point estimates are 
generally higher.  In Panel B of Table 3 (equal-weight returns), we find that 6 of our anomalies 
have a monthly 3-factor alpha above 1%.  The 3-factor monthly alphas are as follows: Net Stock 
Issuance (1.06%), Composite Issuance (1.05%), Net Operating Assets (1.20%), Momentum 
(1.14%), Asset Growth (1.17%), and Investment to Assets (1.14%).  In general, when looking at 
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the monthly alphas, researchers conclude that these investment strategies are anomalous because 
the returns associated with the strategies cannot be explained by linear factor models. The 
argument against the use of linear factor models is that they are unable to capture the true risk 
factors underlying a specific strategy. We investigate this notion in the next section. 
 [Insert Table 3] 
 
IV. Results: Strategy Drawdown Analysis  
In this section we examine drawdowns for 11 long/short academic anomalies.  We 
calculate maximum drawdowns for each anomaly and provide the dates the drawdown began and 
ended. For comparison, we also provide the return on the long portfolio, the short portfolio, and 
the S&P 500 return over this same time period. In addition, we calculate the maximum 
drawdown across all rolling twelve month periods. This analysis fixes the holding period to 
twelve months and determines the worst possible performance among all rolling twelve month 
periods.  
Panel A of Table 4 examines the maximum drawdowns for the value-weight long/short 
returns.  When looking at the worst drawdown in the history of the long/short return series, we 
find that 6 of the 11 strategies have maximum drawdowns of more than 50%.  The Oscore, 
Momentum, and Return on Assets, endure maximum drawdowns of 83.50%, 86.05% and 
84.71%, respectively!  These losses would trigger immediate margin calls and liquidations from 
brokers. We do find that Net Stock Issuance and Composite Issuance limit maximum 
drawdowns, with maximum drawdowns of 29.23% and 26.27%, respectively. If a fund employed 
minimal leverage, a fund implementing these strategies would likely survive a broker liquidation 
scenario. 
[Insert Table 4] 
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In addition to broker margin calls and liquidations, investment managers face liquidation 
threats from their investors. Liquidations occur for two primary reasons: 1) there are information 
asymmetries between investors and investment managers, and 2) investors rely on past 
performance to ascertain expected future performance (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). To 
understand the potential threat of liquidation from outside investors, we examine the 
performance of the S&P 500 during the maximum drawdown period and the twelve month 
drawdown period for each of our respective academic anomalies. 
In nine out of eleven cases, the S&P 500 has exceptional performance during the largest 
loss scenarios for the value-weighted long/short strategies. In the case of the Net Stock Issuance 
and the Composite Issuance anomaly—the long/short strategies with the most reasonable 
drawdowns—the S&P 500 returns 56.40% and 49.46% during the respective drawdown periods. 
One can conjecture that investors would find it difficult to maintain discipline to a long/short 
strategy when they are underperforming a broad equity index by over 75%. Stories about the 
benefits of “uncorrelated alpha” can only go so far. 
One conclusion suggested by the previous analysis is that arbitrageurs trading long/short 
anomalies are forced to exit their trades at the wrong time. This forced liquidation might create a 
limit of arbitrage: investors are forced to liquidate positions at the exact point when expected 
returns are the highest (i.e., Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). One prediction from this hypothesis is 
that returns to long/short anomalies are high following terrible performance. We test this 
prediction in Table 5.  
Table 5 reports the returns on the 11 academic anomalies following their maximum 
drawdown event. We compute three-, six-, and twelve-month compound returns to the long/short 
strategies immediately following the worst drawdown. The evidence suggests that performance 
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following a maximum drawdown event is exceptional. All the anomalies experience strong 
positive returns over three-, six-, and twelve-month periods following the drawdown event. This 
evidence hints that maximum drawdowns create a limit to arbitrage: The drawdowns trigger 
investors to suffer large scale liquidations and this may force them out of the long/short trade at 
the exact time when the trade has the highest expected returns. 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
V. Conclusions 
We describe an easily measurable and intuitive tail risk measure referred to as maximum 
drawdown. Maximum drawdown is defined as the maximum peak to trough loss associated with 
a time series. Maximum drawdown captures the worst possible in-sample performance scenario 
experienced by a buy and hold investor dedicated to a specific strategy.  
We show the usefulness of the simple maximum drawdown measure in the context of 
academic anomalies. Despite robust alpha estimates, we find significant maximum drawdowns 
associated with all long/short asset pricing anomalies. The drawdowns are so extreme, that in 
most of the long/short strategies proposed an arbitrageur would suffer margin calls via direct 
broker intervention or from indirect margin calls via forced liquidations by fund investors. We 
conclude that academic anomalies may not be anomalous because they suffer from hidden tail 
risks. Moving forward, researchers should include a measure of tail-risk before staking claims of 
anomalous market returns. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Hypothetical Alpha Portfolio 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas and summary statistics for the value-weight CRSP index 
(VW CRSP), the VW CRSP index with 10% alpha (we add 10%/12 to each monthly return), and the VW CRSP 
with 10% alpha and a final monthly return of -100% (VW CRSP w/ alpha & bankruptcy). Portfolios for each 
strategy are rebalanced each year on July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1. The time 
period under analysis is from July 1, 1963, to December 31, 2012.  For each portfolio (column), we show the 
average monthly return and the standard deviation of the monthly returns.  We calculate monthly returns to the 
portfolios and run regressions against linear factor models.  The four factors are: the return on the stock market 
(MKT), the return spread between small and large stocks (SMB), the return spread between stocks with high and 
low book-to-market ratios (HML), and the spread between high and low momentum stocks (UMD). We get the 
monthly factor returns from Ken French’s website. We regress the monthly portfolio returns against the 1-factor 
model (MKT), the 3-factor model (MKT, SMB, and HML), and the 4-factor model (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD).  
Monthly Alphas are calculated, with p-values below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is 
indicated in bold.  All p-values use robust standard errors as computed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, 5. 553). 
 
 VW CRSP VW CRSP w/alpha VW CRSP w/alpha & Bankruptcy 
Average monthly returns 0.0088 0.0171 0.0154 
Standard dev. (monthly) 0.0450 0.0450 0.0614 
1-Factor alpha -0.0001 0.0082 0.0065 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
3-Factor alpha -0.0001 0.0082 0.0069 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
4-Factor alpha -0.0001 0.0082 0.0067 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 2: Max Drawdowns and Associated Recovery Rates 
 
This table reports drawdowns measured over different time periods for the value-weight CRSP index, the equal-
weight CRSP index, and the 10-year Treasury bond. The time period under analysis is from July 1, 1963, to 
December 31, 2012. Maximum drawdown (shown in Panel A) is measured as the worst peak to trough performance 
over the full time series; worst 12-month drawdown is measured as the worst 12-month rolling period performance 
over the full times series; worst 36-month drawdown is measured as the worst 36-month rolling period performance 
over the full times series. Recovery rates (shown in Panel B) represent the return required in order to fully recover 
from a given drawdown. 
 
Panel A: Drawdowns VW CRSP EW CRSP 10-Year Treas 
Worst Monthly Drawdown -22.54% -27.22% -8.41% 
Worst Twelve-Month Drawdown -44.21% -47.48% -17.10% 
Worst Thirty Six-Month Drawdown -41.88% -49.74% -17.03% 
Worst Drawdown -51.57% -59.81% -20.97% 
Panel B: Recovery Rates 
Required Recovery (Worst Monthly) 29.09% 37.41% 9.18% 
Required Recovery (Worst 12-month) 79.25% 90.39% 20.63% 
Required Recovery (Worst 36-month) 72.06% 98.95% 20.52% 
Required Recovery (Worst Drawdown) 106.47% 148.79% 26.54% 
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Table 3: Portfolio Returns to Long/Short Anomaly Strategies 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio regression alphas and summary statistics for long/short anomaly strategies. Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced 
each year on July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1.  The one exception is the Momentum strategy, which is rebalanced every 
month.  The time period under analysis is from July 1, 1963, to December 31, 2012.  Panel A shows the results for the value-weighted portfolios, and Panel B 
shows the results for the equal-weighted portfolios.  For each long/short strategy, we show the average monthly return and the standard deviation of the monthly 
returns.  We calculate monthly returns to the portfolios and run regressions against linear factor models.  The four factors are: the return on the stock market 
(MKT), the return spread between small and large stocks (SMB), the return spread between stocks with high and low book-to-market ratios (HML), and the 
spread between high and low momentum stocks (UMD). We get the monthly factor returns from Ken French’s website. We regress the monthly portfolio returns 
against the 1-factor model (MKT), the 3-factor model (MKT, SMB, and HML), and the 4-factor model (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD).  Monthly Alphas are 
calculated, with p-values below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  All p-values use robust standard errors as computed 
in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, 5. 553). 
 
Panel A: Value-Weighted L/S Deciles 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV 
Average returns 0.0161 0.0048 0.0131 0.0113 0.0107 0.0106 0.0223 0.0108 0.0101 0.0099 0.0110 
Standard dev. 0.0612 0.0572 0.0329 0.0368 0.0426 0.0382 0.0873 0.0490 0.0422 0.0644 0.0330 
1-Factor alpha 0.0127 0.0025 0.0098 0.0090 0.0071 0.0063 0.0196 0.0075 0.0066 0.0079 0.0072 
 0.0000 0.2379 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0013 0.0000 
3-Factor alpha 0.0152 0.0058 0.0086 0.0069 0.0071 0.0076 0.0223 0.0087 0.0027 0.0107 0.0046 
 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0706 0.0000 0.0005 
4-Factor alpha 0.0085 0.0060 0.0079 0.0067 0.0069 0.0072 0.0064 0.0070 0.0025 0.0096 0.0043 
 0.0004 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0005 0.0005 0.1515 0.0000 0.0017 
Panel B: Equal-Weighted L/S Deciles 
 DISTRESS OSCORE NETISS COMPISS ACCRUAL NOA MOM GP AG ROA INV 
Average returns 0.0082 0.0039 0.0152 0.0143 0.0117 0.0156 0.0134 0.0107 0.0179 0.0043 0.0169 
Standard dev. 0.0612 0.0520 0.0374 0.0455 0.0256 0.0359 0.0810 0.0431 0.0386 0.0601 0.0313 
1-Factor alpha 0.0042 0.0003 0.0124 0.0124 0.0075 0.0115 0.0096 0.0067 0.0142 0.0009 0.0133 
 0.1060 0.8807 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0044 0.0002 0.0000 0.6985 0.0000 
3-Factor alpha 0.0048 0.0036 0.0106 0.0105 0.0069 0.0120 0.0114 0.0062 0.0117 0.0029 0.0114 
 0.0743 0.0463 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0005 0.0000 0.1815 0.0000 
4-Factor alpha -0.0021 0.0026 0.0093 0.0090 0.0066 0.0112 -0.0020 0.0053 0.0109 0.0013 0.0103 
 0.5042 0.1908 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5169 0.0044 0.0000 0.5938 0.0000 
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Table 4: Drawdowns associated with L/S strategies 
 
This table reports drawdowns measured over different time periods for the long portfolio (Long Ret), the short portfolio (Short Ret), and the long/short portfolios 
(L/S) associated with different anomalies. Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on July 1st and are held from July 1st of year t until June 30th of 
year t+1.  The one exception is the Momentum strategy, which is rebalanced every month. The time period under analysis is from July 1, 1963, to December 31, 
2012. Panel A shows the results for the value-weighted portfolios, and Panel B shows the results for the equal-weighted portfolios.  Maximum drawdown is 
measured as the worst peak to trough performance over the full time series.  We also calculate the worst 12-month drawdown is measured as the worst 12-month 
rolling period performance over the full times series.  The beginning date (Beg Date) and ending date (End Date) for the worst drawdowns and 12-month 
drawdowns are given in the table below.  Last, we provide the performance of the S&P500 over the same time period as the worst drawdown.  For example, the 
worst drawdown for the value-weighted Financial Distress (DISTRESS) occurs between 10/1/2002 and 5/31/2003.  We show that the S&P500 return over that 
same time period is 19.85%.  We do this for each of the long/short portfolios, given the time period of their maximum drawdown, and the time period of their 
worst 12-month drawdown. 
 
Panel A: Value-Weight 
 Maximum Drawdown Worst 12-month Drawdown 
 Long Ret Short Ret L/S Beg Date End Date S&P500 Long Ret Short Ret L/S Beg Date End Date S&P500 
DISTRESS 6.10% 86.88% -54.21% 10/1/2002 5/31/2003 19.85% -9.77% 38.31% -49.99% 7/1/2002 6/30/2003 0.85% 
OSCORE 19.81% 288.08% -83.50% 9/1/1998 3/31/2004 29.89% 38.36% 128.57% -54.77% 5/1/1998 4/30/1999 22.03% 
NETISS 48.48% 100.43% -29.23% 12/1/2008 3/31/2011 56.40% 40.18% 76.61% -23.29% 4/1/2009 3/31/2010 49.08% 
COMPISS 18.51% 56.85% -26.27% 8/1/1970 5/31/1972 49.46% 46.34% 76.69% -19.82% 4/1/2009 3/31/2010 49.08% 
ACCRUAL -24.75% 31.29% -43.96% 7/1/2005 8/31/2009 -5.29% 32.73% 77.58% -27.73% 5/1/1980 4/30/1981 31.65% 
NOA 48.62% 243.06% -59.91% 3/1/1972 7/31/1981 85.59% -0.40% 32.12% -27.20% 6/1/1979 5/31/1980 18.52% 
MOM 23.73% 281.16% -86.05% 3/1/2009 9/30/2009 45.01% 24.43% 246.77% -84.78% 2/1/2009 1/31/2010 32.94% 
GP 107.52% 325.95% -57.56% 9/1/1998 2/29/2000 46.47% 46.99% 156.04% -48.17% 3/1/1999 2/29/2000 12.24% 
AG -11.20% 52.89% -44.49% 1/1/2007 8/31/2012 13.64% -8.66% 28.89% -29.96% 1/1/2007 12/31/2007 5.76% 
ROA 519.36% 1580.34% -84.71% 5/1/1963 6/30/1983 441.71% 60.26% 186.18% -59.42% 9/1/1998 8/31/1999 39.81% 
INV 1.41% 53.98% -35.57% 10/1/2006 6/30/2008 -0.47% -18.19% 16.35% -30.83% 7/1/2007 6/30/2008 -12.67% 
Panel B: Equal-Weight   
DISTRESS -9.20% 58.90% -80.16% 1/1/2001 6/30/2003 -22.89% 7.40% 75.24% -56.18% 7/1/2002 6/30/2003 0.85% 
OSCORE 1207.90% 2671.20% -79.92% 5/1/1964 7/31/1983 345.79% 33.03% 144.54% -49.56% 1/1/1967 12/31/1967 23.97% 
NETISS 48.85% 134.87% -42.26% 11/1/1998 2/29/2000 27.55% 37.40% 98.24% -35.83% 3/1/1999 2/29/2000 12.24% 
COMPISS 45.00% 159.48% -50.03% 9/1/1998 2/29/2000 46.47% 27.80% 100.19% -41.65% 3/1/1999 2/29/2000 12.24% 
ACCRUAL -51.39% -37.18% -19.33% 11/1/2000 9/30/2002 -41.11% -0.92% 19.30% -17.38% 5/1/1985 4/30/1986 36.77% 
NOA -29.79% 20.97% -41.53% 2/1/2004 6/30/2008 23.79% -11.25% 12.51% -20.81% 3/1/2004 2/28/2005 7.02% 
MOM 116.06% 132.18% -92.99% 1/1/2001 10/31/2009 -5.70% -4.51% 256.39% -83.99% 11/1/2008 10/31/2009 9.77% 
GP 97.57% 251.82% -55.26% 1/1/1999 2/29/2000 13.31% 87.22% 215.01% -52.04% 3/1/1999 2/29/2000 12.24% 
AG -65.81% -50.16% -31.66% 2/1/2004 12/31/2008 -10.91% -36.20% -21.04% -19.38% 7/1/2007 6/30/2008 -12.67% 
ROA 7692.48% 13503.07% -88.88% 10/1/1963 2/29/2000 6962.76% 69.54% 265.18% -66.79% 3/1/1999 2/29/2000 12.24% 
INV -6.54% 37.72% -33.02% 2/1/2004 6/30/2008 23.79% -30.55% -10.32% -22.91% 7/1/2007 6/30/2008 -12.67% 
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Table 5: Returns Following Max Drawdowns 
 
This table reports compound returns measured over different time periods (3-month, 6-month, and 12-month) for the long portfolio (Long Ret), short portfolio 
(Short Ret), and the long/short portfolios (L/S) associated with different anomalies. Portfolios for each strategy are rebalanced each year on July 1st and are held 
from July 1st of year t until June 30th of year t+1.  The one exception is the Momentum strategy, which is rebalanced every month. The time period under analysis 
is from July 1, 1963, to December 31, 2012. Panel A shows the results for the value-weighted portfolios, and Panel B shows the results for the equal-weighted 
portfolios.  Maximum drawdown is measured as the worst peak to trough performance over the full time series. The return series are calculated following the 
maximum drawdown experienced by the long/short portfolio.  For example, the worst drawdown experienced by the Financial Distress (DISTRESS) portfolio 
ends on 5/31/2003 (see Table 4), so the 3-month return below shows the returns to the portfolio from 6/1/2003 – 8/31/2003.  This is done similarly for the 6 and 
12 month returns shown below for each long/short portfolio, based off the end date of their maximum drawdown (see Table 4).   
 
Panel A: Value-Weight 
 3-month Return 6-month return 12-month return 
 Long Ret Short Ret L/S Long Ret Short Ret L/S Long Ret Short Ret L/S 
DISTRESS 18.31% 8.73% 9.11% 35.34% 13.06% 20.35% 41.61% 25.60% 13.21% 
OSCORE 3.57% -1.70% 4.86% -1.90% -16.64% 14.99% 4.70% -15.24% 18.77% 
NETISS 2.70% -2.48% 5.15% -8.53% -24.58% 19.43% 14.37% -11.22% 26.48% 
COMPISS 4.90% -4.54% 9.88% 17.60% 0.39% 17.15% 14.30% -21.60% 43.86% 
ACCRUAL 10.65% 4.93% 5.31% 19.02% 9.87% 8.45% 26.16% 3.54% 21.53% 
NOA -6.44% -10.74% 3.60% -5.24% -17.41% 12.73% -8.47% -36.04% 38.77% 
MOM 13.61% -1.06% 13.59% 26.63% 4.73% 20.00% 30.01% -0.77% 28.93% 
GP -4.22% -40.03% 48.56% 10.26% -30.47% 43.25% -16.18% -68.10% 104.54% 
AG 1.07% -5.65% 6.89% 4.50% -8.58% 13.84% 4.50% -8.58% 13.84% 
ROA -2.67% -11.57% 9.70% -6.67% -18.94% 14.23% -15.90% -37.63% 31.83% 
INV -12.33% -31.14% 23.56% -34.90% -56.03% 38.55% -28.50% -45.96% 20.19% 
Panel B: Equal-weight 
DISTRESS 27.45% 20.56% 6.15% 57.05% 39.72% 13.31% 56.12% 54.33% 2.42% 
OSCORE -9.35% -19.46% 11.72% -9.54% -22.82% 15.94% -21.05% -42.40% 34.51% 
NETISS -4.97% -27.72% 27.23% 3.54% -20.82% 24.04% 13.11% -51.02% 68.99% 
COMPISS -2.60% -28.06% 30.65% 5.40% -21.69% 26.74% 17.38% -52.71% 72.57% 
ACCRUAL 24.06% 9.30% 15.68% 24.76% 10.49% 15.06% 151.50% 85.01% 41.50% 
NOA -14.53% -21.54% 7.94% -35.14% -53.02% 30.01% 7.52% -29.41% 40.00% 
MOM 10.61% 6.26% 3.72% 44.34% 28.12% 12.51% 39.72% 13.17% 23.55% 
GP -21.07% -39.56% 25.59% -9.56% -28.02% 17.37% -18.53% -60.54% 69.27% 
AG 12.09% 6.16% 4.51% 74.70% 61.09% 7.67% 173.43% 96.30% 40.49% 
ROA -11.11% -44.31% 47.13% 2.56% -34.82% 41.04% -11.96% -65.29% 64.41% 
INV -14.43% -26.00% 13.56% -43.02% -56.68% 22.64% -17.63% -35.24% 15.14% 
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It’s a basic research question: Which val-uation metric has historically performed the best?Practitioners have relied on a variety 
of valuation measures, including price-to-earn-
ings ratio (P/E) and the relationship between 
total enterprise value and earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortiza-
tion (TEV/EBITDA). Meanwhile, academic 
research (e.g., Fama and French [1992]) has tra-
ditionally relied on the book-to-market ratio 
(B/M) and the more recent gross-profits mea-
sure (GP), introduced by Novy-Marx [2010].
Eugene Fama and Ken French consider 
B/M a superior metric. They reason:
We always emphasize that different 
price ratios are just different ways 
to scale a stock’s price with a funda-
mental, to extract the information in 
the cross-section of stock prices about 
expected returns. One fundamental 
(book value, earnings, or cash f low) 
is pretty much as good as another 
for this job, and the average return 
spreads produced by different ratios 
are similar to and, in statistical terms, 
indistinguishable from one another. 
We like BtM because the book value 
in the numerator is more stable over 
time than earnings or cashf low, 
which is important for keeping turn-
over down in a value portfolio.1
Fama and French suggest that different 
price ratios are “pretty much as good as 
another for this job” of explaining returns. 
We beg to differ. We find economically and 
statistically significant differences in the per-
formance of various valuation metrics. We 
examine a large swath of pricing metrics, all 
expressed in yield format:
• Earnings to market capitalization 
(E/M)
• Earnings before interest and taxes and 
depreciation and amortization to total 
enterprise value (EBITDA/TEV)
• Free cash f low to total enterprise 
value (FCF/TEV)
• Gross profits to total enterprise value 
(GP/TEV)
• Book to market (B/M)
• Forward earnings estimates to market 
capitalization (FE/M)
During the analyzed period of 1971 
through 2010, we find that EBITDA/TEV 
is the best valuation metric to use as an 
investment strategy, relative to other valua-
tion metrics. (Loughran and Wellman [2009] 
find similar results.) An annually rebalanced, 
equal-weight portfolio of high EBITDA/
TEV stocks earns 17.66% a year, with a 2.91% 
annual three-factor alpha (eliminating stocks 
below the 10% NYSE market-equity break-
point). This compares favorably to E/M, 
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a practitioner favorite that inverts price to earnings, or 
P/E. Cheap E/M stocks earn 15.23% a year, but show 
no evidence of alpha after controlling for market, size, 
and value exposures.
The academic favorite, book to market (B/M), 
tells a story similar to that of E/M. It earns 15.03% for 
the cheapest stocks, but with no alpha. Forward earn-
ings estimates to market (FE/M) is the worst-performing 
metric by a wide margin, suggesting that investors should 
shy away from using analyst earnings estimates to make 
investment decisions.
We make other interesting empirical observations 
about valuation metrics. When we analyze returns’ 
spread between the cheapest and most expensive stocks, 
given a specific valuation measure, we again find that 
EBITDA/TEV is the most effective measure. The 
lowest-quintile returns based on EBITDA/TEV return 
7.97% a year, versus 17.66% for the cheapest stocks—a 
spread of 9.69%. This compares very favorably to the 
E/M spread, which is only 5.82% (9.41% for the expen-
sive quintile and 15.23% for the cheap quintile).
Valuation metrics that incorporate last year’s earn-
ings or forward earnings are interesting, but what about 
long-term valuation metrics? Going back to the 1930s, 
practitioners have promoted the concept of using normal-
ized earnings in place of simple one-year earnings esti-
mates. For example, Graham and Dodd [1934, p. 452] 
speak to the use of current earnings in the context of 
valuation metrics. Earnings in P/E, they said, “should 
cover a period of not less than five years, and preferably 
seven to ten years.”
More recently, academics such as Campbell and 
Shiller [1998], suggested that annual earnings are noisy 
as a measure of fundamental value. Anderson and 
Brooks [2006] conducted a robust study of long-term 
P/E ratios and found evidence that using a long-term 
earnings average (eight years) in place of one-year earn-
ings increases the spread in returns between value and 
growth stocks by 6%. (Their evidence is on the U.K. 
stock market from 1975 through 2003). We are unable 
to replicate this result in the U.S. stock market and find 
mixed results with long-term valuation measures.
DATA
Our data sample includes all firms on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX), and NASDAQ firms with the required data 
on CRSP and Compustat. We only examine firms with 
ordinary common equity on CRSP and eliminate all 
REITS, ADRS, closed-end funds, utilities, and financial 
firms. We incorporate CRSP delisting return data using 
the technique of Beaver, McNichols, and Price [2007]. 
To be included in the sample, all f irms must have a 
non-zero market value of equity as of June 30 of year t. 
We construct our valuation measures according to the 
following formulas:
• Total enterprise value (TEV)
 Similar to the Loughran and Wellman [2011], we 
compute TEV as TEV = Market Capitalization 
(M) + Short-term Debt (DLC) + Long-term Debt 
(DLTT) + Preferred Stock Value (PSTKRV) – 
Cash and Short-term Investments (CHE). This 
variable is used in multiple valuation measures.
• Earnings to market capitalization (E/M)
 Following Fama and French [2001], we compute 
earnings as Earnings = Earnings Before 
Extraordinary Items (IB) – Preferred Dividends 
(DVP) + Income Statement Deferred Taxes 
(TXDI), if available.
• Earnings before interest and taxes and depreciation 
and amortization to total enterprise value (EBITDA/
TEV)
 We compute EBITDA as EBITDA = Operating 
Income Before Depreciation (OIBDP) + Non-
operating Income (NOPI).
• Free cash f low to total enterprise value (FCF/TEV)
 Similar to Novy-Marx [2010], we compute FCF 
as FCF = Net Income (NI) + Depreciation and 
Amortization (DP) − Working Capital Change 
(WCAPCH) − Capital Expenditures (CAPX).
• Gross profits to total enterprise value (GP/TEV)
 Following Novy-Marx [2010], we compute GP 
as GP = Total Revenue (REVT) – Cost of Goods 
Sold (COGS).
• Book to market (B/M)
 Similar to Fama and French [2001], we compute 
Book Equity as Book Equity = Stockholder’s 
Equity (SEQ) [or Common Equity (CEQ) + Pre-
ferred Stock Par Value (PSTK) or Assets (AT) − 
Liabilities (LT )] – Preferred Stock (defined below) + 
Balance Sheet Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax 
Credit (TXDITC) if available.
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• Preferred Stock
 We consider Preferred Stock as = Preferred Stock 
Redemption Value (PSTKRV) [or Preferred Stock 
Liquidating Value (PSTKL), or Preferred Stock Par 
Value (PSTK)].
• Forward Earnings Estimates/Market Capitalization
 Forward Earnings = Consensus I/B/E/S earnings 
forecast of EPS for the fiscal year (available 1982 
through 2010). We used a mean of all analysts’ 
annual forecasts issued between March 31 and June 
30 of year t for each f irm, to capture the most 
recent analyst forecasts.
We restrict our data to include only those firms 
that have eight years of data for all the necessary met-
rics described above (except FE/M). We impose this 
restriction to ensure we can conduct all the necessary 
analysis on a similar universe when we perform long-
term valuation tests. To ensure a baseline amount of 
liquidity in the securities on which we perform our tests, 
we restrict our analysis to firms that are above the tenth 
percentile NYSE market equity breakpoint on June 30 
of each year.
Stock returns are measured from 
July 1971 through December 2010. Firm 
size (e.g., market capitalization) is deter-
mined by the June 30 value of year t. Firm 
fundamentals are based on December 31 
of year t − 1. For firms with fiscal years 
ending between January 1 and March 
31 we use year t fundamentals; for firms 
with f iscal years ending after March 
31 we use year t − 1 fundamentals. We 
sort firms into quintiles on each mea-
sure on June 30 of year t, and use this 
value to compute the monthly returns 
from July of year t to June of year t + 1. 
Equal-weight and value-weight portfolio 
returns are buy and hold.
DATA SUMMARY STATISTICS
Exhibit 1 outlines the summary 
statistics. This exhibit highlights the fact 
that our universe, which includes only 
firms with eight full years of data for all 
the variables, is similar to a universe that 
only requires firms to have one year of 
data. Though the eight-year universe firms are larger than 
the one-year universe firms, we see that B/M, leverage, 
momentum, volatility, and turnover are similar for the 
one- and eight-year universes. We replicate our analysis 
using universes that are less constrained than our require-
ment that all firms have eight years of data. All our results 
are similar.
RESULTS: A COMPARISON OF VALUATION 
METRICS
Valuation Metric Performance
We analyze the compound-annual growth rates 
(CAGR) of each valuation metric during the 1971 to 
2010 period for equal-weight and value-weight port-
folios. Exhibit 2 shows the portfolio quintiles’ returns 
sorted by cheap (quintile 5) and expensive (quintile 1). 
Each valuation metric captures the well-known return 
spread between cheap stocks (value) and expensive stocks 
(growth).
But not all valuation metrics are created equal. For 
example, FCF/TEV does a decent job capturing the 
E X H I B I T  1
Summary Statistics: CRSP Universe Compared to Sample
This exhibit reports summary statistics for CRSP stocks with information on all the 
variables in the exhibit compared to all stocks with eight years of data for all variables 
in the exhibit. The returns are from July 1, 1971 until December 31, 2010. This sample 
excludes financials, utilities, and all f irms below the NYSE 10% market capitalization 
cutoff. These sample statistics do not require firms to have a forward earnings estimate. 
The portfolio is formed each year on June 30 and held for one year. The market value of 
equity (ME) is measured on June 30 each year. B/M is defined as (stockholder’s equity + 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit + preferred stock redemption value) divided by 
ME. Leverage is defined as long term debt divided by the book value of assets (described 
above for B/M). Ret (–2, –12) is the buy-and-hold return from the previous July (t − 1) 
through May (t). Volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns computed over the 
past year (250 trading days). Turnover is the average daily share turnover during the past 
year (250 trading days).
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returns for cheap stocks (16.57%), but has little ability 
to identify low-returning growth stocks (11.03%). How-
ever, high-EBITDA/TEV stocks earn 17.66% relative 
to low-EBITDA/TEV stocks, which earn a meager 
7.97%. On an absolute return basis, evidence suggests 
that EBITDA/TEV is superior to alternative valuation 
measures.2
To assess risk-adjusted performance, we control 
for exposures to market, size, and value, and calculate 
three-factor Fama and French alpha estimates for each of 
the quintile portfolios (see Exhibit 2, Panel B). E/M and 
B/M strategies show no alpha after controlling for the 
three-factor model. This is not particularly surprising, 
as B/M is one of the factors in the three-factor model, 
and B/M and E/M are highly correlated.
Nonetheless, alternative valuation metrics such as 
EBITDA/TEV, GP/TEV, and FCF/TEV actually pro-
vide economically and statistically significant alphas. 
There is also weak evidence that FCF/TEV can iden-
tify overvalued stocks, as evident by the −1.96% alpha 
on the most expensive FCF/TEV quintile. We conduct 
the same analysis over the more recent 1991 to 2010 
period and find similar results (results not shown, but 
available upon request).
The value-weight portfolios show less pronounced 
results compared to the equal-weight portfolios, sug-
gesting valuation metrics are more effective in smaller 
stocks. For example, the value-weight portfolio returns 
for EBITDA/TEV, which put more weight on larger 
stocks, earn a 14.39% return for cheap stocks and an 
E X H I B I T  2
One-Year Valuation-Measure Performance
This exhibit reports return statistics for CRSP stocks with eight years of data for all variables in the exhibit. The returns are from July 1, 1971 
until December 31, 2010. This sample excludes financials and utilities, and all f irms below the NYSE 10% market capitalization cutoff. The 
sample is sorted into quintiles on June 30 of each year, and each portfolio is held for one year. Panel A reports the annual returns (equal and 
value-weighted) for each quintile portfolio based on one of the following valuation measures: E/M, EBITDA/TEV, FCF/TEV, GP/TEV, 
and B/M. Panel A also reports the returns of the equal- and value-weight market. Quintile 1 holds growth stocks, whereas quintile 5 contains 
value stocks. Last, Panel A compares the returns of the value and growth stocks for each valuation measure in the 5-1 row. Panel B reports 
the Fama-French three-factor alpha for each valuation measure sorted again by quintiles. Alphas are monthly estimates times 12. t-statistics 
are shown in brackets below each alpha value in Panel B.
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8.16% for expensive stocks. And though there is no clear 
best strategy for value-weight results, evidence suggests 
that EBITDA/TEV and GP/TEV have the best perfor-
mance, and that all strategies have approximately the 
same return and the same spreads between cheap and 
expensive.
The alpha for value-weight portfolios tells a story 
similar to that of the equal-weight portfolios. There is 
evidence that EBITDA/TEV and FCF/TEV add value. 
EBITDA/TEV has a 2.48% annual alpha and FCF/TEV 
has a 2.22% annual alpha. The other valuation metrics 
have no statistically reliable alpha in the context of the 
Fama and French three-factor model.
VALUATION METRIC RISK
Exhibit 3 presents common risk metrics for the 
valuation measures. Panel A highlights the results for 
cheap stocks (value). The valuation metrics are similar 
in character, although EBITDA/TEV and FCF/TEV 
stand out with favorable Sharpe and Sortino ratios (see 
Exhibit 3, Panel A). For example, EBITDA/TEV has a 
monthly Sortino of 0.26, which compares favorably to 
all other metrics.
Maximum draw-downs are similar across all port-
folios. However, the value-weight EBITDA/TEV and 
FCF/TEV portfolios have maximum draw-downs that 
are considerably smaller than that of the other port-
folios. Overall, the cheapest-ranked stock portfolios 
have risk characteristics that are similar, if not superior, 
to the buy-and-hold, equal-weight, and value-weight 
benchmarks.
With respect to the most expensive stocks (growth), 
the results suggest that buying expensive securities is a 
poor risk-adjusted bet (see Exhibit 3, Panel B). Max-
inum draw-downs, Sharpe ratios, and Sortino ratios are 
uniformly worse for expensive stocks relative to cheap 
stocks, regardless of the valuation metric employed. 
Moreover, on every metric, the expensive stocks under-
perform the buy-and-hold benchmarks.
Exhibit 4 shows the draw-downs for EBITDA/
TEV. Both Panels A and B (value- and equal-weighted 
portfolios) show that “cheap” stocks (value) have better 
drawdown measures than “expensive” stocks (growth), 
or CRSP and SP 500 stocks. Looking at the worst per-
formance over 60 months, we see that “cheap” EBITDA/
TEV stocks vastly outperform the market.
FORWARD-LOOKING ESTIMATES
We repeat our analysis on all one-year valuation 
metrics, to include consensus forward earnings estimates 
to market capitalization (FE/M). The period we analyze 
is from July 1, 1982 through December 31, 2010, due to 
data limitations from I/B/E/S.
The top-ranked FE/M quintile’s performance 
is considerably worse than all other measures.3 For 
example, over the 1982 to 2010 time period the CAGR 
for the top-performing FE/M quintile is 8.63%. This 
compares poorly with the value-weight market return 
of 11.73% and the worst-performing valuation mea-
sure B/M, which earned 13.63% over the same period. 
Moreover, these returns strongly underperformed the 
best performing metric, EBITDA/TEV, which earned 
16.37% from 1982 to 2010. The evidence suggests that 
investors should be wary of using forward earnings esti-
mates in their valuation toolkit.
RESULTS: EXAMINING 
LONG-TERM VALUATION MEASURES
 Long-Term Valuation Metric Performance
The central hypothesis proposed by proponents of 
long-term valuation metrics is that normalizing earnings 
decreases the noise of the valuation signal and therefore 
increases the metric’s predictive power. We test this con-
jecture and highlight the results in Exhibit 5. In each 
column of Exhibit 5 we represent a different perturba-
tion of the long-term valuation metric.
For example, the two-year column uses the two-
year average of the numerator for the valuation metric. 
In the case of EBITDA/TEV, this is represented by the 
following equation:
 
EBITDA
TEV
EBITDA
n
TEVn
jj
n
=
=
∑ 1
(1)
Turning to Exhibit 5, we find little evidence that 
the practice of normalizing the numerator for a valuation 
metric has any ability to predict higher portfolio returns. 
If anything, the evidence suggests that the one-year val-
uation measure is superior to normalized metrics.
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We are also unable to replicate the find-
ings from Anderson and Brooks [2006]. These 
authors find evidence that the use of long-term 
valuation metrics increases the spread between 
value stocks and growth stocks by 6% a year 
in the U.K. stock market. In contrast to their 
results, we find that the spread between value 
and growth stocks is very similar across different 
normalizing periods.
RESULTS: ROBUSTNESS OF VALUATION 
METRICS ACROSS THE BUSINESS
Given the analysis thus far, EBITDA/TEV 
is arguably the best-performing value investment 
strategy, on a risk-adjusted basis. However, one 
can imagine a world in which a particular valua-
tion metric might outperform another measure in 
a particular economic environment. For example, 
cash-focused measures, such as free cash f low, 
might perform better during economic down-
turns than would accounting-focused measures, 
such as earnings. Or perhaps a more asset-based 
measure, such as book value, will outperform 
when the economy is more manufacturing based, 
as it was in the 1970s and 1980s, but struggle 
when the economy is oriented toward human 
capital and services, therefore making asset-based 
measures less relevant.
To test these hypotheses, we analyze dif-
ferent valuation metrics’ returns during economic 
expansions and contractions. Our definitions for 
expanding or contracting economic periods are 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research.4 
Results are shown in Exhibit 6.
Exhibit 6, Panel A presents the returns for 
value strategies during economic expansions. 
B/M enjoys periods of relative outperformance in 
the early 1970s, early 1980s, and in late 2009. The 
B/M performance pattern lends weak evidence 
to the hypothesis that balance sheet-based value 
measures perform better than income or cash-
f low statement value metrics when the economy 
generates more returns from tangible assets such 
as property, facilities, and equipment, relative to 
intangible assets such as human capital, R&D, 
and brand equity. Overall, there is no strong 
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E X H I B I T  4
Draw-Down Analysis for EBITDA/TEV
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E X H I B I T  5
Long-Term vs. Short-Term Valuation Measures
This exhibit reports return statistics for CRSP stocks with eight years of data for all variables in the exhibit. The returns are from July 1, 1971 
until December 31, 2010. This sample excludes financials, utilities, and all firms below the NYSE 10% market capitalization cutoff. The sample 
is sorted into quintiles on June 30 of each year and each portfolio is held for one year. Panels A and B report return statistics based on one of the 
following valuation measures: E/M, EBITDA/TEV, FCF/TEV, GP/TEV, and B/M. The one-year valuation measure indicates that the measure 
is constructed using the current numerator and current denominator for each measure. All other year valuation measures (two to eight years) 
take the average of the numerator over the past N years and divide this average by the current denominator. For example, the eight-year FCF/
TEV measure is constructed by averaging the past eight years FCF for each company (including the current observation), and dividing this by the 
company’s current TEV. Panel A reports the equal-weighted return statistics for the value stocks (quintile 5) for each valuation measure. Panel B 
reports the value-weighted return statistics for the growth stocks (quintile 1) for each valuation measure. Both panels A and B also compare the 
value and growth portfolios by looking at the spread between value and growth.
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evidence that a particular valuation metric 
systematically outperforms all other metrics 
during expanding economic periods.
Exhibit 6, Panel B presents the returns 
for value strategies during economic contrac-
tions. Similar to Panel A’s results, those of 
Panel B suggest a lack of clear evidence that 
a particular value strategy systematically out-
performs all other strategies in contracting 
economic periods. For example, during the 
July 1981 to November 1982 and March 2001 
to November 2001 contractions GP/TEV 
shows strong outperformance, but this same 
metric has the worst performance during the 
December 2007 to June 2009 recession.
Overall, there is little evidence that a 
particular value strategy outperforms all other 
metrics during economic contractions and 
expansions. However, there is clear evidence 
that value strategies as a whole do outper-
form passive benchmarks in good times and in 
bad. The one exception to this rule occurred 
during the April 1975 to June 1981 business 
cycle, a time when a passive small-cap equity 
portfolio performed exceptionally well.
CONCLUSION
Evidence suggests that EBITDA/TEV 
has historically been the best-performing val-
uation metric, an assertion based on a variety 
of analyses. Our analysis of absolute perfor-
mance, risk metrics, and three-factor alpha 
estimates confirms that EBITDA/TEV has 
historically been a superior strategy, but also 
suggests that FCF/TEV can add value to a 
portfolio.
Based on analysis of periods of economic 
contraction and expansion, we find no evi-
dence that a single valuation measure outper-
forms all others in contractions or expansions. 
However, we do find evidence that valua-
tion-based strategies outperform the market 
in both expanding and contracting economic 
environments. Finally, we explore a popular 
concept in the investment community that 
suggests that the use of long-term valuation 
ratios can enhance portfolio performance. In E
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contrast to prior empirical work, we find that long-term 
ratios add little investment value over one-year valua-
tion metrics.
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